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Major depression is a severely debilitating psychiatric condition with high preva-
lence and substantial economic impact. However, its aetiology is largely unknown,
mechanistic understanding remains limited, and treatment outcomes are hard to
predict. Recently, a “computational psychiatry” approach has emerged which em-
braces the idea of using computational models to link brain function, behaviour and
psychiatric illness. This thesis describes the use of computational psychiatry tools
and techniques to advance understanding of abnormalities in decision-making and
neuronal activity associated with depressive illness.
Behaviour during novel reward learning tasks was analysed from patients diagnosed
with major depressive disorder and healthy controls. Formal computational mod-
elling was used to show behavioural impairments associated with depression during
both learning and decision-making phases. Depressed participants displayed lower
memory of rewards and decreased ability to use internal value estimations during
decision-making. Functional MRI results showed decreased reward signals in areas
including the striatum were associated with depression symptoms. Computational
models were used to generate latent variable time-series of internal value estima-
tions which were used for model-based fMRI analyses. Reward value encoding in
hippocampus and rostral anterior cingulate was abnormal in depression and ante-
rior mid-cingulate (aMCC) activity was altered during decision-making. A signal
encoding the difference between the values of the two options was also found in
the aMCC, linking the behavioural model to localised brain function. Depressed
patients showed decreased event-related connectivity between aMCC and rostral
cingulate regions, implying impaired communication between value estimation
and decision-making regions. A large community-based sample of participants
reporting a range of depressive symptoms performed a different probabilistic re-
ward learning task. Mood symptoms were associated with blunted striatal reward
signals. Event-related directed medial prefrontal cortex to ventral striatum effec-
tive connectivity was abnormally decreased related to the severity of depression
symptoms. A generative-embedding machine learning approach was used to clas-
sify never-depressed healthy controls from participants with current or past major
depression. A support vector machine classifier achieved 72% diagnostic accuracy
using estimated connectivity parameters as features.
The thesis replicates previous reports of abnormal depression-related neural activity
in areas including the striatum, hippocampus and prefrontal cortex using novel
reward learning tasks. Findings support the theory about abnormal neural reward
valuation in major depression being a core pathophysiological process which could
be a target for treatment. The thesis also provides important novel evidence for
decreased connectivity between prefrontal and limbic brain regions, and within
iv
different prefrontal areas in depression. It shows how abnormalities in reward
value based decision-making may be related to abnormal reward activation and




Clinical depression has an enormous impact, not only affecting the afflicted but also
their loved ones, employers and the wider society. It is not yet known how exactly
processes in the brain are related to depression and how to objectively identify who
is ill, and it is hard to predict which therapy (if any) would work for a specific patient.
Various groups of participants, including depressed patients, healthy controls, and
participants reporting various depression symptoms, performed decision-making
tasks while in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner. Com-
putational models were used to succinctly describe and compare behaviour of
participants, which revealed decision-making abnormalities in depression. Pa-
tients showed lower memory of previously observed rewards and difficulties using
estimated reward values to guide their decisions. This behaviour was related to
alterations in brain activity of several regions, including areas in the prefrontal
cortex and the basal ganglia, which are known to be involved in value estimation
and decision-making. Connectivity between implicated brain regions, that is the
information flow between them, was estimated. Results indicated impaired com-
munication between value estimation and decision-making regions in depression.
Based on the strengths of connectivity between brain regions, machine learning
was used to classify participants into never-depressed healthy versus current or past
depression groups with 72% accuracy.
The thesis replicates and significantly extends previous reports of abnormal be-
haviour, brain activity and brain connectivity related to major depression. It pro-
vides important evidence for an association between mood symptoms and de-
creased connectivity between brain regions which are implicated in reward value
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Depression is immensely devastating and the common conception of it being mere
“low mood” does not begin to capture the severity of this disease. Those who
have suffered from it tell tales of absolute blackness and hopelessness beyond
measure. “It is like living in a body that fights to survive with a mind that tried to
die.” (Anonymous, 2016). In his memoir, William Styron described his suffering in a
brutally honest way:
“Depression is a disorder of mood, so mysteriously painful and elusive
in the way it becomes known to the self — to the mediating intellect
— as to verge close to being beyond description. It thus remains nearly
incomprehensible to those who have not experienced it in its extreme
mode.”
— William Styron, Darkness Visible: A Memoir of Madness
Indeed, due to its debilitating impact and high prevalence, depression ranks as
one of the greatest burdens on societies around the world (Üstün, Ayuso-Mateos,
Chatterji, et al., 2004). It is extremely costly and responsible for one of the highest
rates of “years lived with disability” (YLDs), only rivalled by other extremely common
diseases such as low back pain and migraine (Vos, Flaxman, Naghavi, et al., 2012;
Vos, Abajobir, Abate, et al., 2017). The World Health Organisation projects that
depression will become the leading cause of disease burden by 2030 (WHO report
20071).
Unfortunately, too little is known about this crushing disease and the general con-
sensus is that clinical practice in psychiatry has not advanced significantly in over
50 years (Stephan, Bach, Fletcher, et al., 2016; Stephan, Binder, Breakspear, et al.,
2016). Treatment outcomes are hard to predict and many patients never fully re-
cover (Steele and Paulus, 2019).
Nevertheless, there is hope. Technology and neuroimaging techniques are advanc-
ing rapidly and are leading to exciting new discoveries about the brain, and finally
allow some long standing theories to be tested. The use of computational models
1https://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/GBD_report_2004update_full.pdf
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and machine learning techniques is especially promising which has given rise to the
field of “computational psychiatry” (Montague, Dolan, Friston, and Dayan, 2012),
which is promising to lead psychiatry into a new “golden age” (Vinogradov, 2017).
There is substantial evidence for behavioural and neuronal abnormalities during the
performance of reward learning and decision-making tasks in depression (see Chap-
ter 2). This thesis uses computational models to succinctly capture participants’
behaviour during such tasks and then combines this modelling with observed brain
activity during the task to test novel hypotheses about depressive illness.
1.1 Computational Models
Computational or mathematical models have been used prominently in many
areas of science and engineering for a long time. Nowadays they are also used
in neuroscience, such as in computational neuroscience. Models can be used
to capture and describe the essence of a concept or system by abstracting and
simplifying it and eliminating unnecessary complexities.
Marr (1982) famously proposed three levels at which an information-processing
device such as the brain should be understood and models can span one or more
of these levels: (a) the computational level, specifying the goal of the computation,
(b) the algorithmic level, explaining how the goal can be achieved, and (c) the
implementation level, specifying how the algorithm can be physically realised. It
should be noted that although the levels are often practically useful, they are not
necessarily complete nor does every published work fit neatly into one of these
three levels.
In this thesis, I model the behaviour and decision making of participants by trying
to find a model which best captures the choices they make during a controlled
experiment. This is then followed by comparing the models (or parameters of these
models) of participants suffering from depression with healthy control participants,
allowing the analysis of how groups differ.
Computational modelling of behavioural data commonly involves a sequence of
steps and I briefly highlight some here. For more detailed descriptions, explanations
and discussion the reader may want to consult one of the many previous introduc-
tions (e.g. see Wilson and Collins, 2019). Here I focus on conceptual understanding.
More mathematical details about the methods used in this thesis are provided in
the appendices and the cited literature.
The first step is usually to design a model (or a model space consisting of multiple
models), ideally in combination with the design of the experiment, to address a
scientific question. It is important not to forget that all models are an approximation,
so in a sense “wrong”, and the more appropriate question is if they can be useful
(see also Box and Draper, 1987).
1.1. Computational Models 3
Once the models are defined and data from the experiment is collected, models
are then “fitted” to the data. This means searching for parameters which result in
a model performance most similar to the observed choice behaviour. There are
different approaches one could take but in this thesis I generally use a maximum
likelihood or maximum a posteriori approach which means I let models assign
a probability to each possible action and then try to maximise the probability of
producing the whole sequence of observed actions. Gradient descent is commonly
used to find these maxima.
While this can be done on a per-participant basis, in this thesis the prior assumption
is sometimes made that in general, participants will behave similarly to one another.
Formally this means that first parameter estimation is performed for each partici-
pant and then all these estimates are combined into a single empirical group level
prior, which is used to constrain subsequent parameter estimations of individuals.
Model comparison is a crucial next step and is used to choose the most parsimo-
nious model, meaning a model which is as simple as possible but no simpler. There
are again different approaches but importantly one should always remember that
model comparison is conditional on the defined model space and so a chosen “best”
model should always be viewed relative to the other “worse” models.
Once a model is selected it can then be used to test the original scientific question.
For example, in this thesis I look at potential differences in estimated parameters
between groups of healthy and depressed participants. These parameters might
correspond to underlying constructs of interest not easily detectable from the raw
behavioural data, such as a “learning rate parameter” intended to capture how fast
participants update their previously held beliefs with new information.
So far, a profoundly important property of the discussed models has been neglected:
they can be simulated to generate artificial data. This can and should be done
throughout the process of computational modelling. Ideally models are simulated
before any real data is collected so that, for example, the researcher can identify how
much data will be needed for reliable parameter estimation and model selection.
The method of “parameter recovery” involves simulating data with known parame-
ters and then recovering the parameters by fitting the model to the generated data.
If the original and recovered parameters are very different it might be an indication
of an underpowered experiment or the use of inappropriate methods. Similarly,
“model recovery” can be used to check if the model comparison procedures works as
intended given a set of data and models. Data is simulated from one of the models
(in turn) and then each model is fitted to the artificial data, and model comparison
is used to identify the best fitting model. If the chosen model is different from the
model which actually generated the data this again might be an indication of a lack
of data, or the choice of an inappropriate model comparison method.
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1.1.1 Computational psychiatry
In recent years computational psychiatry has emerged as a subfield of compu-
tational neuroscience (Huys, Moutoussis, and Williams, 2011; Montague, Dolan,
Friston, and Dayan, 2012; Friston, Stephan, Montague, and Dolan, 2014; Wang and
Krystal, 2014; Maia, 2015; Adams, Huys, and Roiser, 2016; Huys, Maia, and Frank,
2016; Stephan, Bach, Fletcher, et al., 2016; Vinogradov, 2017). It embraces the idea
of using computational models to advance understanding of mental illness with the
goal of improving their prediction and treatment.
Both data-driven (applying machine learning) and theory-driven approaches are
used (Huys, Maia, and Frank, 2016). In these thesis I primarily focus on the latter
approach and use prior knowledge or hypotheses about possible mechanisms to in-
form our work although I also explore machine learning (classification) techniques.
Computational psychiatry is not restricted to a single level of description and, for
example, in this thesis I aim to link (depression-related) behaviour with (abnormal)
neuronal function.
Despite the many promises, computational psychiatry has yet to prove itself by
changing real clinical practice (Stephan and Mathys, 2014). It has been argued
that it is already possible for computational research to have an impact in clinical
settings as for example machine learning techniques make it possible to predict
diagnosis or treatment outcomes (Steele and Paulus, 2019). However, practical
implementation is currently hindered by a lack of routine collection of quantita-
tive data and will require a collective effort from researchers, policy and funding
agencies, and practitioners, and a general cultural change (Steele and Paulus, 2019;
McGuire, Sato, Mechelli, et al., 2015).
1.2 Functional magnetic resonance imaging
In this thesis I analyse functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data. The
use of fMRI has skyrocketed since its development in the early 1990s because it
allows researchers to non-invasively investigate brain activity (Poldrack, Mumford,
and Nichols, 2011; see Figure 1.1). More specifically, it measures changes in the
blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal. When neurons become active
they need more energy including oxygen which is provided to them through a local
increase in blood flow (haemodynamic response). MRI technology depends on
the observation that haemoglobin has different magnetic properties depending on
how much oxygen it is carrying. An MRI scanner can be used to detect these small
changes in the magnetic signal. For more details about the history and physics of
(functional) MRI please refer to previous literature such as Poldrack, Mumford, and
Nichols (2011) who provide a more detailed overview of the history of fMRI and
its relationship to PET imaging and Buxton (2009) who discusses related physical
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concepts in details. In this thesis I am primarily concerned with making inferences
from fMRI data collected while participants performed a (cognitive) task.




















FIGURE 1.1: The number of matches to a PubMed query of
"fMRI"[All Fields] OR "functional MRI"[All Fields] OR
"functional magnetic resonance imaging"[All Fields] AND
("YEAR/01/01"[PDAT] : "YEAR/12/31"[PDAT]) for YEAR between
1992 and 2019. This was inspired by Poldrack, Mumford, and Nichols
(2011) who showed a similiar plot up to 2010.
While the analysis of fMRI data is complex there are dedicated toolboxes and soft-
ware packages such as SPM (Friston, Ashburner, Kiebel, et al., 2007; Ashburner,
2012), FSL (Jenkinson, Beckmann, Behrens, et al., 2012) and AFNI (Cox, 1996)
available which simplify this task. Analysis usually proceeds in two parts, namely
pre-processing and statistical inference, both of which involve a series of steps.
For example, pre-processing commonly includes a step in which the individual
scans (i.e. the time-series of scans which usually means a whole-brain scan roughly
every two seconds) are realigned to account for head movements. The scans of all
individuals also need to be anatomically normalised to a standard template brain
space so they can be compared and used for group analysis. Spatial smoothing and
temporal filtering are used to reduce noise. Visual quality control is routinely used
to spot possible artefacts although this becomes impractical with very large sets
of data which can, for example, affect machine learning performance (Johnston,
Mwangi, Matthews, et al., 2013).
For the statistical modelling a general linear model (GLM) is commonly used. The
BOLD signal acts as the dependent variable and a design matrix defines the experi-
mental design with a row for each scan and a column for each explanatory variable
such as stimulus timings. The parameters are estimated and used to produce con-
trast images for each individual; for example to find areas which are more active
(compared to an implicit baseline) when a stimulus is shown. These “first level”
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images of individuals are then taken to the “second level” to look at overall group
activation or to compare different groups. The “significance” of these activations or
activation differences can be assessed using t-tests, but given the mass-univariate
approach (i.e. one test is run for every single voxel), voxel significance needs to be
corrected for multiple comparisons (Nichols, 2012).
In addition to this “model-free” approach I also use a “model-based” approach
in this thesis (e.g. see Gläscher and O’Doherty, 2010). Importantly, “model-free”
here does not mean the absence of any model (it clearly relies on multiple models,
including the GLM), but rather that it is not incorporating a computational model
of a cognitive process. In the model-based approach such a model is defined and
some aspect of it is incorporated into the GLM. For example, a model about how
participants learn about the values of certain stimuli and how they then use these
values to make decisions is fitted to their behavioural data. A latent (hidden) variable
such as the value of a certain stimulus at each timepoint throughout the experiment
is then extracted and included as regressor in the GLM (after convolution with a
haemodynamic response function). This allows the researcher to find areas of the
brain which are “encoding” this value (i.e. areas with activity which are correlated
with the predicted signal).
Lastly, it is worth mentioning “connectivity” in the brain which is increasingly
becoming a focus in the field (Kahan and Foltynie, 2013). There are at least three
types to distinguish. Structural connectivity refers to the anatomical connections
between regions. This type of connectivity is not directly accessible using fMRI,
but can be studied using diffusion tensor imaging and it can be used as prior to
constrain other types of connectivity (Friston, 2011). Functional connectivity refers
to undirected statistical dependencies (correlations) between regions (Kahan and
Foltynie, 2013). A high functional connectivity between two regions would mean
their BOLD signals show similar fluctuations over the course of an experiment
(Kahan and Foltynie, 2013). Effective connectivity goes a step further and its aim
is to infer directed influence from one region to another. In this thesis I use the
dynamic causal modelling (DCM) framework (Friston, Harrison, and Penny, 2003)
to estimate this directed connectivity. Models are built to describe how activity in
a region (and external stimuli) might change activity in other regions, then model
comparison is used to select the most parsimonious explanation.
1.3 Organisation of this thesis
The aim of this thesis is to use computational modelling and fMRI to investigate
the relationship between depression symptoms, (abnormal) behaviour and brain
activity and connectivity. This work was done in the context of “reward learning”
as there is a large body of evidence suggesting abnormalities are associated with
depression. More specifically, I asked whether mood symptoms are associated with
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(a) anomalous behaviour, (b) blunted striatal response to reward, (c) value encoding
and the use of values during decision making, and (d) a change in the connectivity
related to prefrontal cortex regions.
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on depression from a computational perspective.
It starts by describing symptoms, diagnosis and statistics of the disorder. Existing
theories are introduced, including possible biological underpinnings which also
forms the basis of the work in the following chapters. A number of studies using
computational approaches are reviewed and a ‘case study’ is used to give an example
of the usefulness of computational models.
Chapters 3 and 4 present the results of an fMRI study involving a group of unmed-
icated patients suffering from depression and a group of healthy controls. The
participants had to estimate the probability that a certain fractal would lead to a
rewarding outcome based on a small number of passive fractal-reward association
trials. Intermittently, participants had to make an active choice between (the reward
probability of) one of the observed fractals and an explicit probability displayed as
a (percentage) number.
Chapter 3 describes the behavioural and computational modelling analyses. Pa-
tients performed worse than controls and the modelling revealed that this was
based on impairments during both the passive observation and the active decision
making phases. Specifically, depressed participants displayed lower memory or in-
creased discounting of observed rewards and a decreased ability to use the internal
estimations of the reward probabilities to make decisions.
Chapter 4 builds on these results and examines the neuronal basis for the group
behavioural differences. Specifically, I used model-based fMRI to look at value
encoding and brain activity during decision making and their relationship with
depression. Replicating previous studies, we found blunted striatal reward activa-
tion in the depressed group. Value encoding was decreased in depression within
brain regions including hippocampus and rostral anterior cingulate, regions which
have been reported to show reward value encoding in healthy subjects. An anterior
mid-cingulate region showed increased activity and decreased (functional) connec-
tivity to rostral cingulate regions in depression. Linking the behavioural model to
brain function, this suggests a possible impairment in the communication of value
estimates from rostral to dorsal prefrontal regions.
Chapter 5 expands on this hypothesis of abnormal connectivity but uses Dynamic
Causal Modelling to also infer the directed effect of one brain region on another.
A large community-based sample of participants took part in a reward learning
study and computational modelling of behaviour, model-free and model-based
fMRI, and DCM were used for analyses. Increased depression symptom severity was
associated with decreased medial prefrontal cortex to ventral striatum top-down
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effective connectivity. This is consistent with a number of theories (see Chapter 2)
positing a role of abnormal cortico-limbic connectivity in depression.
Chapter 6 explores how a combination of data-driven and theory-driven (“gener-
ative embedding”) approaches might help with the detection of past or present
depressive episodes. A machine learning classifier was built to differentiate between
never-depressed healthy participants and lifetime depression patients using esti-
mated DCM effective connectivity parameters as input features. A cross-validated
balanced accuracy of 72% was achieved.
Chapter 7 discusses and brings together the different strands of research and shows
how they integrate into previous research and advance the current understanding
of depression. It addresses a number of common limitations within the wider area
of computational research on depression. Finally, it discusses unexplored avenues





This chapter reviews the literature about depressive illness and previous computa-
tional approaches towards this devastating disease which inspired the work described
in the following chapters. The contents of this chapter will appear in a shorter form
as chapter in a textbook: S. Rupprechter, V. Valton, and P. Seriès (2020). “Depressive
Disorders from a Computational Perspective”. In: Computational Psychiatry: A
Primer. Ed. by P. Seriès. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. Chap. 7.
My contributions
A selection of papers to review and the general outline of the textbook chapter were
discussed with my coauthors in the beginning. I drafted the first version of the
chapter which then went through multiple rounds of editing from all authors. I
created Figures 2.1–2.3 and assembled and adapted Figures 2.4 and 2.5 from (Huys,
Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan, 2013). I also wrote the extended version of the
chapter for this thesis.
2.1 Depressive disorders
Depression and anxiety disorders are the two most common psychiatric disorders
world-wide (Alonso, Angermeyer, Bernert, et al., 2004; Ayuso-Mateos, Vázquez-
Barquero, Dowrick, et al., 2001; Üstün, Ayuso-Mateos, Chatterji, et al., 2004; Vos,
Flaxman, Naghavi, et al., 2012) and display a high level of co morbidity: patients
suffering from one of these illnesses are often affected by the other one as well
(Kessler, Berglund, Demler, et al., 2003). In the United States, Kessler, Berglund,
Demler, et al. (2003) estimated the lifetime prevalence of major depressive disorder
(MDD) at over 16%. Similar figures have been reported for Europe at 13% (Alonso,
Angermeyer, Bernert, et al., 2004).
Diagnosis for MDD is commonly based on the Diagnostics and Statistical Manual
of mental disorders (DSM-V; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The manual
lists two core symptoms of MDD: depressed mood and loss of interest or pleasure
(anhedonia), of which at least one has to be present for diagnosis. Other symptoms
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include a significant change in weight, insomnia, hypersomnia, psychomotor ag-
itation or retardation, fatigue or loss of energy, feelings of worthlessness or guilt,
a diminished ability to think or concentrate, and recurrent thoughts of death or
suicide. Overall, five or more symptoms have to be present for at least two weeks,
cause significant impairments in important areas of daily life, and should not be
better explained by other psychiatric disorders. The International Classification of
Diseases (ICD-10; World Health Organization, 1992) has similar criteria for diagnosis
of (single) depressive episodes and recurrent depressive disorder. For research stud-
ies, DSM and ICD diagnoses are frequently established using diagnostic systems
such as the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM disorders (SCID, First, Spitzer,
Gibbon, Williams, et al., 2002 or the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview
(MINI, Sheehan, Lecrubier, Sheehan, et al., 1998).
Patients often show cognitive deficits on a broad range of tasks probing executive
function and memory (Snyder, 2013; Rock, Roiser, Riedel, and Blackwell, 2014), and
impairments often remain (to some degree) after remission (Rock, Roiser, Riedel,
and Blackwell, 2014). Rock and colleagues argue that cognitive impairments should
be viewed as core features of depression rather than secondary symptoms.
Strikingly, according to the DSM definition, it is possible (in theory; although un-
likely in clinical practice) for two people to receive the same diagnosis of MDD
without sharing a single symptom. One MDD patient may experience depressed
mood, weight gain, constant tiredness and fatigue, and regularly think about ending
their life. Another MDD patient may experience anhedonia, lose a lot of weight, and
go through psychomotor and concentration difficulties while being unable to sleep
properly. The existence of these non-overlapping profiles partly stems from the fact
that categories and symptoms of depression originated from clinical consensus and
do not necessarily have a basis in biology (Insel, Cuthbert, Garvey, et al., 2010; Fried,
Nesse, Zivin, et al., 2014).
As a consequence, some research has started to focus on individual symptoms—for
example anhedonia (Pizzagalli, 2014; see also the case study in Section 2.3)—in
addition to categorical group differences. In the clinical and drug trial literature,
Hamilton Depression Rating (HRSD-17) and Montgomery-Åsberg Depression Rat-
ing Scale (MADRS) are two of the most popular rating scales. In research environ-
ments, the Beck depression inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, et al., 1961) is
also a popular choice to measure overall depressive severity and a sub-score can be
extracted from items of the questionnaire to quantify anhedonic symptom severity.
These questionnaires also allow a dimensional (as opposed to categorical) approach,
which is emphasised in current research (see below). Compared to SCID or MINI
these dimensional ratings are not diagnostic and, for example, a high anhedonia
score does not necessarily indicate depression and could be related to substance
use or withdrawal (Destoop, Morrens, Coppens, and Dom, 2019).
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Recently, much cognitive research has focused on decreased sensitivity to reward in
depression. There are at least two important reasons for this focus: First, reward
processing appears to align with a lack of interest or pleasure (anhedonia), a core
symptom of depression and one to which we will come back again in the case study
section of this chapter. Second, reward processes are arguably better understood
than mood processes, both at the neurobiological and at the behavioural level.
Indeed, cognitive neuroscience has started to dissociate and delineate different
sub-domains of reward processing, which can be studied independently in relation
to anhedonia (Treadway and Zald, 2013). For example, “incentive salience” (“desire”
or “want”) can be distinguished from “motivation” and “hedonic response” (enjoy-
ment) and we may want to independently study the association of each of these
sub-domains with depression. For instance, your attention and focus on a piece of
chocolate (a potentially rewarding stimulus) is different from how much you enjoy
the chocolate while you are eating it. These two subdomains may also be indepen-
dent from your willingness to expend effort to obtain that piece of chocolate.
Cléry-Melin, Schmidt, Lafargue, et al. (2011) tested depressed patients and healthy
controls on a task in which they could exert physical effort (through grip force on
a handle) to attain monetary rewards of varying magnitudes. They found that de-
pressed participants did not exert more physical effort to obtain higher rewards (as
opposed to lower rewards). However, they believed they had exerted more effort for
higher rewards, as evidenced by their higher effort ratings. Controls, on the other
hand, objectively exerted more effort for greater rewards, but reported subjectively
reduced effort ratings for higher rewards compared to lower rewards. In another
study (Treadway, Bossaller, Shelton, and Zald, 2012), participants were able to ob-
tain varying amounts of money if they managed to make a large number of button
presses within a short time window. Depressed patients exerted less effort (made
less button presses) than controls in order to obtain reward. Together these studies
suggest that depression, and anhedonia in particular, may be related to impair-
ments in the motivation and willingness to exert effort for rewards. This may also
explain why behavioural activation therapies have been reported to work well for
depressed patients: these practices specifically target decreased motivation (Tread-
way, Bossaller, Shelton, and Zald, 2012). However, how such psychological therapies
can be applied successfully in real clinical environments and how effective they are
for severe depression is still debated (DeRubeis, Hollon, Amsterdam, et al., 2005;
Cuijpers, Straten, Bohlmeijer, et al., 2010; Driessen, Cuijpers, Hollon, and Dekker,
2010).
Some researchers have advocated for a network analysis approach to psychopath-
ology, in which major depression and other psychological disorders are conceptu-
alised as clusters of causally connected symptoms (Borsboom and Cramer, 2013).
This drops the assumption that symptoms stem from a single latent cause, but
acknowledges that current psychiatric classifications are not arbitrary as they label
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groups of symptoms which create “reliable patterns of covariance” (Borsboom and
Cramer, 2013).
It is difficult to set a boundary between healthy and pathological mood and indeed
it is unclear whether such a boundary exists at all (Ruscio, 2019). There does not
appear to be a discontinuity at the MDD diagnostic threshold (i.e. five symptoms)
and sub-threshold levels of symptoms can come with noticeable impairment and
may predict escalation and relapse (Ruscio, 2019). Currently, however, there is no
consensus about how to reconcile this apparent continuum of pathological mood
with clinical diagnoses and treatment (Ruscio, 2019).
Recently, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) in the US launched the
Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project to create a framework for research in
psychiatry (Insel, Cuthbert, Garvey, et al., 2010). Rather than defining categories
of disorders, RDoC uses a dimensional system which recognises the full range of
observable behaviour and neurobiological function. It groups research into dif-
ferent domains including positive valence systems, negative valence systems and
cognitive systems. Each of these can then be studied using different “units” of anal-
ysis, including genes, neural circuits and behaviours. In the future, a practitioner
could then supplement a diagnosis of “major depressive episode” with behavioural
and neuroimaging data from a reward-based learning task to determine the best
treatment (Insel, Cuthbert, Garvey, et al., 2010). However, at least in the near future,
RDoC is not expected to replace DSM or ICD, but rather co-exist beside them to
guide research while being continually updated and improved (Insel, Cuthbert,
Garvey, et al., 2010; Lilienfeld and Treadway, 2016).
2.1.1 Cognitive theories of depression
An early influential theory, inspired by a wealth of animal studies, is that of learned
helplessness (Seligman, 1972; Maier and Seligman, 1976; Abramson, Seligman, and
Teasdale, 1978). The theory suggests that continued exposure to aversive (stressful)
environments over which animals do not have any control lead to behavioural
deficits similar to those observed in depression. In such a framework, the patients’
distress is believed to stem from their perception of a lack of control over the en-
vironment and ensuing rewards or penalties. This, in turn, could explain patients’
distress and lack of motivation to initiate actions. Stress has been proposed as a
mechanism for memory impairments in depression (Dillon and Pizzagalli, 2018)
and Pizzagalli (2014) hypothesised that dysfunctional interactions between stress
and the brain reward system can lead to anhedonia.
A complementary and not necessarily alternative influential theory about depres-
sion concentrated on “negative biases” involved in the development and mainte-
nance of depression (Beck, 2008), and which led to the emergence of cognitive be-
havioural therapies (CBT). This line of research hypothesised that negative schemas
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about the self, the world, and the future form due to adverse early-life experiences.
According to this framework, negative schemas could lead patients to downplay the
magnitude of positive events, or attribute negative valence to objectively neutral
events. Patients would effectively perceive the world through “dark tainted” glasses.
A recent extension of this cognitive theory suggested that negative biases play a
causal role in the development and maintenance of depression (Roiser, Elliott, and
Sahakian, 2012): both low-level perceptual and reinforcement biases and high-level
cognitive control biases could influence negative schemas. It has also been sug-
gested that common antidepressant medications target the negative, presumably
bottom-up perceptual biases rather than targeting mood directly (Harmer, Good-
win, and Cowen, 2009). This would be consistent with observations that while
medications typically have an effect at the synapse level within hours, recovery
from depression is often more gradual and can take several weeks (Roiser, Elliott,
and Sahakian, 2012). In contrast, CBT is proposed to work in a top-down manner,
helping to improve and re-learn affective cognitive control, negative schemas and
expectations (Roiser, Elliott, and Sahakian, 2012).
An alternative extension of Beck’s cognitive theory by Joormann and colleagues
emphasised the role of deficits in emotion regulation in depression (Joormann
and Vanderlind, 2014; Joormann and Stanton, 2016). Most (first) major depres-
sive episodes follow a significant negative life event, but only few people who live
through such events develop the disorder (Joormann and Stanton, 2016). These ob-
servations, they argue, point towards the importance of emotional self-regulation in
MDD (Joormann and Stanton, 2016) and they refer to a substantial amount of litera-
ture showing a distortion of emotion regulation strategies in depression (increased
rumination and suppression, decreased distraction and reappraisal). Underlying
these emotion regulation difficulties may be biases in attention, interpretation and
memory which can all be linked to the emotional response, and deficits in cogni-
tive control, which may hinder an improvement of these strategies (Joormann and
Stanton, 2016).
Overall, there is large overlap between the different theories of depression. Most
cognitive theories place a large emphasis on biases influencing emotional pro-
cessing (Gotlib and Joormann, 2010), but some differ in their explanation of the
development of these biases; for example whether they develop in response to
early stressful life experiences (Beck, 2008; Pizzagalli, 2014) or stem from biased
perceptual and reinforcement processes (Roiser, Elliott, and Sahakian, 2012). A lack
of control (real or imagined) could contribute to the emergence and maintenance
of such biases.
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2.1.2 Biological basis for depression
Helen Mayberg was one of the earliest to point out that rather than depression being
related to the failure of a single brain region, it is likely to be a system wide disorder
affecting multiple regions and the pathways between them (Mayberg, 1997; May-
berg, Lozano, Voon, et al., 2005; Mayberg, 2009). Mayberg and colleagues proposed
a circuit model of depression in which regions are grouped into four clusters reflect-
ing impaired dimensions in depression (Mayberg, 2009): Medial prefrontal cortical
regions (“mood regulation”, active cognitive control, reinforcement, contingencies),
dorsal and parietal cortical regions (“exteroception”, attention, appraisal, action),
ventral limbic regions including subgenual cingulate, anterior insula, hippocam-
pus, and brainstem (“interoception”, drive states, autonomic function, circadian
rhythms), and other subcortical regions including amygdala, ventral striatum, cau-
date, thalamus and midbrain / ventral tegmental area (“mood monitoring”, novelty,
salience, learning, habit).
These regions have been highlighted in a large number of functional imaging studies,
and Mayberg focused on the subgenual section of the anterior cingulate, Brodmann
area 25, which is interconnected with many of them and had been found to be
hyperactive in (treatment resistant) major depression (Mayberg, 2009). This region
was the target of a deep brain stimulation trial involving six treatment resistant
MDD patients of which four were deemed to show sustained remission (Mayberg,
Lozano, Voon, et al., 2005) which led to the initiation of additional stimulation
studies (Mayberg, 2009). The trial ultimately did not work as it did not result in
statistically significant differences between stimulation and control groups and was
halted early (Holtzheimer, Husain, Lisanby, et al., 2017).
Disner, Beevers, Haigh, and Beck (2011) reviewed Beck’s cognitive model and pro-
posed an underlying neurobiological system largely consistent with Mayberg’s lim-
bic-cortical dysregulation model. Two key processes were identified which initiate
and sustain cognitive biases. An impaired bottom-up pathway, involving a hyper-
active amygdala, the subgenual cingulate, ACC, striatum (blunted NAc response
and abnormal caudate and putamen functioning), and hippocampus ending in the
frontal lobe, leads to abnormal responses to emotional stimuli. An impaired top-
down pathway, from the PFC through anterior cingulate and thalamus and ending
in subcortical regions, is related to diminished cognitive control which allows biases
to persist.
Several neurotransmitters, most commonly serotonin and dopamine, are impli-
cated in reward and punishment processing in depression (Eshel and Roiser, 2010).
Dopamine is implicated in reinforcement learning processes (Schultz, 2002) and
has consistently been associated with depression in humans and animals (Pizzagalli,
2014). Serotonin has long been implicated in the processing of aversive stimuli,
response inhibition and learned helplessness and depression may be related to a
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failure of stopping such aversive processes (Deakin, 2013). Antidepressant med-
ications have their most obvious effect altering brain serotonin levels (Eshel and
Roiser, 2010).
Deakin and Graeff (Deakin and Graeff, 1991; Deakin, 2013) made a number of pre-
dictions regarding the involvement of the serotonin system in depressed mood and
anxiety. Instead of conceptualizing depression as a serotonin deficit disorder, they
proposed an overactive dorsal raphe nucleus (DRN) which would affect amygdala
and striatum with overactive projections and an underactive median raphe nucleus
with underactive projections to the hippocampus (Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin, et al.,
2015).
Notably, Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin, et al. (2015) used a combined loss-avoidance
and win-gain paradigm and found neuroimaging results consistent with Deakin and
Graeff’s predictions in treatment resistant depression. DRN and amygdala activity
was significantly increased and nucleus accumbens decreased in patients. During
loss events, depressed individuals failed to regulate the hippocampus resulting in
overactivity and this was also correlated with BDI (depression severity) and HADS-A
(anxiety severity) scores.
Dopamine is heavily linked to reward processing and the role of blunted dopamine
transmission in depression has received much attention (Pizzagalli, 2014). This
could potentially help explain behavioural and neuroimaging reports of abnormal
prediction-error based reinforcement learning (Kumar, Waiter, Ahearn, et al., 2008),
but direct human evidence of reduced dopamine transmission during reward learn-
ing tasks is missing (Pizzagalli, 2014; Dunlop and Nemeroff, 2007). Pizzagalli (2014)
hypothesised that stress affects dopamine (reward) pathways which could induce
anhedonia leading to depression.
A large number of neuroimaging studies have repeatedly revealed associations
between depressive mood and changes in activation of various brain regions (Bartra,
McGuire, and Kable, 2013; Zhang, Chang, Guo, et al., 2013; Chase, Kumar, Eickhoff,
and Dombrovski, 2015; Keren, O’Callaghan, Vidal-Ribas, et al., 2018). Hyperactivity
of the amygdala in response to or anticipation of sad or negative stimuli in MDD has
consistently been found, consistent with the conception that the amygdala is part
of the emotion generation and regulation system (Joormann and Stanton, 2016).
Another part of the emotion generation system is the ventral striatum (Joormann
and Stanton, 2016) and multiple studies have shown blunted reward responses in
this area (Bartra, McGuire, and Kable, 2013; Keren, O’Callaghan, Vidal-Ribas, et al.,
2018; Pizzagalli, 2014).
Reduced activation of other subcortical regions, including caudate, putamen, and
thalamus during reward processing in MDD has been reported (Zhang, Chang, Guo,
et al., 2013; Bartra, McGuire, and Kable, 2013; Keren, O’Callaghan, Vidal-Ribas,
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et al., 2018). Gradin, Kumar, Waiter, et al. (2011) described decreased reward value
encoding in the hippocampus in treatment resistant depression.
Prefrontal areas are frequently conceptualised as higher level processing parts,
exerting cognitive control and regulating emotions (Joormann and Stanton, 2016).
The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) are
implicated in the representation of internal values (Chase, Kumar, Eickhoff, and
Dombrovski, 2015). Depression is associated with abnormal activation in these
regions (Pizzagalli, 2014; Cléry-Melin, Jollant, and Gorwood, 2018), possibly related
to abnormal use of reward values during decision-making (see Chapters 3 and 4).
As described previously, abnormal connectivity between prefrontal cortical and lim-
bic/subcortical areas is assumed to play a major role in the onset and continuation
of depression (Mayberg (2009), Joormann and Stanton (2016), Pizzagalli (2014), and
Roiser, Elliott, and Sahakian (2012) and see also Chapter 5).
There is some evidence for volume changes in depression in various areas including
amygdala, hippocampus, and prefrontal areas (Mayberg, 2009). Particularly note-
worthy are large meta-analyses which have concluded that MDD is associated with
reduced hippocampal volume (Schmaal, Veltman, Erp, et al., 2016) and alterations
in cortical thickness, especially in OFC (Schmaal, Hibar, Sämann, et al., 2017). How-
ever, there is considerable variability in findings of changes in volume (Mayberg,
2009), and it is important to note that acute lesions in these areas do not seem to
initiate depressive symptoms (Mayberg, 2009).
Genetics and environmental influences likely play important roles in the aetiology
of depression (Sullivan, Neale, and Kendler, 2000). A genome-wide association
study identified 44 significantly associated genomic regions with depressive symp-
toms (Wray, Ripke, Mattheisen, et al., 2018) which was increased to approximately
100 loci in a recent follow-up meta-analysis (Howard, Adams, Clarke, et al., 2019).
However, effect sizes are small and the explained variance is typically less than
2% (Wray, Ripke, Mattheisen, et al., 2018) which means these effects will likely not
be useful for individual patient predictions in the near future (Steele and Paulus,
2019).
2.1.3 Treatment
One of the reasons why advances in this field are desperately needed is because
existing treatment options are inadequate for many patients (Taghva, Malone, and
Rezai, 2013; Culpepper, 2010).
It has been reported that treatment of depression is ineffective in about half to two
thirds of patients (Culpepper, 2013; Cohen and DeRubeis, 2018). Recently, a large
study in the United States concluded that only about a third of adults who had been
positively screened for depression actually received treatment and only roughly a
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third of adults who did receive treatment for depression had screened positive for
the disorder (Olfson, Blanco, and Marcus, 2016), revealing the inappropriateness
and mismatch between diagnosis and treatment of depression.
The most common treatments are antidepressant medication and psychotherapy
(Olfson, Blanco, and Marcus, 2016) and the combination of the two may further
enhance recovery (Khan, Faucett, Lichtenberg, et al., 2012). Typical antidepressant
classes include selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI), selective serotonin-
norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors (SNRI), tricyclic antidepressants (TCA), and
monoamine oxidase (MAO) inhibitors (Shultz and Malone Jr, 2013). Behavioural
therapies typically focus on targeting negative cognitive biases, thoughts and beliefs,
to improve emotion regulation (Beck, 2008; Joormann and Stanton, 2016).
Some studies indicate that deep brain stimulation for treatment resistant depres-
sion might become a viable therapeutic option, but results are still inconsistent
and further work is needed to improve target selection (Taghva, Malone, and Rezai,
2013). Subgenual cingulate (Mayberg, 2009) and ventral striatum are two promising
targets, but small changes of the exact location might lead to substantially different
outcomes (Taghva, Malone, and Rezai, 2013). Other possible therapies for treat-
ment resistant depression include transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). Advantages of such stimulation techniques in
comparison to lesioning procedures (for example, anterior cingulotomy; Steele,
Christmas, Eljamel, and Matthews, 2008) include reversibility and the possibility of
adjusting features such as the stimulation frequency (Taghva, Malone, and Rezai,
2013), but rely on permanently implanted hardware.
Treatment selection is a difficult problem and there currently is no obvious way to
choose a treatment for a particular patient and it can take many months to Find
a treatment which works (Steele and Paulus, 2019). It has been suggested that
neuroscience techniques could be used to make clinically useful predictions about
treatment outcomes without necessarily understanding the underlying nosology
or mechanisms (Steele and Paulus, 2019). Recently, the availability of larger and
larger amounts of data has enabled machine learning approaches to be used for
treatment outcome predictions with some initial success (Chekroud, Zotti, Shehzad,
et al., 2016).
2.2 Past and current computational approaches
A variety of different computational approaches, ranging from connectionist and
neural networks, to drift diffusion models, reinforcement learning and Bayesian
decision theory, have been used to study the behaviour of MDD patients. I will
briefly describe some of the findings from each of these approaches as well as more
recent models of mood.
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2.2.1 Connectionist models
One early approach that has been used to model depression is a connectionist
approach, which is inspired by the idea that complex functions can naturally arise
from the interaction of simple units (“neurons”) in a network.
Siegle, Steinhauer, and Thase (2004) asked groups of depressed and healthy indi-
viduals to perform a Stroop colours naming task. In this task, colour words are
presented on each trial with different ink colours matching or not matching the
word (e.g. the word “red” written in blue ink), and participants have to name the
ink colour while refraining from reading the word itself (Figure 2.1). The task is
typically used to probe attentional control. Pupil dilation measurements were used
as an indicator for cognitive load, because pupils reliably dilate under cognitively
demanding conditions (Siegle, Steinhauer, and Thase, 2004). Previous studies had
shown impairments within groups of depressed subjects, but the nature of these
impairments varied, with patients sometimes showing slower responses and other
times increased error rates. Siegle, Steinhauer, and Thase (2004) found similar per-
formance patterns for the two groups, but differences in pupil dilation. Depressed
individuals showed decreased pupil dilation, consistent with decreased cognitive
control. A neural network was used to identify possible mechanisms that could
have resulted in these group differences. The modelling suggested that decreased
prefrontal cortex activity could lead to the observed cognitive control differences in
this experiment. Such a disruption might also explain attentional deficits commonly
observed in depression (Siegle, Steinhauer, and Thase, 2004).
blue
FIGURE 2.1: A sketch of the Stroop colour-naming task, as used
by Siegle, Steinhauer, and Thase (2004). Participants had to respond
by indicating the colour of the ink of the word (here red), while ignor-
ing the written word (here blue).
Siegle and Hasselmo (2002) provided another example of how neural network mod-
els can be used to better understand deficits in depression during (negatively biased)
emotional information processing. The task considered was one where emotional
word stimuli were observed, which participants had to label as positive, negative,
or neutral. Patients typically show biases in emotional information processing, for
example quicker responses to negative information (Siegle and Hasselmo, 2002).
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A neural network model was used to simulate classification of emotional stimuli.
It could reproduce the typically observed behaviour of depressed patients: it was
quicker to identify negative information than positive information and showed
larger sustained activity when confronted with negative words. Different mecha-
nisms could lead to these observed abnormalities in the network, including over-
learning of negative information, which can be related to rumination, i.e. the ten-
dency to repetitively think about the causes, situational factors, and consequences
of one’s negative emotional experience. A network that had over-learned on nega-
tive information could be retrained using positive information (akin to a cognitive
behavioural therapy), which resulted in the normalisation of network activity in
response to negative information. The longer the network had “ruminated”, the
longer it took for the “therapy” (i.e. retraining) to work, providing insights into the
recovery from depression using CBT and its interactions with rumination. Siegle
and Hasselmo (2002) therefore suggested that rumination can be predictive of treat-
ment response and should be routinely assessed in depressed individuals. Based
on Siegle’s work, a simulation study looked at the impact of hippocampal atrophy
in depression (Gradin and Pomi, 2008). They reported evidence for links between
atrophy and both cognitive impairments and the maintenance of depression, con-
sistent with a large meta-analysis which reported reduced hippocampal volume in
MDD (Schmaal, Veltman, Erp, et al., 2016).
2.2.2 Drift diffusion models
Drift diffusion models (DDMs) have also been used to better understand the mech-
anisms underlying depressive illness. These models are especially useful when the
modelling of reaction time and accuracy in combination is of primary interest.
For example, Pe, Vandekerckhove, and Kuppens (2013) modelled behaviour on
the emotional flanker task to analyse negative biases in depression. In this task,
participants are shown a positively or negatively valenced word that they are asked
to classify according to valence. The central stimulus is flanked by two additional
words with positive, negative or neutral valence (Figure 2.2). The authors hypothe-
sised that higher depressive symptomatology and rumination (as measured by self
report questionnaires) are related to negative attentional biases (i.e. a bias towards
negative target words). Classical analyses showed that the higher the rumination
score, the stronger the facilitation effect (computed from accuracy scores) of nega-
tive distracters on negative targets and the weaker the facilitation effect of positive
distracters on positive targets. After controlling for depression, only the former
effect remained. A DDM analysis on the other hand revealed more effects involving
the drift rate, which corresponds to the rate at which information is being processed.
The drift rate was negatively correlated with rumination scores on trials where a
negative target word was flanked by positive words and was positively correlated
with rumination scores on trials where negative words flanked a negative or positive
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word. After controlling for depression scores, rumination still predicted attentional
bias for negative information, but depression scores were no longer predictive af-
ter controlling for rumination. The computational modelling therefore revealed
that rumination was associated with an enhanced processing of words flanked by








FIGURE 2.2: A sketch of two types of trials of the emotional flanker
task, as used by (Pe, Vandekerckhove, and Kuppens, 2013). Partici-
pants had to classify the word in the centre according to its valence.
(A) An incongruent trial, in which the target word love and the flank-
ing word abuse have differing valence. (B) A congruent trial, in which
the valence of the flanking word is the same as the valence of the
target. (Note that Dutch, four letters long, monosyllabic words were
used by Pe, Vandekerckhove, and Kuppens (2013)).
In addition to negative biases, depression is also associated with impairments in
executive function (Snyder, 2013). Dillon, Wiecki, Pechtel, et al. (2015) used a com-
bination of three drift diffusion processes to account for behaviour on a different
(non-emotional) version of the flanker task. In this version, stimuli and distracters
were three arrows pointing left or right. The central and flanking arrows could
either be congruent (pointing in the same direction) or incongruent. Depressed
and healthy participants had to indicate the direction of the arrow in the middle.
The authors’ goal was again to address inconsistent findings of previous studies,
which had sometimes found enhanced executive functioning in depression during
tasks that demand careful thought. Depression can lead to increased analytical
information processing (c.f. rumination), which results in worse performance dur-
ing tasks requiring fast decisions, but can also lead to increased accuracy when
careful approach is necessitated and reflexive responses need to be inhibited. Dillon,
Wiecki, Pechtel, et al. (2015) found that depressed participants were more accu-
rate but slower than controls on incongruent trials. They decomposed behaviour
on the flanker task into three different mechanisms that might be affected by de-
pression, and which were modelled by separate drift diffusion processes: (1) a
reflexive mechanism biased to respond according to the flankers, (2) a response
inhibition mechanism able to suppress the reflexive response, and (3) executive
control responsible for correct responses in the presence of incongruent flankers.
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The analysis of model parameters showed that the drift rate for the executive control
mechanism was lower in depression, which on its own would lead to slower, but
also less accurate responses. However, this executive control deficit was offset by
an additional decreased drift rate in the reflexive mechanism. This could explain
impaired executive function but highly accurate responses in MDD (Dillon, Wiecki,
Pechtel, et al., 2015).
One more example comes from Vallesi, Canalaz, Balestrieri, and Brambilla (2015),
who used DDMs to better understand deficits in the regulation of speed-accuracy
trade-offs in depression. At the beginning of each trial, a cue signalled whether
participants should focus on speed or accuracy. It was found that MDD patients,
unlike controls, adjusted their decision threshold based on the instructions for the
previous trial, with speed instructions decreasing the decision boundary (indepen-
dently of the cue for the current trial). That is, patients had difficulties overcoming
instructions from the previous trial and flexibly switching between fast and accurate
decision-making. In addition, drift rates within the patient group were generally
lower than in the control group, indicating a slowing down of cognitive processing,
which is commonly found in MDD patients.
2.2.3 Reinforcement learning models
In reinforcement learning models, behaviour is captured on a trial-by-trial basis.
An agent makes a decision based on some internal valuation of the objects in the
environment, observes an outcome, and then uses this outcome to update the
internal values. There exists substantial behavioural and neural evidence, often
supported by computational modelling, for impaired reinforcement learning during
depression (see Chen, Takahashi, Nakagawa, et al., 2015 for a review).
Chase, Frank, Michael, et al. (2010) fitted a Q-learning model to the behaviour
of MDD patients and healthy controls on a probabilistic selection task. On each
trial, one of three possible stimulus pairs was displayed and participants had to
choose one of the stimuli, which were followed by positive or negative feedback
according to different probabilities. They did not find evidence for their initial
hypothesis that patients would preferentially learn from negative outcomes due
to a tendency in depression to focus on negative events. Participants’ anhedonia
scores, however, negatively correlated with positive and negative learning rate
as well as the exploration-exploitation (softmax) parameter. The study therefore
provided evidence that depression, and specifically anhedonia, is related to altered
reinforcement learning. Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan (2013) performed a
meta-analysis on the Signal Detection Task (Pizzagalli, Jahn, and O’Shea, 2005).
In contrast to the previous study, they concluded that anhedonia is principally
associated with blunted sensitivity to reward as opposed to an impaired ability to
learn from experienced rewards. The task and their approach is covered in more
detail in the case study section below.
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Temporal difference (TD) prediction-error learning signals have been linked to the
firing of dopamine neurons in the brain (Montague, Dayan, and Sejnowski, 1996;
Schultz, 1998; Schultz, 2002; O’Doherty, Dayan, Schultz, et al., 2004) and there exists
substantial evidence that these neurons play an important part in the experience
of pleasure and reward (Dunlop and Nemeroff, 2007). Using fMRI and a Pavlovian
reward-learning task, Kumar, Waiter, Ahearn, et al. (2008) investigated whether TD
learning signals would be reduced in MDD patients. The authors indeed found
blunted reward prediction error signals in the patient group and additionally a
correlation between such blunting and illness severity ratings. This provides a link
between an impaired physiological TD learning mechanism and reduced reward
learning behaviour as observed in anhedonia.
The previous study by Kumar, Waiter, Ahearn, et al. (2008) investigated Pavlovian
learning during which participants passively observed stimulus-outcome associ-
ations. An early study to look at instrumental learning through active decision-
making in depression was performed by Gradin, Kumar, Waiter, et al. (2011). Stimuli
were associated with different reward probabilities, which slowly changed. Predic-
tion errors and expected values of a Q-learning model were regressed against fMRI
brain activity. Compared to healthy controls, depressed patients did not display
behavioural differences. However, physiologically they showed reduced expected
reward signals as well as blunted prediction error encoding in dopamine-rich ar-
eas of the brain. This blunting correlated with anhedonia scores. This shows that
model-based fMRI can reveal differences in reward learning; even in the absence of
behavioural effects.
2.2.4 Bayesian decision theory
At a more abstract level, Bayesian decision theory (BDT) has been used to explain
common symptoms of depression such as anhedonia, helplessness and pessimism
(Huys, Vogelstein, Dayan, and Bottou, 2008; Trimmer, Higginson, Fawcett, et al.,
2015; Huys, Daw, and Dayan, 2015). Bayesian decision theory allows formulation of
optimal behaviour during a task and then analysis of how sub-optimal behaviour
can arise.
Huys, Vogelstein, Dayan, and Bottou (2008) fitted a Bayesian reinforcement learning
model to the behaviour of depressed and healthy participants in two reward learn-
ing tasks. Importantly, their formulation of the model included two parameters,
describing sensitivity to reward and a prior belief about control (cf. helplessness).
Higher values of the control parameter corresponded to stronger beliefs about the
predictability of outcomes following an action. Individuals who believe they have
a lot of control over their environment would predict that previously rewarded
actions will likely be rewarded again, while someone with a low control prior would
expect weaker associations between action and reward. Huys, Vogelstein, Dayan,
and Bottou (2008) then showed how a linear classifier could be used to distinguish
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between healthy and depressed participants after they had played a slot machine
game, based purely on the two values of individuals’ parameters. This suggests that
model parameters obtained by fitting a behavioural task, such as a probabilistic
learning task, could be used to classify MDD to a high accuracy. The objective
classification of illness is an important goal of computational psychiatry (Stephan
and Mathys, 2014).
A comprehensive evaluation framework formulated through BDT was introduced
by Huys, Daw, and Dayan (2015), in which they discuss how depressive symptoms
can arise from impairments in utility evaluation and prior beliefs about (the control
over) outcomes. They theorised that it is primarily model-based reinforcement
learning, rather than model-free learning, which is abnormal in depression.
A theoretical description of how optimal decision-making can lead to (seemingly)
depressed behaviour and inaction similar to learned-helplessness in a probabilistic
environment can also be found in (Trimmer, Higginson, Fawcett, et al., 2015). They
concluded that to understand a patient’s current depressed behaviour, the history
of the individual should be considered by describing it much further back in the
past than what is the current norm. Imagine, for example, that Bob gets fired from
his job due to “corporate restructuring” due to an economic crisis. Further, no other
company seems interested in hiring while the economy is in this downswing, which
is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. Best efforts and repeated attempts
to get a new job fail and adverse events in the environment increase (e.g. he loses
friends or family or becomes homeless). Bob starts to learn that his actions do not
seem to influence his environment. Negative outcomes appear unavoidable and
over time his willingness to try to escape his situation decreases. Distressed and
desperate, Bob starts to show symptoms reminiscent of depression. He has “learned
to be helpless”.
2.2.5 A model of momentary happiness
Rutledge, Skandali, Dayan, and Dolan (2014) developed a computational model to
describe healthy participants’ “momentary happiness” during a decision-making
task including gain and loss components. Subjects repeatedly chose between a fixed
option which would always result in the indicated outcome and a risky option which
would yield one of two possible indicated outcomes with equal probabilities. After
every two to three trials, participants were asked to rate their current happiness on
a sliding scale. Overall earnings increased over the course of the experiment but
overall happiness did not change although trial-by-trial variance was observed. The
computational model which best described the variation in happiness over time
indicated that momentary happiness was best described as a function of recent
reward expectations and prediction errors, rather than simply as a function of recent
rewards.
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The model has been applied multiple times and it has been shown that activity in
the ventral striatum is correlated with future happiness ratings and that fluctuations
in momentary happiness can reliably be related to expectations, rewards and RPEs
in a quantitative fashion (Rutledge, Skandali, Dayan, and Dolan, 2014; Rutledge,
Skandali, Dayan, and Dolan, 2015; Rutledge, De Berker, Espenhahn, et al., 2016;
Eldar, Rutledge, Dolan, and Niv, 2016).
Based on previous studies (c.f. Sections 2.1.2-2.2.3) linking depression to altered re-
ward prediction errors and dopamine function, the same computational happiness
model was used in an fMRI study as well as a large smartphone-based study both
including MDD subjects and healthy controls (Rutledge, Moutoussis, Smittenaar,
et al., 2017). Depression did not reduce the emotional impact of RPEs on happiness,
but the estimated base happiness was significantly negatively associated with sever-
ity of depression symptoms. In contrast to earlier studies (Kumar, Waiter, Ahearn,
et al., 2008; Gradin, Kumar, Waiter, et al., 2011), RPE signals in the ventral striatum
were not significantly different between groups. Rutledge, Moutoussis, Smittenaar,
et al. (2017) concluded that the underlying dopaminergic system responsible for
producing RPEs (Rutledge, Skandali, Dayan, and Dolan, 2015) is likely intact in
depression and previous results (Pizzagalli, Holmes, Dillon, et al., 2009; Kumar,
Waiter, Ahearn, et al., 2008; Gradin, Kumar, Waiter, et al., 2011; Robinson, Cools,
Carlisi, et al., 2012) may reflect other downstream changes in the brain’s reward
learning system (e.g. see Kumar, Goer, Murray, et al., 2018). This also supports the
previously mentioned idea that depression is primarily characterised by altered
goal-directed decision-making and model-based reasoning (Huys, Daw, and Dayan,
2015). Importantly, there was no learning and no ambiguity involved in the task
used by Rutledge, Skandali, Dayan, and Dolan (2014) and Rutledge, Moutoussis,
Smittenaar, et al. (2017), and altered ventral striatal signals from previous studies
may be related to an impairment in the model-based system active during rein-
forcement learning. While the computation of the (dopaminergic) prediction error
may not fundamentally be affected in depression, the inputs to the computation
might be different in depression (see also the concept of reward sensitivity in the
case study described in Section 2.3), especially when task and environment are com-
plex. Depression is associated with learning abnormalities, especially in rewarding
contexts, and the disorder might be related to difficulties in estimating or keeping
track of uncertainty (Pulcu and Browning, 2019).
The precise mathematical description of the generative process which results in (a
change in) happiness ratings has the advantage of showing exactly what is formally
described in the model. For example, as pointed out by Pulcu and Browning (2017),
a possible influence of (negative) self-appraisal is not considered. It also becomes
clear from the model that it can only describe momentary changes in emotional
state, but not long-term changes in mood which will be important to consider when
studying depression. Repeatedly asking participants how they feel during a task
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may also result in “demand effects” as they might believe they should report higher
happiness after a win (Pulcu and Browning, 2017). It is perhaps a bit surprising
that small unexpected rewards or losses could repeatedly change subjects’ emo-
tional state from “very unhappy” to “very happy” and back within minutes. These
considerations might also help explain the fact that although participants reported
variations in momentary happiness, their overall mood did not change between
start and end of the experiment. The monetary compensation earned throughout
the task did not appear to change overall happiness at all. It is worth noting that in
a study involving successful mood induction (Vinckier, Rigoux, Oudiette, and Pes-
siglione, 2018) the model best describing mood variation did not include expected
value or RPEs but only the effect of (positive and negative) feedback. Nevertheless,
the computational approach of describing momentary changes in happiness is
promising and has been shown to work well within both healthy and ill participants
(Rutledge, Skandali, Dayan, and Dolan, 2014; Rutledge, Moutoussis, Smittenaar,
et al., 2017). It is now necessary to look at longer time-scales (i.e. long-term mood
rather than momentary happiness) and study how variations in mood can be related
to major depression (see Eldar, Roth, Dayan, and Dolan, 2018 for initial work looking
at mood variation within healthy participants during a period of seven days).
In this thesis I assume that the mood of participants remains essentially stable over
the course of the experiments. More specifically, I assume that any small variation
in the mood of a participant would not change their depression severity rating. In
the study described in Chapters 3 and 4 participants were not shown the potentially
rewarding outcomes after their choices so (the lack of) feedback should not have
influenced their momentary mood. More interestingly, in Chapter 5 I describe a
study in which participants did receive rewards (in the form of points) depending on
their choices and the study also included an element of (lack of) control. Although
it is possible that their momentary happiness changed following the outcomes and
their corresponding prediction errors, we assumed that any such variation would
not (systematically) change their self-reported depression severity ratings.
2.3 A case study: How does reward learning relate to anhe-
donia?
This section will provide a “case study” of the use of computational modelling in de-
pression: a meta-analysis published by Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan (2013)
of a behavioural task that has consistently revealed reward-learning impairments in
depressed and anhedonic individuals and other closely related groups.
Anhedonia is a core symptom of depression. Different behavioural tasks have been
used to show that reward feedback objectively has less impact on participants who
subjectively report anhedonia (Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan, 2013). How-
ever, there are different ways through which such a relationship could be realised.
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The goal of the meta-analysis was to find out whether anhedonia was principally
associated with the initial rewarding experience of stimuli, or the subsequent learn-
ing from these rewards. The two mechanisms are important to disentangle, as they
would likely correspond to distinct aetiologies and different strategies for therapies
(Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan, 2013).
2.3.1 Signal detection task
The Signal Detection Task (see Figure 2.3) consists of many (often 300) trials. In
each trial one of two possible stimulus pictures (cartoon faces) is shown and the
participant is prompted to indicate which picture was observed. This can be quite
difficult, because the stimuli look very similar—they only differ slightly in the length
of their mouth—and are only displayed for a fraction of a second. If participants
correctly identify a stimulus, they sometimes receive a reward (e.g. in the form of




FIGURE 2.3: A sketch of the signal detection task (Huys, Pizzagalli,
Bogdan, and Dayan, 2013). On each trial participants observe one of
two possible cartoon faces which only differ slightly in the lengths
of their mouths. They have to indicate which face they observed.
The reward structure is asymmetrical with one of the stimuli being
rewarded more frequently than the alternative.
The most important aspect of the task is the asymmetrical reward structure. Unbe-
knownst to participants, one of the stimuli (called the “rich” stimulus) is followed
by reward approximately three times as often as the alternative “lean” stimulus. If
participants are not certain about the stimulus, they can incorporate knowledge
about their reward history into their decision and choose the rich stimulus so as to
maximize their chances to accumulate rewards. Healthy individuals have consis-
tently shown to develop a response bias towards the rich option (Huys, Pizzagalli,
Bogdan, and Dayan, 2013).
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Using the Signal Detection Task, Pizzagalli, Jahn, and O’Shea (2005) found a reduced
ability in (healthy) participants with high depression (BDI) scores to adjust their
behaviour based on their reward history, while low BDI participants developed a
stronger response bias towards the rich stimulus. Similarly, worse performance has
been observed in MDD patients (Pizzagalli, Iosifescu, Hallett, et al., 2008), stressed
individuals (Bogdan and Pizzagalli, 2006), euthymic (i.e. neutral mood) bipolar
outpatients (Pizzagalli, Goetz, Ostacher, et al., 2008), as well as volunteers receiving
medication (Pizzagalli, Evins, Schetter, et al., 2008), and even healthy participants
with a history of MDD (Dutra, Brooks, Lempert, et al., 2009; Pechtel, Dutra, Goetz,
and Pizzagalli, 2013).
These studies used signal detection theory and summary statistics from raw be-
haviour to analyse the data. Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan (2013) extended
this by using trial-by-trial reinforcement learning (RL) modelling to better under-
stand the evolution of the behaviour through time, and get to a finer granularity in
the analysis of the behaviour.
While anhedonia has been associated with a diminished ability to use rewards to
guide decision-making (such as in studies listed above), there exist varied possibili-
ties for this impairment. Of primary interest in this case study was the distinction
between the primary reward sensitivity, the immediately experienced consumma-
tory pleasure following reward, and the learning from reward. Huys, Pizzagalli,
Bogdan, and Dayan (2013) included these two factors as parameters into a reinforce-
ment learning model. Figure 2.4 shows how changes in either reward sensitivity (ρ)
or learning rate (ε) could lead to the empirically observed changes in response bias.
2.3.2 A basic RL model
A standard Q-learning update rule incorporates learning rate in the following way:
Qt+1(at, st) = Qt(at, st) + ε× δt (2.1)
where st is the displayed stimulus on trial t, at is the action on trial t (i.e. which
button was pressed), Qt(at, st) denotes the internal value assigned to the stimulus
action pair (at, st) at trial t, r ∈ 0, 1 is the observed outcome, and δt = ρr−Qt(at, st) is
the prediction error. Note that Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan (2013) included
a reward sensitivity parameter ρ that scales the true value of the reward. A lowering
of the learning rate ε increases the time needed to learn about the stimulus-action
pairs, while a lowering of the reward sensitivity ρ alters the asymptotic (average)
values of Q that are associated with each pair.
In addition, Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan (2013) included a term, γI(at, st),
encoding participants’ ability to follow the task instructions (i.e. press one key for
the short mouth stimulus, and the other key for the long mouth stimulus), where:
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FIGURE 2.4: Modeling the signal detection task. Response bias on
simulated data (adapted from Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan
(2013)). Three blocks of 100 trials were simulated and the develop-
ment of the response bias is shown across these blocks in each bar
chart. On the left, a typical pattern of group differences is shown,
with controls developing a strong response bias over the three blocks,
and patients showing a reduced bias. The middle chart shows how
a reduced reward sensitivity (ρ) could lead to these observed differ-
ences. The right chart shows how a reduced learning rate (ε) could
also lead to similar differences.
I(at, st) = 1 if stimulus st required action at, and
I(at, st) = 0 if action at is the wrong response to stimulus st.
Higher values for the parameter γ indicate a better ability to follow instructions
and will result in generally higher accuracy. The two terms for I and Q were added
together to form a “weight” for a particular stimulus-action pair (on trial t):
Wt(at, st) = γI(at, st) +Qt(at, st) (2.2)
These weights are related to the probability of choosing action a when stimulus s
was presented. From the above equation we can see that the probability of choosing
an action does not only depend on following the task instructions (I), but also on
the internal value based on previous experience (Q). Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and




1 + exp(−(Wt(at, st)−Wt(āt, st)))
(2.3)
Wt(āt, st) is the weight associated with choosing the wrong action for stimulus s at
trial t. The softmax gives the probability that individuals choose the correct action
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given a certain stimulus. While individuals’ parameters are not directly accessible,
it is possible to infer them by fitting the model to their sequence of actions, i.e. by
finding parameters that maximize the probability that the model would produce a
similar sequence of actions when presented with the same sequence of stimuli.
2.3.3 Including uncertainty in the model
The above model ignores one central aspect of the Signal Detection Task: stimuli
are only displayed very briefly and so participants can never be certain about which
of the two stimuli they actually observed. To account for perceptual uncertainty
about the stimulus, Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan (2013) expanded the model
to assume that when participants compute their internal weights that guide their
decision, they incorporate the possibility for both stimuli to have been presented.
This leads to an updated equation for the weights, which now includes a term for
stimulus s as well as a term for the alternative stimulus s:
Wt(at, st) = γI(at, st) + ζQt(at, st) + (1− ζ)Qt(at, s̄t) (2.4)
Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan (2013) used the parameter ζ to capture the
average certainty (i.e. their belief) about which stimulus they actually observed, and
called this model “Belief”.
2.3.4 Testing more hypotheses
Reinforcement learning models can be used to describe specific hypotheses about
the behaviour of participants while performing the task. Model comparison then
allows one to find the model that “best fits” the data, by which is generally meant
that the model is neither too simplistic nor too complex and can explain how the
data was generated. Usually, model comparison is used to test different hypotheses,
heuristics, or strategies that participants may employ to solve the task. One other
such hypothesis about performance in the Signal Detection Task is that participants
could feel as if they are being punished when they do not receive a reward on a given
trial. In the models described above, the reward r was coded as 1 or 0 (presence
or absence of reward). Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan (2013) changed the
model to test the possibility that participants would perceive a lack of reward as
punishment by including a punishment sensitivity parameter ρ−. The prediction
error term therefore becomes
δt = ρrt + ρ
−(1− rt)−Qt(at, st) (2.5)
A final possibility is that participants might completely ignore the stimuli and
only focus on the values of actions. Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan (2013)
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formalised an “Action” model by setting the ζ parameter of the model “Belief” (in
Eq. 2.4) to 0.5, which results in the weights equation randomly. Huys, Pizzagalli,
Bogdan, and Dayan (2013) then attempted to relate the estimated model parameters
to measures of depressive symptoms severity, and in particular to anhedonia. The
authors used the anhedonic depression (AD) questionnaire and an anhedonia sub-
score from the BDI. They performed a correlation analysis to investigate whether
primary reward sensitivity (ρ) or learning (ε) was most associated with anhedonia
(Figure 2.5B). They found a negative correlation between ρ and AD, but no significant
correlation between ε and AD. This suggested that reward sensitivity rather than
learning rate is primarily impaired in anhedonic depression.
FIGURE 2.5: Results of the signal detection task (adapted from Huys,
Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan (2013)). (A) Results of the model com-
parison. Compared to the three alternative models, the model “Belief”
was shown to be the most parsimonious explanation for the data. (B)
Linear correlation coefficients between anhedonic depression and
reward sensitivity (left; significant at p < .05) and learning rate (right;
not significant) parameters. (See Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan
(2013) for details on this hierarchical regression analysis.)
2.3.5 Limitations
There are limitations to these results. For example, Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and
Dayan (2013) found that reward sensitivity and learning rate were strongly negatively
correlated, meaning changes in one of the parameters could be compensated by
changes in the other parameter. The authors addressed this by showing that the
relationship between AD and reward sensitivity (but not learning rate) remained
significant in the majority of simulated data-sets (i.e. choices simulated using the
estimated parameters). In addition, they reported that the significant correlation
remained after orthogonalising reward sensitivity parameter with respect to the
learning rate parameter. Nevertheless, the two parameter can, at least to some
extent, explain similar features of the data, and future work will need to address
this using a different tasks. Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan, 2013 did not
provide exact details of some of the estimated statistics such as the estimated linear
coefficients and their scales of the hierarchical regression model. It is possible that
a slight increase in power would have led to an additional positive association of AD
with learning rate (c.f. Figure 2.5).
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Additionally, the reward sensitivity parameter could not be distinguished from a
temperature parameter typically included in the softmax decision rule. Indeed, in
the formulation of the model these two parameters could be substituted for each
other exactly. This means that differences in the reward sensitivity parameter might
have masked differences in the exploration-exploitation behaviour of participants.
Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan, 2013 found a negative correlation between
ρ and anhedonic depression but no significant correlations between ρ and BDI
anhedonia subscore. This is surprising given the strong correlation between the
two questionnaires and further increases the difficulty of interpreting the presence
or absence of associations between (correlated) questionnaire scores and (corre-
lated) model parameters. More work is required to pinpoint which depression and
anhedonia symptoms are related to a difference in reward sensitivity and in which
contexts this association is important. Notably, when individual data-sets of this
meta-analysis were analysed separately it was shown that neither model parame-
ter categorically separated any of the groups (such as MDD patients from healthy
controls; Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan, 2013).
One aspect of reward processing that the study did not explore is effort, which is a
large part of everyday decision making. Because in the signal detection task partici-
pants always have to exert the same amount of effort (a button press) independent
of the stimulus they chose, it was not possible to address this here.
2.4 Discussion
Depression is a devastating disease with a major societal impact and rising preva-
lence (Vos, Flaxman, Naghavi, et al., 2012), which make it an important area of study.
Due to unclear boundaries between categorical definitions of psychiatric disor-
ders, current research often focuses on dimensional measures such as neuroticism
or depression symptoms such as anhedonia, both of which have been identified
as promising endophenotypes of depression (Pizzagalli, 2014). However, it has
been noted that anhedonia itself encompasses various subdomains (e.g. hedonic
response to pleasurable stimuli, but also motivation to pursue such stimuli) and
these also need to be teased apart (Treadway and Zald, 2013).
Patients suffering from depression routinely display impairments in a range of dif-
ferent experimental paradigms (Snyder (2013), Rock, Roiser, Riedel, and Blackwell
(2014), and Chen, Takahashi, Nakagawa, et al. (2015) and see also Chapter 3). Differ-
ent computational tools and techniques (connectionist models, diffusion models,
reinforcement learning techniques, Bayesian decision theory) have been used to
describe this (abnormal) behaviour and brain activity in depression, to gain insight
into cognitive and neural processes, and to make predictions.
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An important aim for computational psychiatry is the development of compu-
tational assays that can be used to separate patients into subgroups, generate
treatment recommendations, and make predictions for the outcome of those treat-
ments (Stephan, Bach, Fletcher, et al., 2016; Stephan and Mathys, 2014; Chekroud,
Zotti, Shehzad, et al., 2016). As Huys, Maia, and Frank (2016) put it, “Aspects of
decision-making that have predictive value may become useful for the guidance
of treatment or for alternative (and complementary) classifications of psychiatric
disorders and individual patients.” Reinforcement learning has been described as
especially promising in this regard (Hitchcock, Radulescu, Niv, and Sims, 2017) and
has indeed shown potential for classification of depression from purely behavioural
data without the need for (subjective) questionnaires (Huys, Vogelstein, Dayan, and
Bottou, 2008).
Commonly observed pessimistic cognitive biases and thoughts in depression have
been explained using prior beliefs within the framework of Bayesian decision the-
ory (Huys, Daw, and Dayan, 2015; Stankevicius, Huys, Kalra, and Seriès, 2014).
Simulations of neural network models have shown that biases could arise from a
combination of different mechanisms including over-learning of negative informa-
tion and rumination (Siegle and Hasselmo, 2002). Drift diffusion models have been
used to explain how aberrant behaviour relates to executive control deficits (Dillon,
Wiecki, Pechtel, et al., 2015; Vallesi, Canalaz, Balestrieri, and Brambilla, 2015) and
rumination (Pe, Vandekerckhove, and Kuppens, 2013).
RL models in which behaviour is fitted on a trial-by-trial basis make it possible to
measure group differences in behaviour that are not obvious from raw data. The
described case study (Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan, 2013) pooled data from
various studies using the same experimental paradigm and fitted different reinforce-
ment learning models according to hypotheses of the behaviour of participants. The
goal was to better understand anhedonia and how it is related to aberrant reward
processing. Results indicated that the symptom is primarily associated with the
initial experience of reward, rather than the reward learning mechanism.
At a neuronal level, there is substantial evidence that dopamine neuron activ-
ity encodes reward prediction errors (among other things; Schultz, 1998; Iglesias,
Tomiello, Schneebeli, and Stephan, 2017). Work by Kumar, Waiter, Ahearn, et al.
(2008) and Gradin, Kumar, Waiter, et al. (2011) revealed that in depression prediction
error signals appear reduced in the striatum and other dopamine rich regions of
the brain, suggesting that symptoms of depression are associated with an abnormal
encoding of reward learning signals.
It is worth noting that in the meta-analysis of Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan
(2013), the authors found the two parameters of interest (reward sensitivity and
learning rate) to be highly negatively correlated. Small changes in one of the pa-
rameters could therefore be compensated by changes in the other parameter, and
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Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan (2013) had to perform additional analyses in
order to increase their confidence in the fitted parameter values. The authors used
the popular softmax function to model decision probabilities, but decided against
adding a temperature (or exploration-exploitation) parameter, because it would
have traded off against the important reward sensitivity parameter. Changes in one
of these parameters could have been compensated by changes in the other parame-
ter. The larger question here is how to reliably distinguish between parameters. At
least some computational variables are thought to be encoded in the brain (Iglesias,
Tomiello, Schneebeli, and Stephan, 2017), for example dopamine neurons’ activ-
ity is believed to encode prediction errors. However, to discover these biological
correlates we need reliable estimates that are not confounded by other parameters.
The signal detection task was not initially designed with RL modelling in mind
for example, and one could think about running a subtask to isolate exploration-
exploitation behaviour and estimate the temperature parameter independently.
Replication of results, especially involving a larger number of participants, will also
be important before useful computational assays can be developed. Paulus, Huys,
and Maia (2016) proposed a pipeline, consisting of phases analogous to generic
drug development stages, which will allow computational psychiatry to translate
findings from neuroscience into clinical practice.
Current research has often focused on reward. While the omission of a reward might
be felt as punishment by participants (as was assumed by Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan,
and Dayan, 2013), Chen, Takahashi, Nakagawa, et al. (2015) point out that reward
and punishment processing involve different neural bases. They hypothesise that
depression might be characterised by a gain-loss asymmetry, so that patients ex-
perience decreased reward sensitivity but increased punishment sensitivity (see
also Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin, et al., 2015). As mentioned above, reward process-
ing can also further be sub-divided into different domains. The association between
anhedonia and the motivation to exert effort could not be addressed in our case
study. In natural settings, patients weigh the pros (reward outcome) against the
cons (effort required) to make a decision (cost-benefit analysis). Therefore, when an
individual displays an abnormally large effort sensitivity, perceiving efforts as more
effortful than they objectively are, they may decide against engaging in a potentially
rewarding activity. The effort cost might be perceived as outweighing the potential
reward outcome. This is also related to what is observed in Parkinsons’ patients
who display high levels of apathy (a symptom akin to anhedonia; Husain and Roiser,
2018). In the future, scientists may want to design tasks that enable them to test
hypotheses about different reward learning domains such as effort sensitivity and
reward sensitivity.
While much research points towards behavioural deficits of patients suffering from
MDD, there is also evidence for improved performance in depression (Beevers, Wor-
thy, Gorlick, et al., 2013). Replications and robust (computational) techniques will
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be needed to pinpoint exactly when impairments occur and how they relate to aber-
rant brain activity. Memory impairments are common in depression (Rock, Roiser,
Riedel, and Blackwell, 2014; Snyder, 2013), but computationally they seem as of yet
still largely unexplored. Notably, Dombrovski, Clark, Siegle, et al. (2010) included a
memory parameter in their reinforcement-learning model and found that depressed
suicide attempters discounted previously observed rewards more than healthy con-
trols. It has been proposed that many observed impairments in schizophrenia could
potentially be explained by deficits in the memory of patients (Strauss, Robinson,
Waltz, et al., 2010; Collins, Brown, Gold, et al., 2014). Future research might want to
consider whether memory (encoding and/or retrieval) impairments could also be a
(partial) explanation for many of the observed abnormalities in depression.
2.5 Summary
Behavioural impairments are prevalent in depression and computational meth-
ods provide a useful tool to tease apart different (neural) mechanisms that might
influence learning and decision-making. Computational modelling of behaviour
in participants with depression has provided refinement and additional evidence
for theories of MDD, which suggest that negative (perceptual) biases, deficient
cognitive control, impaired reward learning, and beliefs about the controllability
of the environment are all important aspects of the disease. Clever task design
and replication involving larger samples, combined with robust computational
techniques, are now needed to advance the field. It is important as well not to
neglect the study of patients with moderate-severe mood disorder (rather than par-
ticipants with low mood or mild forms of depression, who are often easier to study)
and particularly treatment resistant patients who are common in secondary care
psychiatric services. We need to move from methods which are able to distinguish
between groups of patients and healthy control participants, to methods which
show convincing individual patient differences along symptom dimensions. This
will ultimately be necessary to allow objective treatment recommendations and
predictions of outcomes for individuals.
The work described in this thesis uses tools and techniques from computational
psychiatry to test for behavioural and brain imaging differences between patients
suffering from depression, participants showing various depressive symptoms,
and healthy controls. Behaviour during reward learning tasks was analysed and
modelled in a similar way as described in the case study report of this chapter. It
was found that patients were impaired in their use of internal value estimations
(Chapter 3; Rupprechter, Stankevicius, Huys, Steele, et al., 2018). These results were
used to describe hypotheses about differences in the underlying neuronal function
of value encoding and decision making (Chapter 4; Rupprechter, Stankevicius, Huys,
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Series, et al., 2020). Consistent with studies reviewed in this chapter, we reported
abnormal activity in striatum, hipppocampus and anterior cingulate (Chapter 4).
Given these results and the evidence for abnormal activity (and functional con-
nectivity) of cortical and limbic regions in depression, I set out to directly test the
hypothesis of abnormal cortico-limbic reward-related effective connectivity be-
ing associated with depressive symptoms. Corroborating a number of theories
reviewed in this chapter, I found that increased severity of depressive symptoms
was associated with decreased connectivity from the medial prefrontal cortex to
the ventral striatum (Chapter 5). In a last “proof of concept” study I then tested
whether estimated effective connectivity parameters could be used as features for a
data-driven (machine learning) computational psychiatry approach: differentiat-
ing never-depressed healthy controls from participants with past or present major
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This chapter consists of a slightly modified version of a published journal article: S.
Rupprechter, A. Stankevicius, Q. J. M. Huys, J. D. Steele, et al. (2018). “Major Depres-
sion Impairs the Use of Reward Values for Decision-Making”. In: Scientific Reports
8.13798. Supplementary Materials for this chapter are included in Appendix A.
The study was designed as a follow up to the work of Stankevicius, Huys, Kalra,
and Seriès (2014) in which the authors used computational modelling to show a
relationship between optimism and prior belief about reward in a healthy sample.
The experiment consisted of about 240 observation trials intermitted by exactly 60
decision trials. Participants observed brief displays of various fractal stimuli which
were followed by a binary reward outcome signal in the form of a full (reward) or
empty (no reward) treasure chest. Sixty different fractals were shown (each followed
by a treasure chest) and on average each type of fractal was observed 4 times. The
exact number of how often a particular fractal stimulus was displayed was drawn
from a Poisson distribution with mean 4. After a fractal had been shown its allotted
number of times it was then included in a single decision trial at a later time point.
A choice had to be made between an explicit reward probability (the proportion
of filled circles out of 10 total circles) and a previously observed fractal for which
subjects had to estimate the reward probability. For example, a simple model might
assume participants keep track of the total number of times a fractal was observed
and the number of times it was followed by reward. They could use this to calculate
the proportion of rewarded events and compare it to the explicit proportion to
choose the more rewarding option. Stankevicius, Huys, Kalra, and Seriès (2014)
expanded on this idea and assumed participants behaved as Bayesian observers
who also integrated their prior belief about the probability of reward into their
decision making. This prior belief (or more precisely the mean of the assumed
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prior distribution) significantly correlated with participants’ self-reported optimism
scores. More optimistic subjects had a higher prior belief that fractal stimuli would
lead to a reward.
Cognitive biases in depression are closely related to the absence of an optimism
bias (Sharot, 2011) and increased pessimistic biases (see Chapter 2) and therefore
future research about the effects of depressive symptoms on the performance in
this task was indicated (Stankevicius, Huys, Kalra, and Seriès, 2014). It was decided
that in addition to potential behavioural differences between a group of depressed
patients and healthy controls, the neural basis of the value estimation and decision
making was of interest and so an fMRI study was designed. Because two separate
groups were recruited, analysis focused on group comparisons, but correlation
analyses are also provided in the Supplement (Appendix A). To capture the BOLD
signal, a few important changes to the timings of the task had to be made which are
also discussed in the Supplement (Appendix A). Overall, these changes probably
contributed to the fact that we did not replicate the relationship between optimism
scores and a prior belief about reward. Nevertheless, other behavioural group
differences are described in this paper. Computational modelling was used to
analyse smaller components of the behaviour and results indicated lower memory
of observed rewards and an impaired ability to use internal value estimations when
making a choice in the depressed group.
My contributions
I specified and implemented the models and analysis. I also created the figures,
wrote the first version of the manuscript, and drafted the first response to the peer
reviewers. All this was only made possible through invaluable contributions by my
coauthors with whom I discussed the analysis strategy and the results and who
edited multiple versions of the manuscript. They had also already optimised the
experiment for fMRI and collected the data at the start of my Ph.D. program.
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Abstract
Depression is a debilitating condition with a high prevalence. Depressed patients
have been shown to be diminished in their ability to integrate their reinforcement
history to adjust future behaviour during instrumental reward learning tasks. Here,
we tested whether such impairments could also be observed in a Pavlovian con-
ditioning task. We recruited and analysed 32 subjects, 15 with depression and 17
healthy controls, to study behavioural group differences in learning and decision-
making. Participants had to estimate the probability of some fractal stimuli to be
associated with a binary reward, based on a few passive observations. They then
had to make a choice between one of the observed fractals and another target for
which the reward probability was explicitly given. Computational modelling was
used to succinctly describe participants’ behaviour. Patients performed worse than
controls at the task. Computational modelling revealed that this was caused by
behavioural impairments during both learning and decision phases. Depressed
subjects showed lower memory of observed rewards and had an impaired ability to
use internal value estimations to guide decision-making in our task.
3.1 Introduction
Although major depressive disorder (MDD) is a debilitating condition with a high
prevalence and substantial economic impact (Pizzagalli, 2014). A core symptom of
clinical depression is anhedonia (World Health Organization, 1992) and patients
often display impairments in executive function, working memory and attention
(McIntyre, Cha, Soczynska, et al., 2013; Rock, Roiser, Riedel, and Blackwell, 2014).
Another common symptom during depressive episodes is “bleak and pessimistic
views of the future” (World Health Organization, 1992). The theory of learned
helplessness posits that people with a pessimistic explanatory style (attributing
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their helplessness to a stable, global, internal cause) are at greater risk of develop-
ing depression (Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale, 1978). There exists extensive
evidence that patients diagnosed with MDD exhibit features of Beck’s Negative Cog-
nitive Triad, which is characterized by negative and pessimistic views about oneself,
the world and the future (Beck, Rush, Shaw, and Emery, 1979), consistent with a
pervasive pessimistic cognitive bias. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI, Beck,
Ward, Mendelson, et al., 1961) and the Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS, Beck and
Steer, 1988) both measure aspects of this triad and Cognitive Behavioural Therapy
(CBT), which targets these negative biases can be an effective treatment for depres-
sion (Beck, 2005; Butler, Chapman, Forman, and Beck, 2006). Here we used a novel
experimental paradigm and computational models of decision-making in order
to supplement these subjective clinical interviews and rating scales with objective
behavioural evidence.
Behavioural impairment in MDD has consistently been found with at least two tasks
(see Chen, Takahashi, Nakagawa, et al. (2015) for a review): the Iowa Gambling Task
(see Must, Horvath, Nemeth, and Janka (2013) for a mini review) and the Signal
Detection Task (see Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan (2013) for a meta-analysis).
In both paradigms, participants repeatedly choose between options and observe
probabilistic reward outcomes based on their choices. Depressed patients are
impaired in their ability to properly integrate their reinforcement history to adjust
future behaviour.
We used a probabilistic reward-learning task, which has previously been reported
to demonstrate individual behavioural differences that were associated with Life
Orientation Test - Revised (LOT-R; which measures optimism) scores (Stankevicius,
Huys, Kalra, and Seriès, 2014), as well as neuroticism scores (see Supplement) in
healthy subjects. In the task, participants were asked to maximize their rewards
by choosing between fractal stimuli, for which they could estimate the probability
of reward from previous passive observations, and another target associated with
an explicit reward probability value. Here we tested patients with depression as
well as healthy controls and used a computational modelling approach to describe
their behaviour. This allowed us to formulate specific hypotheses, corresponding to
distinct computational models, about both the learning and the decision process
during the task. While focusing on group differences, we also explored how par-
ticipants’ ratings of depression severity, optimism and neuroticism affected their
performance across groups.
Specifically, we tested whether there was objective evidence for: (a) a behavioural
difference in learning and decision-making between MDD subjects and healthy
controls, and (b) a pessimistic bias about the likelihood of reward in MDD, and then
performed exploratory analyses, probing for (c) a correlation between computa-
tional model parameters and ratings of depression severity or neuroticism.
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3.2 Methods and Materials
3.2.1 Participants
The main dataset analysed here consists of thirty-nine subjects (Tables 3.1 and S1)
including 19 patients meeting DSM-IV criteria for a diagnosis of MDD and 20 control
participants without a history of depression or other psychiatric disorder. The task
was performed during fMRI scanning and in the following this will be referred
to as “fMRI dataset”. Importantly, patients were unmedicated. Diagnosis was
made according to the MINI PLUS (v5.0) structured diagnostic interview (Sheehan,
Lecrubier, Sheehan, et al., 1998). The mean BDI score of the patient group (24.7)
can be regarded as “moderate severity” depression (see Supplement for additional
information on questionnaire scores). Data collection took place at the Clinical
Research Imaging Centre, Ninewells Hospital and Medical School, Dundee. The
study was approved by the East of Scotland Research Ethics Service (UK Research
Ethics Committee, study reference 13/ES/0043) and all experiments were performed
in accordance with relevant guidelines and regulations. Written informed consent
was obtained from all subjects.
MDD and control groups of the fMRI dataset were matched for age, sex and Na-
tional Adult Reading Test (NART) scores, which were used to estimate premorbid
IQ (Bright, Jaldow, and Kopelman, 2002). Exclusion criteria included claustrophobia,
serious physical illness, pre-existing cerebrovascular, neurological disease, previous
history of significant head injury, and receipt of any medication likely to affect brain
function. All subjects were recruited using the University of Dundee advertisement
system HERMES and were paid £20 plus up to £10 dependent on task performance.
Four patients and three controls were excluded from further analysis from the fMRI
dataset, after performance results showed that they did not choose the higher re-
ward (in the 48 trials in which the reward probability was not the same) in at least
50% of cases. Two additional participants were excluded from all analysis, because
they did not complete the study. Model comparison and primary data analysis,
which used the fMRI dataset, therefore included 15 participants with MDD and 17
controls.
To further validate our results, we also analysed a second dataset we had previously
collected to validate the experiment outside the scanner. In the following, this will
be referred to as “Pilot dataset”. It included 3 MDD and 21 control participants
(Tables 3.1 and S1). Recruitment and assessment was performed in the same way as
above and the same ethics statement applies. Model comparison was performed on
the fMRI dataset and the best performing model was then separately fitted to the
Pilot dataset.
42
Chapter 3. Major Depression Impairs the Use of Reward Values for
Decision-Making
Group N Age Sex (F/M) BDI Neuroticism LOT-R NART
fMRI Patients 15 17 – 41 12 / 3 24.7± 13.1 46.3± 7.1 9.1± 5.5 46.8± 4.2
fMRI Controls 17 18 – 33 13 / 4 4.2± 5.6 29.8± 8.0 18.4± 3.1 46.6± 3.2
Pilot Patients 3 N/A N/A 27.7 50.7 9.3 45.3
Pilot Controls 21 N/A N/A 10.1± 12.2 34.4± 11.5 14.5± 5.5 44.0± 11.3
TABLE 3.1: Demographics of participants from both dataset versions
(see Table S1 for more details). BDI, Beck Depression Inventory;
LOTR, Life Orientation Test - Revised; NART, National Adult Reading
Test; Data given as n or mean± std. Due to the small number of Pilot
patients, standard deviations are not shown for this group.
3.2.2 Experiment
The paradigm (Figure 3.1) was adapted from Stankevicius and colleagues (Stanke-
vicius, Huys, Kalra, and Seriès, 2014). The experiment was implemented in MAT-
LAB R2007b (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA) using the Psychophysics Toolbox
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner, Brainard, Pelli, et al., 2007). Additional details
about the experiment are provided in the Supplement and the fMRI analysis will be













... - O1 - O2 - O1 - O3 - O1 - O2 - O1 - D1 - O2 - O4 - D2 - ...
FIGURE 3.1: Experimental paradigm. Subject passively observed
different fractal stimuli which were followed by reward (a pound sym-
bol) or no reward (blank screen). Interleaved with these observations
were decision prompts in which they had to make a choice between
one of the observed fractals (for which they could estimate reward
probability) and an explicit numeric probability value in order to
maximize their reward. An example of a longer sequence is shown at
the bottom with the encased subsequence depicted above.
Participants passively observed fractal stimuli, which were followed by either a
reward (depicted by a pound symbol) or no reward (no symbol). Interleaved with
these observations were decision screens, during which they were asked to make
a choice between one of the fractal stimuli they had observed, and an explicit
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numeric probability value. Participants were asked to choose the higher probability
(or reward) value option, which required them to estimate the value of the fractal
stimuli they had observed. There were seven possible differences in the numeric
value probability. Either option could have a higher probability value of 10%, 20%
or 30% (each of which was the case for 8 decision trials) or they could have the same
probability of reward (in 12 trials). Our Pilot dataset used a slightly different task,
in which possible differences ranged from -90% to +90% instead (in 10% intervals,
each displayed in 4 decision trials).
Participants observed a variable number of fractals between decision screens, but
each fractal was observed exactly four times before it was used within a decision.
Each fractal was used in a single decision and in total participants made 60 decisions
(and therefore observed fractals 240 times). The sequence of observations and
decisions was pseudo-random, and identical for all subjects. Performance feedback
was only given at the end of the experiment. Data collection for each subject lasted
approximately 2 hours, which included collection of rating scale data (see Table S1).
3.2.3 Behavioural Performance Data Analysis
We tested for differences in average reaction time, IQ (NART) and other question-
naire scores between the groups using Welch’s t-tests. We measured participants’
performance in terms of how often the fractal was chosen as a function of the dif-
ference between the probabilities of the two options (assuming exact estimations
for the fractal probabilities; i.e. if a fractal was followed by reward three times, and
followed by non-reward once, the fractal probability would be 75%). We fitted a




1 + exp(−β × x)
. (3.1)
3.2.4 Computational Modelling
Three different families of models were fitted to the data (see Table 3.2 for a sum-
mary), representing distinct hypotheses about how participants make decisions
during the task. All models assume that participants estimate an internal “value”
for each fractal they observe and compare this value to the displayed probability
when asked to make a choice.
First, we fitted variations of a family of reinforcement learning (RL) models that
incorporate trial-by-trial prediction errors and a learning rate parameter. During
each trial, the fractal is associated with an expectation about reward based on the
internal value and this expectation is updated after observing the reward or lack
thereof. Such RL models have been used extensively to describe reward-based
learning and much research has gone into understanding the connection between
44
Chapter 3. Major Depression Impairs the Use of Reward Values for
Decision-Making
Name V update p(choose fractal i) Parameters




i − V ti ) σ(β(V ti − φi)) v0, ε, β
RL-learning V t+1i = V
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i /4− φi)) A, ρ, β
Bayesian Vi = ni+αNi+α+γ σ(β(Vi − φi)) α, β, γ
TABLE 3.2: Model specification. The second column shows how
internal values for a fractal i are updated after observing an outcome
r in trial t. The Bayesian model does not model learning on a trial-by-
trial basis. The third column depicts the choice rule that is used to
calculate the probability of choosing the fractal over the alternative
option (Equation 3.3). The initial value is set to zero or modelled by
v0. φi is the displayed probability when asked to make a choice for
fractal i. ε is the learning rate; β is the inverse temperature parameter;
A is the memory parameter; ρ is the reward sensitivity parameter; α
and γ are the parameters of the Beta prior. Ni and ni are the number
of times a fractal i was observed and followed by reward respectively.
See main text and Supplement for additional details.
prediction errors and the dopamine system (Schultz, 2002). In two of the models
(“RL-basic” and “RL-learning”), the initial value parameter was allowed to vary be-
tween 0 and 1, and could therefore act in a similar way as the mean of the prior belief
in the Bayesian model (see below). The other two RL models (“RL-unbiased” and
“RL-learning-unbiased”) kept the bias parameter fixed at 0.5, which corresponded
to a prior belief that reward was equally likely from the fractal or the explicit option.
Two of these models (“RL-learning” and “RL-learning-unbiased”) aimed at testing
whether learning was different following rewards versus no-rewards (“punishment”)
by including separate learning parameters for each outcome. It has been proposed
that there may be heightened asymmetry between learning from positive and nega-
tive outcomes in depression and separate learning rate parameters can be used to
account for this (see Chen, Takahashi, Nakagawa, et al. (2015) for a review). They
were also used in the previous version of this task (Stankevicius, Huys, Kalra, and
Seriès, 2014).
Next, we fitted the winning model of Stankevicius, Huys, Kalra, and Seriès (2014)
(see Table 3.2 and Supplement), which tests the hypothesis that subjects behave as
Bayesian observers during the task. This model assumed that at the decision time
for a given fractal, participants estimate the number of times the fractal was followed
by a reward (the likelihood) and combine this evidence with a prior belief about
the probability of rewards associated with the fractals. Although the observations
are not modelled on a trial-by-trial basis, this model assumes that the likelihood
is computed by (implicitly) counting, and perfectly remembering, the number of
times each fractal is associated with reward. In the original experiment, Stankevicius,
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Huys, Kalra, and Seriès (2014) found that the mean of the participants’ prior belief
distribution correlated positively with their optimism scores (LOT-R). A more recent
analysis of the same data also revealed a negative correlation of the prior mean with
neuroticism scores (see Supplement). This means optimists and people scoring low
on neuroticism overestimated the reward associated with fractal stimuli and that in
this task, optimism and neuroticism acted as a prior belief, biasing performance in
situations of uncertainty.
This Bayesian model comes with some limitations. First of all, it does not allow us
to distinguish between observation and decision phases, because it ignores indi-
vidual observation trials. More importantly, the model assumes perfect memory
of observations, which is an unrealistic assumption, especially since memory im-
pairments in MDD are exceedingly common (McIntyre, Cha, Soczynska, et al., 2013;
Rock, Roiser, Riedel, and Blackwell, 2014; Ebmeier, Donaghey, and Steele, 2006;
McDermott and Ebmeier, 2009; Gotlib and Joormann, 2010).
To overcome these limitations, we therefore also fitted two additional trial-by-trial
models (“Leaky” and “Leaky-ρ”), which include neither a learning rate nor a pre-
diction error, but which include a discounting factor (also termed a “memory”
parameter). Note that the Leaky model is equivalent to the Bayesian model assum-
ing a flat prior and non-optimal (“leaky”) memory. Internal value estimates are
updated after observing fractal i and associated reward r at observation t as





where A (0 < A < 1) is the memory parameter (the closer it is to 0, the more
a subject “forgets” about their observations and the less they take into account
previously observed rewards) and rti = +1 if observation t of fractal i was rewarded
and 0 otherwise. Initial internal values were set to zero. A second model in this
family (Leaky-ρ) includes a scaling (“reward sensitivity”) parameter on observed
rewards, to capture participants’ subjective valuations of observed rewards. Notably,
reward processing (dysfunction) has been identified as a promising phenotype of
depression (Pizzagalli, 2014).
The probability of choosing an action was calculated by passing estimated and
explicitly displayed reward probability values through a softmax function. For the
Leaky model, fractal i was chosen (as opposed to the displayed reward probability
φi) with probability
p(choose fractal i) = σ(β × (f(Vi)− φi)) =
1
1 + exp(−β × (f(Vi)− φi))
, (3.3)
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where f(x) = x/4 is a deterministic function which transforms the internal value
estimates to a probability comparable to φ. The shape of the sigmoid function
was determined by the β parameter. The higher this inverse temperature parame-
ter, the more deterministic decisions become, while lower values lead to “noisier”
decision-making. When the values of actions are unknown, this parameter governs
the balancing of exploration and exploitation in reinforcement learning (Sutton and
Barto, 1998). Higher values mean actions are chosen more greedily, lower values
lead to suboptimal actions being chosen more often to explore the environment.
Here participants were asked to maximize their reward, which means they were
asked to always choose the option with the higher probability of reward and there
was no advantage of “exploring” the other option. Each fractal was only associated
with a single decision and feedback was only given at the end of the experiment
and not after each decision. This makes it unlikely that individuals consciously
decided to choose the option they thought had a lower probability just to explore
the alternative. More plausibly, participants made wrong choices when they either
were not certain about what they had observed or had incorrectly estimated the
probability of a certain fractal leading to reward. Note that variations in the two
parameters (A and β) produce separable behavioural effects. Beta affects the prob-
ability of choosing the option estimated to have higher probability of reward on
all decision-trials. Memory primarily affects the trials in which the fractal should
have a higher chance of reward (if perfectly estimated) than the displayed numeric
probability (see Supplement).
3.2.5 Model Fitting and Model Comparison
We used model fitting and comparison procedures previously described by Huys
and colleagues (Dombrovski, Clark, Siegle, et al., 2010). Parameters were maximum
a posteriori (MAP) estimates incorporating an empirical prior, estimated from
the data. Parameters were initialized with maximum likelihood values; then an
expectation-maximization procedure was used to iteratively update the estimates
(see Supplement). We calculated the integrated Bayesian Information Criterion
(iBIC; Huys, Cools, Gölzer, et al., 2011) for all fitted models to find the model that
best fitted the data, taking into account complexity. Simulations were run to verify
that both the fitting and comparison procedure recovered reasonable parameters
and chose the correct type of model when generating and re-fitting data using
known parameters and models (see Supplement).
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Model-free Analysis
A summary of all questionnaire scores of the two groups is displayed in Table S1.
National Adult Reading Test (NART) scores indicated no difference in IQ between
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the groups (t(26.3) = 0.158, p = 0.876). Overall, participants did not respond in 17
of 1920 trials (0.89%). Mean response times were not significantly different between
groups (RT patients µ ± σ = 2286 ± 455ms; RT controls µ ± σ = 2185 ± 360ms;
t(26.6) = 0.692, p = 0.495).
Figure 3.2 shows the fitted sigmoid curves using the average of the fitted parame-
ters for each group. The fitted offset parameter (α) was not significantly different
between groups (t(28.1) = 0.023, p = 0.982), but the slope parameter (β) was sig-
nificantly different (t(26.3) = −2.383, p = 0.025), with controls having steeper
curves (β controls µ± σ = 0.566± 0.316), indicating they were significantly better
at learning (β patients µ± σ = 0.350± 0.185). Stankevicius, Huys, Kalra, and Seriès
(2014) recorded a systematic bias in optimistic people towards choosing fractals.
We did not find such a systematic bias in healthy participants (as compared to
MDD patients) towards choosing fractals, but the difference in the slope parameters
indicated performance differences between the groups that we further examined
using computational modelling. We were particularly interested in understand-
ing whether those differences stemmed from observation phase or decision phase
abnormalities.


















FIGURE 3.2: Average sigmoid functions (solid lines) fitted to psycho-
metric curves (dashed lines) of the two groups of the fMRI dataset.
Dashed lines depict the average proportion of responses in which the
fractal was chosen as a function of the difference between estimated
and explicit reward probabilities. Solid lines show the average of
simple sigmoid functions fitted to the psychometric curves of indi-
viduals. A perfect observer would never choose the fractal when the
explicit probability is higher (-30%, -20%, -10%) and always choose
the fractal when the estimated probability is higher (10%, 20%, 30%).
An unbiased observer would be expected to choose the fractal in half
of the trials when reward probability is the same for both options.
Error bars represent between subjects standard errors.
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3.3.2 Model-based Analysis
Model selection using iBIC showed that the Leaky model best described participants’
performance in our data (Figure 3.3), indicating that in our dataset participants did
not seem to rely on their prior beliefs, but were limited by their episodic memory.









FIGURE 3.3: Results of the model comparison. iBIC values of different
models relative to the best fitting model Leaky. A difference of 10 or
higher is considered strong evidence for the model with the lower
value (Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan, 2013).
The memory parameter differed significantly between groups (z = −2.153, p =
0.031; A patients µ± σ = 0.90± 0.04, median = 0.91; A controls µ± σ = 0.92± 0.09,
median = 0.96). This indicates that patients discounted their estimated values more
than controls on each trial, possibly indicating impairments in episodic memory.
The choice sensitivity parameter (β) was also significantly different between groups
(z = −2.341, p = 0.019; β patients µ±σ = 4.67±1.45, β controls µ±σ = 5.89±1.33),
meaning that controls found it easier to follow their internal estimations, while
patients chose more randomly. There was a trend suggesting a correlation between
parameter estimates (r = 0.349, p = 0.051). We performed additional simulations by
systematically varying the parameters to see if parameter recovery of one parameter
was systematically influenced by the other parameter and convinced ourselves that
parameter correlation did not cause problems during inference (see Supplement).
We were also interested in understanding whether there existed interesting rela-
tionships between model parameters and questionnaire scores. This exploratory
analysis revealed a negative relationship between beta and neuroticism across the
two groups (see Supplement). As this was indistinguishable from a group level effect,
we then combined our fMRI dataset with our Pilot dataset and focused on healthy
participants only. Within the pooled control groups, there was also a significant
negative relationship between beta and neuroticism (t(35) = −2.679, p = 0.011)
after controlling for dataset version (Figure S6). This means high neuroticism was
related to more variable decision-making in controls.
Further analyses details are reported in the Supplement.
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3.4 Discussion
Here we used a probabilistic reward-learning task associated with computational
modelling to capture behavioural differences between groups of depressed and
healthy participants. We found evidence for impairments in MDD subjects during
both learning and decision-making. Our results demonstrate a strong association
between depression and participants’ inability to make decisions based on their in-
ternal value estimations. MDD patients also showed decreased memory of observed
rewards throughout the task. We did not find evidence for a systematic pessimistic
bias about the likelihood of reward in depressed participants (see Supplement for a
discussion).
Depression is characterized by behavioural, emotional and cognitive symptoms
(Gotlib and Joormann, 2010). It is well established that MDD patients display
cognitive impairments including deficits in executive function, working memory,
attention and psychomotor processing speed (McIntyre, Cha, Soczynska, et al., 2013;
Rock, Roiser, Riedel, and Blackwell, 2014). Behavioural differences in reinforcement
learning performance between groups of depressed and healthy participants have
been reported previously (see Chen, Takahashi, Nakagawa, et al. (2015) for a review).
In the Iowa Gambling Task subjects repeatedly choose from one of four different
decks of cards with different reward and punishment contingencies (unknown to
the player). High immediate rewards (or losses in an adapted version) are followed
by even higher losses (or rewards) at unpredictable points for some decks. Other
decks are associated with lower immediate rewards but even lower unpredictable
losses. MDD patients typically choose more often from disadvantageous decks, dis-
playing a worsened sensitivity to discriminating reward and punishment (see Must,
Horvath, Nemeth, and Janka (2013) for a mini review). In the Signal Detection
Task participants observe in each trial one of two hard to distinguish stimuli for a
very short time and are asked to indicate which stimulus they observed. Correct
answers are sometimes rewarded, but unbeknownst to subjects, one of the stimuli is
rewarded three times as often as the alternative. Whilst healthy people show a bias
towards choosing the more frequently rewarded option, MDD patients do not de-
velop this bias (see Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan (2013) for a meta-analysis),
an effect thought to be related to anhedonia.
In both the Iowa Gambling Task and the Signal Detection Task participants undergo
instrumental conditioning, in which chosen actions are reinforced or punished.
Subjects learn from their individual choices and the rewards that follow, and will
not experience the same reinforcement history, because their rewards depend on
their choices. Findings of differences in behaviour or neural activity between groups
therefore have to deal with potentially confounding effects of unequal reinforce-
ment histories. Our experiment contains a Pavlovian conditioning phase, during
which conditioned stimuli (fractals) are paired with reward and no choices are
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made. All participants passively observed the exact same sequence of stimuli and
these rewards. Participants could not learn from their instrumental choices in our
task, because each fractal stimulus was only associated with a single decision and
feedback was only displayed at the end of the experiment.
Computational modelling was used to capture the behaviour of participants dur-
ing the task and formal model comparison to choose the best fitting model, from
which we identified the best fitting parameters for each participant. MDD patients
performed worse on our task and the model-based analysis showed that this was
due to differences in two model parameters. First, patients discounted (or forgot)
previous reward history more than comparison subjects, consistent with reported
impairments in memory and attentional deficits (McIntyre, Cha, Soczynska, et al.,
2013; Rock, Roiser, Riedel, and Blackwell, 2014). Dombrovski and colleagues found
suicide attempters (but intriguingly not non-suicidal depressed elderly people) had
lower memory parameter values than control participants in a probabilistic reversal
learning task (Dombrovski, Clark, Siegle, et al., 2010). Our finding is also consis-
tent with another recent study by Pulcu and colleagues which reported increased
discounting of rewards in MDD (Pulcu, Trotter, Thomas, et al., 2014), although
discounting in our task was related to past rewards, while Pulcu and colleagues’ task
involved future rewards. Notably, a link between memory and delay discounting has
previously been reported (Bickel, Yi, Landes, et al., 2011; Wesley and Bickel, 2014).
Second, we found MDD patients had more difficulty following their internal value
estimations of different stimuli, making decisions more randomly. It is possible that
patients had a lower confidence in their ability to perform the task, similar to how
learned helplessness theories view depression as a consequence of an organism’s
diminished belief about its ability to influence outcomes (Abramson, Seligman, and
Teasdale, 1978). Taken together, our results therefore suggest that MDD is associated
with dysfunctions in both learning and decision-making.
Neuroticism is associated with a vulnerability to many common psychiatric disor-
ders including depression (Widiger and Oltmanns, 2017; Ormel, Bastiaansen, Riese,
et al., 2013). Stress reactivity is thought to be a core aspect of neuroticism, with
individuals scoring highly on neuroticism showing greater sensitivity to aversive
(stressful) events (Ormel, Bastiaansen, Riese, et al., 2013). A large population based
study concluded that neuroticism increases vulnerability to depression because
of increased sensitivity to stressful life events (Kendler, Kuhn, and Prescott, 2004).
In addition to group differences discussed above, we were interested in exploring
possible relationships between participants’ fitted model parameter values and
questionnaire scores. Within control participants, across two different versions of
the task, we recorded a negative relationship between self-reported neuroticism
and a model parameter capturing a subject’s ability to use internal value estimates,
meaning higher neuroticism scores were associated with a more variable decision
process. Taking this exploratory analysis further, we found that this association also
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existed across healthy and MDD groups. However, we could not reliably distinguish
this from a group-level effect, and future work is needed to address this.
In conclusion, our results demonstrate impairments in MDD in a probabilistic
reward-learning task during both learning and decision-making phases of the ex-
periment. Patients, naturally scoring higher on neuroticism than controls, had a
decreased memory of previous rewards and were less able use internally estimated
values to guide decision-making in our task.
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Future work
As mentioned in the preamble of this chapter, I was not involved in the design of
this study. This section briefly explores a few things that could have been done
differently and/or might be fruitful avenues for future work with regard to study
design.
Ideally study design goes hand in hand with model and parameter recovery sim-
ulations as, for example, this makes it possible to estimate the minimum number
of trials and participants which should be included. For example, I ran additional
parameter recovery simulations which showed considerably better parameter es-
timates for the Leaky model when the number of trials was doubled (i.e. number
of fractals doubled, but each fractal still only observed four times). Thirty-two sets
of parameters were drawn randomly from the estimated group prior distribution
(from the real data) and then used to generate artificial data. This was repeated
ten times, including five times for which double the amount of data (120 fractals)
was generated. Unsurprisingly, the mean of the root mean square errors for the
inverse temperature parameter was lower by 0.38 (which is approximately 1/6 of
the variance of beta values fitted to the real data) when the recovery simulations
included more data. The estimation of the memory parameter showed almost no
change (< 0.003 difference).
Under idealised assumptions, one could therefore estimate how many trials are
needed for some maximum desired error. Similarly, one could use simulations to
estimate how many participants would be needed per group to be able to reliably
distinguish between models or find a difference in parameters. That is, similar
to classical power analysis, for some assumed effect size one could estimate the
number of required participants. Importantly however, experimental design (which
as mentioned above should happen hand in hand with model design and simu-
lations) is always critical to be able to achieve the desired effect and answer the
experimenters’ question and can greatly affect how well models can be fit.
It is important to note that fMRI stipulates additional constraints, such as a maxi-
mum time an experiment may run, which need to be considered. The scanner is
a loud and uncomfortable environment and participants will lose concentration
and motivation. While short scanning sessions might therefore be preferable, the
BOLD response is sluggish and usually requires trials to be at least a few seconds
long. In addition, while events were jittered to optimise disambiguation of the
haemodynamic response, power estimation in fMRI is generally difficult and in
our case impossible as no similar data previously existed. Experimental designs
therefore always involve a trade-off between optimal computational requirements
and practical feasibility, and the current study relied on expert knowledge of one of
the authors (J.D. Steele) to achieve this.
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In the original experiment (Stankevicius, Huys, Kalra, and Seriès, 2014) the authors
reported a relationship between self-reported optimism scores and participants’
prior belief about reward associated with fractal stimuli which we did not replicate
in this study. Notably, Stankevicius, Huys, Kalra, and Seriès (2014) also performed
control experiments and found that reducing the uncertainty by showing each
fractal much more often would eliminate the difference between optimistic and
pessimistic participants.
For the current study the paradigm was changed in various ways to optimise it for
fMRI. Trials lasted longer and fractals were observed for several seconds rather than
only a fraction of a second. Participants also had to undergo a lengthy training
session and each fractal was observed exactly 4 times rather than a random number
of times between 2 and 10. These adjustments likely decreased participant’s uncer-
tainty about the reward probabilities and might have been part of the reason for the
non-replication (see also Appendix A).
It might have been worth to adjust the paradigm a bit more to increase the chance of
replication. I might have suggested that each fractal should be involved in multiple
decisions, after they have been observed a various number of times. Outcomes
would still not be shown after decisions and so participants would still only learn
from passive observations and not their own choices. For example, each fractal
could be involved in three decisions; after it had been observed three, four and five
times. Not only would this likely have kept some of the uncertainty of the original
experiment about the number of times a certain fractal had been observed, but
might also have allowed us to study the effects of a change in this uncertainty and
might have improved the ability to estimate and interpret memory parameters.
Simulations could show if parameter or model recovery could be improved by
having different fractals be observed different number of times which would further
increase uncertainty.
While our models differed in how they assumed people observed and updated their
internal value estimations, they all used the same softmax decision model. (The
Leaky models can be rewritten to move the division by four to the value update
equations.) The softmax function first calculates the difference between estimated
and explicit probabilities and uses this to calculate a “probability” between zero
and one. It is worth noting that for most models of all three families of models, the
estimated value is sometimes underestimated. For example, in the Leaky model
if A is 0.9 the value of a fractal would be around 3.44/4 = 0.86 rather than 1 after
four reward observations. Similarly, for a learning rate of 0.25 in the RL-unbiased
model, the estimated value would be around 0.75 after four reward observations1,
and because α and γ in the Bayesian model are constrained to be positive the model
can also underestimate the internal value. The reward sensitivity parameter of the
1The RL model would eventually converge to the correct value, but that requires many more
observations.
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Leaky-ρ model could compensate for such possible underestimation, but model
comparison showed that even though the model in a sense is “more correct”, the
data did not support the added complexity and the simpler Leaky model was the
“better” model.
Note that if the proposed changes to the study paradigm above were implemented
the Leaky model might need to be reworked or extended because it would be
less likely that participants would assume a fixed number of four observations.
Simulations could be used to check if a scaling parameter within the decision model
could reliably be estimated.
It would have been possible to adjust the explicit probability, φ, in the decision
model to account for the potential underestimation bias. As the underestimation
depends on A, the most obvious way to adjust exactly would be to just get rid of
the memory parameter as otherwise it might not be estimable. This means A could
simply be set to 1, which would result in a model equivalent to the Bayesian model
assuming no (or a flat) prior. I implemented this model, but model comparison
showed that it was “worse” than the Leaky model (∆iBIC = 15.5, which is very
similar to the Leaky-ρ model).
Another possibility would have been to allow A to be greater than 1, which might
be interpreted as participants overvaluing rewards received farther in the past. I
again implemented this model and model comparison slightly favoured this new
model compared to the Leaky model (∆iBIC = 6.4). Parameter estimates of bothA
and β were highly correlated between the two models (r = 0.91 and r = 0.97 respec-
tively). While the group difference in the inverse temperature parameter remained
significantly different, the difference in the A parameter was not significant using
this model (z = −1.511, p = 0.131; A patients µ± σ = 0.94± 0.05, median = 0.93; A
controls µ± σ = 0.96± 0.08, median = 0.99).
Due to the strong correlations between parameter estimates of our Leaky model and
the new potentially better model it is unlikely that results of Chapter 4, for which
we did not directly rely on a significant group difference, would have been very
different had the new model be used instead. To be completely certain, a re-analysis
of the model-based results would be necessary. Note however that before drawing
strong conclusions from the model comparison results above, it will be necessary to
perform simulations using these models to make sure they can adequately explain
the data, and parameter and model recovery show acceptable performance. Future
work might consider the exact implications of possible overvaluation of rewards and
whether such a model should be included. As always with computational modelling
work, there might be models which explain the data “even better”, and any inference








This chapter consists of a slightly modified version of a published journal article:
S. Rupprechter, A. Stankevicius, Q. J. M. Huys, P. Series, et al. (2020). “Abnormal
reward valuation and event-related connectivity in unmedicated major depressive
disorder”. In: Psychological Medicine, pp. 1–9. Supplementary Materials for this
chapter are included in Appendix B.
The work described in this chapter directly follows our behavioural analysis in the
previous chapter in which we had identified behavioural abnormalities in depres-
sion. We reported a lower memory or higher discounting factor in the MDD group,
possibly signalling impairments in working memory. In addition, the depressed
group had a significantly lower choice sensitivity parameter, indicating that they
found it more difficult to base their decisions on their internal value estimations.
Here, we aimed to identify the neural substrates of these abnormalities. More
specifically, we wanted to look at possible group differences in the strength of
the value encoding signal. Our “best” behavioural model was used to simulate
the evolution of their internally estimated values for each participant and these
estimated values were then used as model-based parametric modulators. During
fractal trials the value of the displayed fractal was of interest. During decision trials
we used the difference between the two displayed values (i.e. the difference between
estimated and explicit probability value). This difference of the values corresponded
exactly to the input the decision model received.
Altered value encoding signals were found in areas including hippocampus and
rostral anterior cingulate regions, while differences during decision making were
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especially pronounced in an anterior mid cingulate area. Due to the hypothesis that
MDD is associated with abnormalities in a distributed network rather than changes
in isolated areas of the brain, we then turned to connectivity analysis. We wanted
to identify if areas exhibiting abnormal encoding or use of reward values would
also show a change in connectivity. We indeed found weaker connectivity between
mid cingulate (“decision making”) and rostral anterior cingulate (“value encoding”)
areas in MDD patients.
My contributions
I preprocessed the fMRI data and performed the model-free and model-based anal-
ysis. I considered and proposed specific testable hypotheses relevant to this work
and discussed them with my coauthors. I interpreted the results in the context of the
translational neuroscience background literature after discussing it with my coau-
thors. I created the figures, wrote the first version of the manuscript, and drafted the
first response to the peer reviewers. All this was only made possible through invalu-
able contributions by my coauthors with whom I discussed the analysis strategy
and the results, and who edited multiple versions of the manuscript.
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Abstract
Background. Experience of emotion is closely linked to valuation. Mood can
be viewed as a bias to experience positive or negative emotions and abnormally
biased subjective reward valuation and cognitions are core characteristics of major
depression.
Methods. Thirty-four unmedicated subjects with major depressive disorder and
controls estimated the probability that fractal stimuli were associated with reward,
based on passive observations, so they could subsequently choose the higher of
either their estimated fractal value or an explicitly presented reward probability.
Using model-based functional magnetic resonance imaging, we estimated each
subject’s internal value estimation, with psychophysiological interaction analysis
used to examine event-related connectivity, testing hypotheses of abnormal reward
valuation and cingulate connectivity in depression.
Results. Reward value encoding in the hippocampus and rostral anterior cingulate
was abnormal in depression. In addition, abnormal decision-making in depression
was associated with increased anterior mid-cingulate activity and a signal in this
region encoded the difference between the values of the two options. This localised
decision-making and its impairment to the anterior mid-cingulate cortex (aMCC)
consistent with theories of cognitive control. Notably, subjects with depression had
significantly decreased event-related connectivity between the aMCC and rostral
cingulate regions during decision-making, implying impaired communication be-
tween the neural substrates of expected value estimation and decision-making in
depression.
Conclusions. Our findings support the theory that abnormal neural reward valu-
ation plays a central role in major depressive disorder (MDD). To the extent that
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emotion reflects valuation, abnormal valuation could explain abnormal emotional
experience in MDD, reflect a core pathophysiological process and be a target of
treatment.
4.1 Introduction
Psychiatric disorders are the leading cause of disability world-wide with major
depressive disorder (MDD) the commonest cause (Whiteford, Degenhardt, Rehm,
et al., 2013). Severe and enduring mental illness is associated with a reduction in
lifespan of 5–15 years (Chang, Hayes, Perera, et al., 2011) and suicide is a leading
cause of death in young adults (WHO, 2018). However, understanding of illness
mechanisms remains rudimentary, there are no biomarkers in clinical use, clinical
outcomes are difficult to predict for individual patients and it is widely recognised
clinical practice in psychiatry has not progressed significantly in the past 50 years
(Stephan, Bach, Fletcher, et al., 2016; Stephan, Binder, Breakspear, et al., 2016).
Better understanding of illness mechanisms is crucial for progress.
Dolan has argued that emotional experience is closely linked to valuation (Dolan,
2002). Normal mood can be viewed as a bias to experience positive or negative
emotions and abnormally biased subjective reward valuation (anhedonia) and
cognitions are core characteristics of MDD (Gradin, Kumar, Waiter, et al., 2011;
Kumar, Waiter, Ahearn, et al., 2008). The origin and persistence of core symptoms
of MDD, such as anhedonia, helplessness, rumination and cognitive biases can
be explained as arising from biased internal processing; i.e. a biased evaluation of
internal states and biased cognitions (Huys and Renz, 2017; Huys, Daw, and Dayan,
2015). Such a decision-theoretic approach allows quantitative coupling of valuation
and action which is a central aspect of emotion (Dolan, 2002). A behavioural meta-
analysis found evidence for reduced primary reward value sensitivity in depression
(Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan, 2013) and other recent reviews have argued
for blunted reward valuation in anxiety and depression (Bishop and Gagne, 2018;
Rizvi, Pizzagalli, Sproule, and Kennedy, 2016) modulated by stress vulnerability
(Pizzagalli, 2014). This conceptualisation of MDD is consistent with the National
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), Research Domain Criteria (RDoC, Cuthbert and
Insel (2013)) framework, implying a blunted positive valence system, increased
sensitivity of the negative valence system and cognitive biases in line with both
(Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin, et al., 2015).
Model-based functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) can be used to de-
termine brain region encoding of signals derived from a computational model
such as estimated value or reward prediction error (RPE) (O’Doherty, Hampton,
and Kim, 2007). Meta-analyses have highlighted the importance of the striatum
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) as regions encoding value (Bartra,
McGuire, and Kable, 2013; Chase, Kumar, Eickhoff, and Dombrovski, 2015). Using
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model-based fMRI with an instrumental task, we reported blunted encoding of
expected reward value in chronically medicated patients with treatment-resistant
MDD and schizophrenia (Gradin, Kumar, Waiter, et al., 2011); however, the effect
of medication on these results was unclear. A recent meta-analysis of fMRI and
electroencephalography studies found converging evidence for blunted striatal
activation and feedback-related negativity responses to reward in depression which
may precede the first episode of illness (Keren, O’Callaghan, Vidal-Ribas, et al.,
2018). Very recently, we reported behavioural evidence for impairments in both the
learning and decision-making phases of a novel Pavlovian conditioning task using
computational modelling (Rupprechter, Stankevicius, Huys, Steele, et al., 2018).
Here we extend that behavioural analysis to identify the neural substrates of these
abnormalities.
Although a number of studies have reported RPE abnormalities (e.g. most recently,
Kumar, Goer, Murray, et al., 2018), to our knowledge only a few have tested for
expected reward value encoding abnormalities using fMRI with a computational
model in MDD patients: we reported blunted reward value encoding (Gradin, Ku-
mar, Waiter, et al., 2011) and reduced reward value signals have been reported in
elderly depressed patients with a history of suicide attempts (Dombrovski, Szanto,
Clark, et al., 2013). In addition, Greenberg et al. reported that healthy subjects
but not unipolar unmedicated depressed patients showed the expected theoretical
inverse relationship between prediction error and reward expectancy, mediated
by anhedonia (Greenberg, Chase, Almeida, et al., 2015) with similar observations
in medicated depressed patients with MDD or bipolar disorder (Chase, Nusslock,
Almeida, et al., 2013). Notably though, Greenberg et al. did not find evidence for
blunted reward value or RPE signals in unmedicated unipolar depression (Green-
berg, Fournier, Sisitsky, et al., 2015).
Here we tested the following four hypotheses: (a) is it possible to replicate previous
findings of blunted striatal reward response signals in MDD (Keren, O’Callaghan,
Vidal-Ribas, et al., 2018), (b) do unmedicated subjects with MDD exhibit abnormal
brain encoding of learned Pavlovian reward values during decision making, (c) are
there correlations between aberrant brain encoding and illness severity and (d) is
there evidence for abnormal event-related connectivity in MDD for brain regions
identified as exhibiting abnormal encoding of reward values.
4.2 Methods and Materials
4.2.1 Participants
The study was approved by the East of Scotland Research Ethics Committee (REC
reference 13/ES/0043) and written informed consent obtained from all subjects.
Thirty-nine subjects comprising 19 satisfying DSM-IV criteria for MDD not receiving
antidepressant medication and 20 healthy controls matched on age, sex and IQ
60
Chapter 4. Abnormal Reward Valuation and Event-Related Connectivity in
Unmedicated Major Depressive Disorder
(NART; Nelson and Willison, 1991) were recruited. Diagnosis was made according
to MINI Plus v5.0 structured diagnostic criteria (Sheehan, Lecrubier, Sheehan, et al.,
1998). Demographics and illness severity (Beck Depression Inventory, BDI; Beck,
Steer, Ball, and Ranieri, 1996) scores are summarised in Table 4.1 with more de-
tails in Supplementary Materials. Exclusion criteria were claustrophobia, serious
physical illness, pre-existing cerebrovascular or other neurological disease, previous
history of significant head injury and receipt of medication likely to affect brain
function. Subjects were recruited using the University of Dundee advertisement
system HERMES and compensated for participation (£20) with up to £10 extra de-
pending on task performance. One MDD subject and four controls were excluded
due to problems with fMRI data acquisition, so data from 18 MDD subjects and 16
controls were analysed. Power estimation in fMRI is recognised as difficult because
of the complexity of the analyses and not possible in this instance as no previous
similar data existed to allow such an estimate. We did however know on the basis of
previous work that the behavioural data, acquired in the same experimental session,
showed a significant abnormality (Rupprechter, Stankevicius, Huys, Steele, et al.,
2018).
Group N Age range Sex (F/M) BDI NART
Patients 18 18 – 33 15 / 3 25.9± 12.9 45.8± 4.5










TABLE 4.1: Clinical characteristics of subjects Group. BDI, Beck
Depression Inventory; NART, National Adult Reading Test. Data are
displayed as n or mean ± standard deviation. For more details see
online Supplementary materials.
4.2.2 Paradigm
The task was adapted from our earlier work (Stankevicius, Huys, Kalra, and Ser-
iès, 2014) and described in detail in Supplementary Materials. Subjects passively
observed a series of different fractals; each fractal was always followed by either a
reward symbol (£) indicating “value” or a blank screen indicating “no value”. Each
fractal was observed on four occasions. Participants had to form an internal es-
timate of the value (reward probability) associated with each fractal (i.e. number
of observed rewards divided by total number of observations). The fractal then
appeared at a later time in a single decision trial where subjects were asked to
choose the higher reward probability, which required comparison of their internally
estimated value for the fractal with a displayed numeric value. Participants made
a choice by pressing one of two available buttons (“choose fractal” and “choose
explicit probability”). Either option could have a value 10, 20 or 30% higher than
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FIGURE 4.1: Pavlovian learning paradigm. Participants passively
observed different fractals followed by reward or no reward. From
these observations they estimated the probability of reward for each
fractal then choose the higher of their estimated fractal value or an
explicitly presented value.
the other or be of equal value. Either option could have a value 10, 20 or 30% higher
than the other or be of equal value. This means a total of 240 fractals (60×4) were ob-
served with 60 decisions being made. The sequence of observations and decisions
were interleaved in a pseudo-random order and identical for all subjects. The study
was divided into four sessions of 15 min each, between which there were periods
where participants could briefly rest. Each session was split into three blocks and
during each block participants made five decisions after having observed 5 × 4
fractals. Participants did not receive feedback during the task but were told their
performance scores would be converted into money they would receive at the end
of the experiment. The task is summarised in Figure 4.1.
4.2.3 Computational Modelling of Behaviour
To measure individuals’ performance, their psychometric response curves were
plotted as the percentage of times a fractal option was chosen as a function of the
difference between the probabilities associated with each option with curves fitted
with a sigmoid function (Rupprechter, Stankevicius, Huys, Steele, et al., 2018). The
slopes of the sigmoid curves were significantly steeper for controls compared to
MDD (p = 0.025) and detailed computational analyses indicated that MDD was
associated with impaired value learning. Details on these behavioural analyses are
summarised in the Supplementary Materials and have been published elsewhere
(Rupprechter, Stankevicius, Huys, Steele, et al., 2018).
Briefly, to reveal which decision-making components explained the performance
difference, three different families of models were compared, reflecting distinct
hypotheses about how participants make decisions. All models assumed partic-
ipants internally estimated a value for each observed fractal then compared this
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estimate to the explicitly presented value when making a decision. For model fitting,
parameters were estimated using maximum a posteriori estimates incorporating
an empirical prior estimated from behavioural data initialised using maximum
likelihood estimates. Thereafter, expectation–maximisation was used to iteratively
improve the value estimates and the model that best fitted the behavioural data,
taking into account model complexity, was identified using the integrated Bayesian
information criterion (Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan, 2013; Rupprechter,
Stankevicius, Huys, Steele, et al., 2018). Here we focus on the best model identified
from that work (Rupprechter, Stankevicius, Huys, Steele, et al., 2018) as this was
used for model-based fMRI analyses.
The model that best described observed behaviour was termed “Leaky” and in-
cluded a retrospective discounting factor or memory loss parameter (Rupprechter,
Stankevicius, Huys, Steele, et al., 2018). Internal value estimates were assumed to
be updated after observing fractal i and associated reward r occurring at time t as





where A is a memory parameter (range 0− 1) and smaller A reflected increased for-
getting or retrospective discounting, r was unity if a £ reward symbol was observed
and zero otherwise. The probability of choosing fractal i was calculated using a
softmax function
p(choose fractal i) = σ(β × (f(Vi)− φi)) =
1
1 + exp(−β × (f(Vi)− φi))
, (4.2)
incorporating estimated value (V ) and explicitly presented value (φ) where f(x) =
x/4 is a transformation of the internal value estimate compared to the explicitly
displayed reward probability of the alternative choice. The inverse temperature β
determined the ability of participants to use internal value estimations to make
decisions. Smaller values of β indicated a more variable use of internal values.
4.2.4 Image Acquisition and Pre-processing
Functional whole brain images were acquired using a 3T Siemens Magnetom Tim
Trio scanner using an echo-planar imaging sequence with the following parameters:
repetition time = 2500 ms, echo time = 30 ms, flip angle = 90◦, field of view = 224
mm, matrix = 64× 64, 37 slices, voxel size 3.5× 3.5× 3.5 mm. The first four blood
oxygen level-dependent volumes were discarded as standard because of transient
effects. Data were pre-processed using Statistical Parametric Mapping 12 (SPM121)
with functional images realigned to the first image, unwarped and co-registered
1https://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/
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to the segmented T1 weighted structural image. An estimated deformation field
was used to spatially normalise the images and an 8 mm Gaussian kernel used to
smooth the functional images.
Random-effects, event-related designs were used for analyses. Three event times
were of particular interest: (a) when participants observed a fractal stimulus and
may have retrieved their previously estimated value for that fractal, (b) when par-
ticipants observed a rewarding Pavlovian association (£ symbol) indicating reward
value or alternatively a blank screen in the case of zero value, this being the trial
“outcome event” and (c) when participants were prompted to choose between the
estimated value of an observed fractal and an explicit probability value this being
the “decision event”. For first level analyses, events were modelled as truncated
delta functions and convolved with the SPM12 canonical haemodynamic response
function without time or dispersion derivatives. Vectors representing these events
were entered into first level analyses for each subject and six rigid body motion re-
alignment parameters estimated during pre-processing included as covariates of no
interest. Activation at these event times was investigated using both model-based
and standard fMRI strategies, testing for significant activations across and between
groups and for correlations of activity with illness severity scores.
Given strong evidence for blunted striatal responses to rewards in depression, we
used the results of an automated meta-analysis of fMRI studies on healthy subjects
(“Neurosynth”, Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, et al., 2011) with the search term “reward”
which identified 922 studies. We then chose voxels with the global maximum z-
score in left and right hemisphere located in left (-12, 10, -8) and right (12, 10, -8)
nucleus accumbens (NAc). For each participant in our study we extracted median
beta values from the reward contrast maps from a 5 mm sphere centred at these
co-ordinates, then tested for significant group differences using Welch’s t test.
For model-based fMRI, the Leaky model was used to calculate the value of each
fractal on each trial. The estimated value was used as a first level analysis parametric
modulator at the time when the fractal stimulus was presented. Additionally, the
difference between the internally estimated fractal probability value and the dis-
played explicit probability value was calculated and used as a parametric modulator
at the decision time. The value difference was defined as Vchosen − Valternative, i.e.
the value of the chosen option minus the value of the alternative option. Notably,
our model uses the value difference to assign probabilities for choosing each option
at the decision time. We therefore expected to observe a value difference encoding
signal in regions identified as being active at the decision time.
Event-related functional connectivity between brain regions activated during the
task was calculated using the generalised psychophysiological interaction (gPPI)
method (McLaren, Ries, Xu, and Johnson, 2012), which tested the hypothesis that
value-based decision making involves a distributed network and MDD is associated
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with abnormal connectivity in that network. Specifically, we assessed how the “deci-
sion event” (the psychological state) modulated activity within brain networks that
included our anterior mid-cingulate cortex (aMCC, Tolomeo, Christmas, Jentzsch,
et al., 2016) seed region. For each participant, we calculated the contrast at the first
(i.e. subject) level (connectivity at decision time > implicit baseline) and then took
these contrasts to a standard second (i.e. group) level analysis using SPM12.
For all calculations, activity was corrected for multiple comparisons using a Monte
Carlo method (Slotnick, Moo, Segal, and Hart Jr, 2003) with simultaneous require-
ment for a cluster extent threshold of 108 contiguous resampled voxels and a voxel
threshold of p < 0.05, resulting in a whole brain corrected cluster threshold of
p < 0.01. This threshold was enforced for all contrasts. With the exception of the
NAc ROI-selection as described above, inference was performed on a whole-brain
level and follow-up ROI analyses were based on local maxima of these whole-brain
activations.
4.3 Results
There was no significant difference between MDD and control groups in the number
of (missed) behavioural responses from subjects during the paradigm: two group t
test p = 0.728. Since behavioural responses were matched and subjects were not
given feedback during the task, all events were matched between groups.
4.3.1 Striatal Reward Response
Given strong evidence for blunted striatal reward response in depression (Gradin,
Kumar, Waiter, et al., 2011; Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin, et al., 2015; Steele, Kumar,
and Ebmeier, 2007), we performed both a whole-brain analysis as well as a region
of interest (see Section 4.2.4) analysis. The outcome event time was associated
with strong activations in regions including the bilateral striatum (10, 12, -4), (-10,
18, 0), aMCC (-10, 10, 48) and bilateral dorsolateral cortex (-46, 8, 24), (44, 6, 32).
Consistent with our first hypothesis using the Region of Interest (ROI) approach,
striatal activation to reward symbols were significantly blunted in unmedicated
MDD in right NAc (12, 10, -8), t(25.54) = 2.907, p = 0.007 with a trend for left NAc
(-12, 10, -8), t(22.80) = 1.953, p = 0.063 (Figure 4.2a). Using voxel-based methods
not confined to the NAc, we found significantly blunted activation in left (-22, 14,
-16) and right striatum (12, 4, -4), (22, 26, 10) (Figure 4.2b). This is consistent with
our independent studies of chronically medicated patients with treatment-resistant
MDD (Gradin, Kumar, Waiter, et al., 2011; Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin, et al., 2015;
Steele, Kumar, and Ebmeier, 2007) and other reports from independent groups (e.g.
Keren, O’Callaghan, Vidal-Ribas, et al., 2018).
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FIGURE 4.2: Reward events. (a) Reward activation in NAc ROIs, (b) de-
creased reward activation in MDD participants compared to healthy
controls (HC) in the striatum. All regions significant at p < 0.01
whole-brain corrected.
4.3.2 Reward Value Encoding
At the fractal presentation time, the estimated value of the presented fractal was
used as a parametric modulator at the first level. Single group second level analy-
ses showed positive encoding of reward value (activation) in controls (Figure 4.3a)
in areas including hippocampus (-38, -28, 0), (46, -26, -2) and rostral ACC (rACC)
(14, 50, -2) and negative encoding (deactivation) of reward value in MDD subjects
(Figure 4.3b) in hippocampus (-30, -30, -2), (36, -26, -2) and rACC (14, 50, -10). A
subsequent two-group comparison revealed significantly larger positive value en-
coding in controls compared to MDD participants (Figure 4.3c, d) in hippocampus
(-36, -32, 2), (48, -26, 4) and rACC (14, 50, -8). Having observed these positive and
negative value encodings within the hippocampus, we extracted estimated contrast-
beta values from the maximum difference voxel (-36,-32,2) and illustrate it split
by group in Figure 4.3d. Note that this post-hoc analysis was primarily performed
for more detailed visualisation rather than inference purposes. We then predicted
that encoding signals in the two regions showing group differences (rACC and hip-
pocampus) would also be related to depression severity; i.e. variation in depression
severity within the depressed group might similarly be related to a change in value
encoding. To test this we again extracted contrast-betas from local-maxima voxels
and ran regression analyses. Within MDD subjects only, there was a significant
negative correlation of BDI illness severity with extracted contrast-betas from the
rACC (r = −0.59, p = 0.009; (14,50,-8); Figure 4.3e) but not hippocampus (r = −0.02,
p = 0.931; (-36,-32,2)).
In addition to classical statistical inference it is important to test for individual
patient predictive accuracy (Steele and Paulus, 2019). Logistic regression with leave-
one-out cross-validation was used to classify participants as MDD or controls using
median beta values of the value encoding contrast at rACC and left hippocampal
ROIs. The classifier achieved an individual subject accuracy of 79% (area under the
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FIGURE 4.3: Reward value encoding at fractal presentation time.
(a) Positive value encoding within healthy controls. (b) Negative
value encoding in depressed participants. (c) Larger value encod-
ing in healthy controls (HC) compared to MDD participants in hip-
pocampus and rostral ACC. All regions significant at p < 0.01 whole-
brain corrected. (d) Group comparison of value encoding in hip-
pocampal ROI (-36,-32,2). (e) Within MDD subjects negative correla-
tion between BDI illness severity and rAC (14,50,-8) value encoding
(r = −0.59, p = 0.009).
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Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve Area Under Curve (AUC) = 0.86; see
Supplementary Materials).
4.3.3 Decision Making
The decision event time was associated with strong activation in regions including
the aMCC (-2, 14, 50) and bilateral anterior insula (-28, 22, -2), (32, 26, -6) across
both groups (Figure 4.4a), a pattern consistent with activation of cognitive control
processes as identified in a large meta-analysis (Shackman, Salomons, Slagter, et al.,
2011). Bilateral insula, subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (-2, 28, -2) and aMCC (-
12, 20, 32) (22, 28, 42) activity was significantly increased in MDD subjects compared
to controls (Figure 4.4b), with the aMCC region (-6, 26, 36) correlating positively
with BDI illness severity scores within the MDD group alone.
The difference between the value of the chosen option and the value of the alter-
native option was used as a parametric modulator at the first level. In the softmax
decision rule, the value difference is used together with the beta inverse tempera-
ture parameter to calculate choice probabilities. Across participants, we observed a
significant negative correlation of value difference encoding in regions including
the aMCC region (-14, 16, 48), (12, 24, 28) (Figure 4.4c). In addition, a negatively
correlated absolute value difference encoding signal was also observed in regions
including aMCC (-4, 24, 46), (10, 10, 46) (Figure 4.4d) and a positively correlated
absolute value difference signal was observed in regions including the rACC (-16, 42,
8), (-4, 50, -14), (24, 38, 4) (Figure 4.4e). Mean value difference and mean absolute
value difference were weakly correlated across participants (r = 0.36, p = 0.037). We
did not identify a significant difference between groups for either value encoding
parameter within these dorsal and rostral cingulate regions (see Supplementary
Materials).
4.3.4 Event-related Connectivity
The aMCC region from the decision event time activation across groups was used
as a seed region for a gPPI analysis, to test whether this region exhibited abnormal
event-related connectivity in MDD compared to controls. Significantly weaker
connectivity at the decision time between the dACC and posterior, mid and rostral
cingulate cortex regions (-12, 42, 4), (8, 50, 8) in MDD was identified as shown in
Figure 4.4f.
4.3.5 Post-hoc Correction for Grey Matter Variation
Because there is evidence for hippocampal volume reductions in recurrent depres-
sion (Schmaal, Veltman, Erp, et al., 2016; Schmaal, Hibar, Sämann, et al., 2017)
an additional analysis was done (see also Supplementary Materials) to test for the
effect of grey matter variation on fMRI findings. For every participant the estimated
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FIGURE 4.4: Activation during decision making. (a) Activation across
all participants (p < 0.05 FWE threshold). (b) Larger activations in
MDD compared to controls. (c) Negative value difference encoding
signal across participants. (d) Negative absolute value difference
encoding signal across participants. (e) Positive absolute value differ-
ence encoding signal across participants. (f) Decreased event-related
connectivity in depression between dorsal cingulate region and other
cingulate regions. All regions significant at p < 0.01 whole-brain
corrected.
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forward deformation field was used to normalise the grey matter probability image,
thereby obtaining for each resampled voxel an estimate of the probability that a
voxel was grey matter. Beta values in the hippocampal and rostral anterior cingulate
of the fMRI contrast images were then multiplied by these grey matter probabilities
and two group t tests used to test for differences. The results still showed signifi-
cant fMRI group differences: left hippocampus t(21.36) = 3.313, p = 0.003; right
hippocampus t(31.03) = 2.501, p = 0.018; rACC t(31.19) = 2.890, p = 0.007.
4.4 Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first study to test hypotheses about abnormal reward
value encoding and event-related connectivity in patients with unmedicated MDD.
In our previous detailed behavioural analyses (Rupprechter, Stankevicius, Huys,
Steele, et al., 2018) we reported impaired behavioural performance in MDD caused
by impairments in both value learning and decision phases of our Pavlovian task;
MDD subjects also showed lower memory of observed reward and had an impaired
ability to use internal value estimations to guide decision making (Rupprechter,
Stankevicius, Huys, Steele, et al., 2018). Here we sought to identify the neural
substrates of these behavioural abnormalities.
Consistent with our first hypothesis, we found that the striatal reward activation
was blunted as was the reward signal in an independently defined NAc ROI of
unmedicated MDD subjects. This is consistent with our previous independent
studies on chronically medicated treatment-resistant MDD (Gradin, Kumar, Waiter,
et al., 2011; Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin, et al., 2015; Steele, Kumar, and Ebmeier,
2007) and reports by independent groups (Keren, O’Callaghan, Vidal-Ribas, et
al., 2018; Zhang, Chang, Guo, et al., 2013). Whilst the region is often referred to
generically in the literature as the “striatum”, which includes the NAc and caudate,
the region of significantly blunted reward activation during our Pavlovian task also
prominently included the region between the two NAc (Figure 4.2b) which is the
septum (Mai, Majtanik, and Paxinos, 2015). This structure is part of the septo-
hippocampal system which is strongly implicated in anxiety and in the action of
antidepressant and anxiolytic medication (Gray and McNaughton, 2000). Notably,
using a very different instrumental task to study an independent group of treat-
ment-resistant medicated patients with MDD, we also observed septal reward signal
blunting and similarly asymmetric blunting of the NAc (Figure 4.3b; Johnston,
Tolomeo, Gradin, et al., 2015). Further study of septal reward response blunting in
MDD is indicated.
Consistent with our second hypothesis, we found brain regions with decreased
reward value signal encoding in MDD, in particular hippocampus and rACC. We
have previously reported decreased reward value encoding in the hippocampus of
an independent group of chronically medicated patients with treatment-resistant
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MDD using an instrumental learning task (Gradin, Kumar, Waiter, et al., 2011)
and as noted above, there is strong evidence for hippocampal abnormalities in
treatment-resistant and recurrent MDD (Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin, et al., 2015;
Schmaal, Veltman, Erp, et al., 2016). Here, using a novel Pavlovian reward task with
unmedicated MDD subjects, we report positive reward value encoding in the hip-
pocampus of controls and negative reward value encoding of reward value in MDD.
Interestingly, a recent Pavlovian study using aversive stimulus learning reported
positive encoding of an aversive conditioned stimulus signal in the habenula of
controls and negative encoding in MDD (Lawson, Nord, Seymour, et al., 2017).
Recent meta-analyses and reviews have provided substantial evidence for the in-
volvement of regions in the PFC including the rACC in the encoding of reward
value (Bartra, McGuire, and Kable, 2013; Chase, Kumar, Eickhoff, and Dombrovski,
2015). The ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) is thought to be a key region involved in
value-based decision making (Gläscher, Hampton, and O’doherty, 2008; Treadway,
Bossaller, Shelton, and Zald, 2012). Notably, Glaescher and colleagues reported
that the vmPFC encoded value signals from a computational model in addition
to the amygdala-hippocampal complex, although these value signals were related
to actions and expected outcomes (Gläscher, Hampton, and O’doherty, 2008). Re-
duced expected reward value signals have previously been reported in the vmPFC of
suicide attempters (Dombrovski, Szanto, Clark, et al., 2013). Importantly and consis-
tent with our third hypothesis, we found a significant negative correlation between
illness severity and rACC value encoding within MDD subjects alone. Consequently,
there is considerable evidence for reward value encoding in the hippocampus
and vmPFC of healthy subjects, and in addition to the present study, evidence for
blunted reward value encoding in two independent studies: on MDD (Gradin, Ku-
mar, Waiter, et al., 2011) and attempted suicide (Dombrovski, Szanto, Clark, et al.,
2013). This suggests these two regions are part of the neural substrates of impaired
value learning observed in our behavioural analyses (Rupprechter, Stankevicius,
Huys, Steele, et al., 2018).
The aMCC has been highlighted as crucial for decision making in a large meta-
analysis of healthy subjects (Shackman, Salomons, Slagter, et al., 2011), and it
has been suggested that abnormalities of anterior cingulate reward-linked com-
putational function and connectivity could explain core symptoms in a variety of
disorders including MDD (Holroyd and Umemoto, 2016). Consistent with this, we
have reported decision-making abnormalities in treatment-resistant MDD patients
receiving aMCC therapeutic lesions (Tolomeo, Christmas, Jentzsch, et al., 2016)
and evidence for electro-convulsive therapy therapeutically altering aMCC connec-
tivity in an independent group of patients with treatment-resistant MDD (Perrin,
Merz, Bennett, et al., 2012). Also consistent with our second hypothesis, in the
present study we found abnormally increased activation in MDD and encoding
of a value difference signal in the aMCC region at the decision time, linking our
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behavioural model (Rupprechter, Stankevicius, Huys, Steele, et al., 2018) to localised
brain function. Consistent with our fourth hypothesis, event-related connectivity
analysis at the decision time revealed reduced connectivity between the aMCC and
more rostral ACC regions, in MDD compared to controls. An influential theory
of aMCC function linking cognitive control, valuation and motivation, proposes
that the underlying function of the aMCC is to determine how much control to
allocate (Shenhav, Botvinick, and Cohen, 2013). Consistent with our interpretation,
the theory posits that the aMCC receives value-representation inputs from regions
such as the vmPFC which are used to monitor outcomes and adjust the level of con-
trol. There is evidence that abnormal anterior cingulate cortex maturation during
adolescence contributes to the development of MDD reflected by inflexible aMCC
connectivity (Ho, Sacchet, Connolly, et al., 2017). The present work suggests this
could be related to impairment in the communication of value estimates from the
rACC to the aMCC where these estimates are used to guide decision making.
A large meta-analysis of subcortical regions found decreased hippocampal volume
in recurrent depression (Schmaal, Veltman, Erp, et al., 2016) and a later meta-
analysis reported a range of cortical structural abnormalities including the rACC
(Schmaal, Hibar, Sämann, et al., 2017) although see Shen, Reus, Cox, et al. (2017). We
therefore did additional analyses addressing the possibility of structural differences
influencing our results (Results section and Supplementary Materials). The value en-
coding signals remained significantly different between groups and our conclusions
are unaltered. Reward and loss have different value functions with overlapping but
different neural substrates which are relevant for MDD (Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin,
et al., 2015) but we could not address this using our current paradigm, although
see Lawson, Nord, Seymour, et al. (2017). A possible limitation of our analyses is
that the voxel threshold p < 0.05 was within the permitted range but not the ideal
range. We therefore repeated the analyses using a more stringent voxel threshold
p < 0.01 and found the results analogous with the exception of the encoding of neg-
ative value difference across subjects which was not significant (see Supplementary
Materials).
4.5 Conclusions
A close link between emotional experience and valuation has previously been pro-
posed (Dolan, 2002). Diverse symptoms of MDD can be explained within a deci-
sion-theoretic framework in which abnormal valuation plays a central role (Huys,
Daw, and Dayan, 2015; Huys and Renz, 2017). We reported behavioural evidence
for abnormal reward value learning and decision making in depression (Chapter 3,
Rupprechter, Stankevicius, Huys, Steele, et al., 2018) and here we identified the
neural substrates of these abnormalities as being the striatum, septo-hippocampal
system and anterior cingulate, with both reward value encoding and event-related
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connectivity being abnormal. This supports the theory that abnormally biased
neural valuation plays a central role in MDD, and suggests there is impaired com-
munication between the neural substrates of valuation and decision making in
depression.
To the extent that emotion reflects valuation, abnormal valuation could explain
abnormal emotional experience in MDD, reflect a core pathophysiological process
and be a target of treatment. Finally, MDD may not be the only common psychiatric
illness associated with abnormal neural valuation, as there is also evidence for
schizophrenia (Gradin, Kumar, Waiter, et al., 2011) and addiction (Redish, 2004;
Redish, Jensen, and Johnson, 2008), implying different psychiatric disorders may
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Abstract
Major Depressive Disorder is a leading cause of disability and significant mortality
yet mechanistic understanding remains limited. Over the past decade evidence has
accumulated from case-control studies that depressive illness is associated with
blunted reward activation in the basal ganglia and other regions such as the medial
prefrontal cortex. However it is unclear whether this finding can be replicated in
a large number of subjects. The functional anatomy of the medial prefrontal cor-
tex and basal ganglia has been extensively studied and the former has excitatory
glutamatergic projections to the latter. Reduced effect of glutamatergic projections
from the prefrontal cortex to the nucleus accumbens has been argued to underlie
motivational disorders such as depression, and many prominent theories of Ma-
jor Depressive Disorder propose a role for abnormal cortico-limbic connectivity.
However, it is unclear whether there is abnormal reward-linked effective connec-
tivity between the medial prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia related to depression.
Whilst resting-state connectivity abnormalities have been frequently reported in
depression, it has not been possible to directly link these findings to reward-learning
studies. Here we tested two main hypotheses. First, mood symptoms are associated
with blunted striatal reward prediction error signals in a large community-based
sample of recovered and currently ill patients, similar to reports from a number of
studies. Second, event-related directed medial prefrontal cortex to basal ganglia
effective connectivity is abnormally increased or decreased related to the severity
of mood symptoms. Using an RDoC approach, data were acquired from a large
community-based sample of subjects who participated in a probabilistic reward
learning task during event-related fMRI. Computational modelling of behaviour,
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model-free and model-based fMRI, and effective connectivity dynamic causal mod-
elling analyses were used to test hypotheses. Increased depressive symptom severity
was related to decreased reward signals in areas which included the nucleus ac-
cumbens in 475 participants. Decreased reward-related effective connectivity from
the medial prefrontal cortex to striatum was associated with increased depressive
symptom severity in 165 participants. Decreased striatal activity may have been
due to decreased cortical to striatal connectivity consistent with glutamatergic and
cortical-limbic related theories of depression and resulted in reduced direct path-
way basal ganglia output. Further study of basal ganglia pathophysiology is required
to better understand these abnormalities in patients with depressive symptoms and
syndromes.
5.1 Introduction
Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is a leading cause of disability worldwide and a
cause of significant mortality, yet there is wide agreement that its treatment has not
changed fundamentally in over half a century (Steele and Paulus, 2019). However,
there is now substantial evidence from a series of independent neuroimaging stud-
ies acquired over more than a decade, that MDD is associated with blunted reward
signals in the medial prefrontal cortex and particularly in the basal ganglia (Forbes,
Christopher May, Siegle, et al., 2006; Steele, Kumar, and Ebmeier, 2007; Kumar,
Waiter, Ahearn, et al., 2008; Pizzagalli, Holmes, Dillon, et al., 2009; Eshel and Roiser,
2010; Gradin, Kumar, Waiter, et al., 2011; Zhang, Chang, Guo, et al., 2013; Pizzagalli,
2014; Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin, et al., 2015; Stringaris, Vidal-Ribas Belil, Artiges,
et al., 2015; Rothkirch, Tonn, Köhler, and Sterzer, 2017; Keren, O’Callaghan, Vidal-
Ribas, et al., 2018; Kumar, Goer, Murray, et al., 2018), consistent with earlier large
behavioural decision making studies (Forbes, Shaw, and Dahl, 2007) and the conclu-
sions of a large behavioural meta-analysis on decision making in depression (Huys,
Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan, 2013).
In addition to studies on task-based reward processing, there are now many studies
of resting state connectivity in major depressive disorder (Kaiser, Andrews-Hanna,
Wager, and Pizzagalli, 2015; Kaiser, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Dillon, et al., 2016); how-
ever, the link between blunted reward signals in task-based reward learning studies
and possible event-related connectivity abnormalities in MDD remains unclear.
Functional connectivity abnormalities present during a resting-state study may
be different from event-related effective connectivity abnormalities during rein-
forcement learning studies involving valenced (reward or punishment) feedback.
Recognition of different types of connectivity is important, because a number of
prominent theories propose a role for abnormal connectivity in depression (May-
berg, Lozano, Voon, et al., 2005; Disner, Beevers, Haigh, and Beck, 2011; Roiser,
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Elliott, and Sahakian, 2012; Russo and Nestler, 2013; Pizzagalli, 2014) without distin-
guishing different types of connectivity. Whilst most MDD neuroimaging studies
have focused on resting state undirected functional connectivity, a recent exception
reported blunted striatal reward prediction error signals and blunted reward-linked
ventral tegmental (VTA) area to striatal event-related connectivity (Kumar, Goer,
Murray, et al., 2018). The VTA projection is dopaminergic, has been extensively
studied in animals and is part of the classical basal ganglia thalamocortical circuit
(Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Alexander, Crutcher, and DeLong, 1991).
Event-related fMRI studies of reward learning tasks in humans report consistent
activation of the basal ganglia and rostral-subgenual medial prefrontal cortex (e.g.
Kim, Shimojo, and O’Doherty, 2011; Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin, et al., 2015) which
are prominent parts of the limbic basal ganglia thalamocortical circuits. The medial
prefrontal cortex to basal ganglia projection has been studied in animals and is
glutamatergic (Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Alexander, Crutcher, and DeLong,
1991). We were particularly interested in whether the effective connectivity for this
medial prefrontal projection was abnormal in volunteers with increased depressive
symptoms and decreased brain reward responses. The rostral cingulate is important
as influential Positron Emission Tomography (PET) imaging studies reported abnor-
mal metabolic activity in MDD (Drevets, Price, Simpson Jr, et al., 1997; Mayberg,
Lozano, Voon, et al., 2005) which motivated a subgenual deep brain stimulation
international treatment trial (Holtzheimer, Husain, Lisanby, et al., 2017).
Here we analysed behaviour and fMRI data from a large community-based sample
of volunteers. A dimensional approach was chosen because the Research Domain
Criteria (RDoC, Insel, Cuthbert, Garvey, et al., 2010) approach aims to explore the
“full range of variation from normal to abnormal”, recognising current diagnostic
systems “do not adequately reflect relevant neurobiological and behavioural sys-
tems — impeding not only research on aetiology and pathophysiology but also the
development of new treatments” (Cuthbert and Insel, 2013). Our behavioural task
included an aspect of control, as there have been reports that reward processing
may be affected by whether an individual values making their own choices and in
our previous work (Romaniuk, Sandu, Waiter, et al., 2019), we found evidence for an
association between the inherent value of choice and activation in MDD-related
regions including striatum and medial prefrontal cortex.
Two primary hypotheses were tested: (a) mood symptoms are associated with ab-
normally blunted reward and/or reward prediction error signals, similar to reports
from a number of clinical studies, and (b) there is abnormal (increased or decreased)
event-related, directed rostral anterior cingulate to basal ganglia effective connectiv-
ity, linked to the severity of mood symptoms. In addition motivated by our previous
work (Romaniuk, Sandu, Waiter, et al., 2019), we also tested the hypothesis that
(c) individuals learned differently from outcomes depending on whether they had
control over decisions, related to the presence of mood symptoms.
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5.2 Materials and methods
5.2.1 Participants
Subjects were recruited via the Stratifying Resilience and Depression Longitudinally
(STRADL) study (Navrady, Wolters, MacIntyre, et al., 2017; Habota, Sandu, Waiter,
et al., 2019). The STRADL clinical cohort is a subset of the Generation Scotland
Scottish Family Health Study who were originally recruited in Scotland 2006–2011,
aged over 18 at the time (Smith, Campbell, Linksted, et al., 2012). Generation
Scotland participants residing in north east Scotland (Grampian and Tayside areas)
were invited to attend a clinic in Aberdeen or Dundee for MRI scanning, other
testing and sample collection.
5.2.2 Clinical Interview and Questionnaire Data
All participants were assessed for a lifetime history of MDD using the Structured
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV disorders (SCID, First, Spitzer, Gibbon, Williams, et al.,
2002). Diagnostic criteria were based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR). Participants also completed a series of question-
naires which included The Quick Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology (QIDS,
Rush, Trivedi, Ibrahim, et al., 2003) which is sixteen-item inventory designed to as-
sess the severity of depression symptoms, and the Hospital Anxiety and Depression
Scale (HADS, Zigmond and Snaith, 1983) anxiety subscale (seven items) which was
used to assess symptoms of anxiety (Habota, Sandu, Waiter, et al., 2019).
5.2.3 Participant Selection and Analyses
Computational modelling of behaviour and event-related fMRI analyses were per-
formed on 475 participants which included twenty subjects with a current Major
Depressive Episode (MDE) (Table 5.1). For Dynamic Causal Modelling (DCM) 165
subjects were selected who had sufficiently strong fMRI signals in the regions of
interest. Sufficiently strong signals are required for DCM to be valid, despite depres-
sive symptoms being associated with blunting of signal strength in clinical studies.
Data selection is summarised in Fig. S9 and further described in the Supplementary
material which contains additional analyses, showing that varying the inclusion
criteria did not significantly influence the DCM results. Importantly, included
and excluded subjects did not differ significantly with respect to QIDS depression
severity scores.
5.2.4 Scanning and Behavioural Paradigms
T1 weighted images and fMRI data were acquired at Dundee and Aberdeen Uni-
versities. For fMRI acquisition in Dundee, a 3T Siemens PRISMA was used with TR
1.56 sec, TE 22 ms, FA 70 degrees, FOV 217 mm, matrix 64 × 64, 32 axial slices; in
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Healthy participants Past MDD Current MDE
Number of subjects 345 110 20






Sex (F/M) 177 / 168 78 / 32 16 / 4












TABLE 5.1: Demographic and clinicals details. QIDS = Quick Inven-
tory of Depressive Symptomatology–Self Report; HADS = Hospital
Anxiety and Depression Scale; GHQ = General Health Questionnaire;
sd = standard deviation
Aberdeen a 3T Philips ACHIEVA was used with TR 1.56 sec, TE 26 ms, FA 70 degrees,
FOV 217 mm, matrix 64× 64, 32 axial slices. Subjects completed 66 trials of a proba-
bilistic reward learning task (Romaniuk, Sandu, Waiter, et al., 2019) which involved
choosing one of two stimuli (yellow or blue squares). Participants were not told that
the stimuli were associated with different reward probabilities (80% for the yellow
square, 20% for the blue square) and feedback on their choices was provided by dis-
play of a number of points: 100 points for a “win” or reward, 0 points for “no win” or
no reward. During the first phase of each trial a cue indicated whether participants
would be allowed to freely make a choice between the two squares or whether the
computer would choose for them and they had to follow that choice. Phases were
jittered, allowing for disambiguation. The number of trials was split into 33 “choice”










FIGURE 5.1: Probabilistic reward learning task. Subjects completed
trials of a probabilistic reward learning task which involved choosing
one of two stimuli. During the first phase of each trial a cue indicated
whether participants would be allowed to freely make a choice be-
tween the two squares or whether the computer would choose for
them and they had to follow that choice. During the second phase a
choice was made or confirmed. During the third phase an outcome
(“no reward” or “reward”) was presented.
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5.2.5 Computational modelling of behaviour
Five reinforcement learning models represented distinct hypotheses about how
subjects learned during the task (Table S1). The aims of the modelling were to
(a) correlate model parameter estimates with depressive symptom severity scores,
(b) estimate reward prediction error (RPE) signals for use in model-based fMRI
analyses and (c) compare learning during choice vs. no-choice trials. Model 1
assumed participants only learned from choice outcomes and ignored no-choice
outcomes, model 2 assumed participants learned equally well during both choice
and no-choice trials, model 3 assumed participants learned at different rates on
choice vs no-choice trials, model 4 assumed reward outcomes were experienced
differently depending on the choice vs. no-choice condition (i.e. different “reward
sensitivity” parameters) and model 5 assumed both learning and outcomes were
experienced differently (different learning rates and reward sensitivity parameters).
Fitted parameters were maximum a posteriori estimates and models were compared
using the integrated Bayesian Information Criterion (iBIC, Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan,
and Dayan, 2013) (Supplementary material).
5.2.6 Image pre-processing and GLM voxel based fMRI analyses
SPM12 was used for analyses with functional images realigned to the first image, un-
warped and slice time corrected. The T1 weighted structural image was segmented
and functional images were co-registered to the bias corrected T1 image. Images
were spatially normalised and smoothed using an 8mm Gaussian kernel. Additional
details are presented in the Supplementary material.
An event-related design was used for the first-level analysis. A first level general
linear model (GLM) design matrix included two columns for onsets of choice or
no-choice cues, four columns of possible outcomes (reward or no-reward dur-
ing choice or no-choice trials), two columns for responses (button-press) during
choice/no-choice trials, and one column for nuisance regressors (response time-out
or incorrect response during no-choice trials). Six rigid body motion realignment
parameters estimated during pre-processing were included as covariates of no in-
terest. For model-based fMRI analyses, the four outcome columns were replaced by
a single column of all outcome events and a column of the parametric modulator:
reward/no-reward outcome coded as 1 or 0, or the estimated Reward Prediction
Error (RPE) signal. Events were modelled as truncated delta-functions and con-
volved with the SPM12 canonical haemodynamic response function without time
or dispersion derivatives.
Contrast estimates from each subject’s first level analysis were taken to the sec-
ond level. Of interest was (a) the reward activations and RPE encoding signals
across all participants calculated using contrasts for the corresponding paramet-
ric modulator (as expected a contrast of reward(choice + no-choice) outcome >
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no-reward(choice + no-choice) outcome in the GLM matrix not using parametric
modulators gave similar results), (b) reward response during choice conditions com-
pared to reward response during no-choice conditions (reward(choice) outcome >
reward(no-choice) outcome), and (c) correlations with depressive symptom scores
across participants.
Multiple comparisons of effects linked to depressive symptom severity were cor-
rected using a whole brain cluster corrected threshold of p < 0.001, comprising
a simultaneous requirement for a p < 0.05 voxel threshold and >131 contiguous
supra-threshold voxels, this being estimated using Monte Carlo simulations (Sup-
plementary Materials, Slotnick, Moo, Segal, and Hart Jr, 2003).
5.2.7 Dynamic Causal Modelling of Event-Related Effective Connectiv-
ity
DCM (Friston, Ashburner, Kiebel, et al., 2007) was used to investigate how the
severity of depressive symptoms was associated with a small network of three brain
regions active during the task. Our connectivity hypotheses concerned between-
subject level inferences, meaning we tested for an association between QIDS scores
and the general task-independent connectivity (DCM “A” matrix).
Brain regions were selected to test the hypotheses of a mood linked change in ef-
fective connectivity between regions involved in the brain’s reward network. The
left ventral striatum (VS) centred at MNI (-12,10,-14) (local reward activation max-
imum; see results and Table S2) was selected because there is extensive evidence
for blunted activation in MDD (Steele, Kumar, and Ebmeier, 2007; Kumar, Waiter,
Ahearn, et al., 2008; Pizzagalli, Holmes, Dillon, et al., 2009; Eshel and Roiser, 2010;
Gradin, Kumar, Waiter, et al., 2011; Zhang, Chang, Guo, et al., 2013; Pizzagalli, 2014;
Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin, et al., 2015; Rothkirch, Tonn, Köhler, and Sterzer, 2017;
Keren, O’Callaghan, Vidal-Ribas, et al., 2018; Kumar, Goer, Murray, et al., 2018).
A medial prefrontal cortex (mPC) region was selected centred at (-2,52,18) (local
maximum of reward-choice activation; Figure 5.2C, Table S4) because this region
usually co-activates with the VS on reward delivery (O’Doherty, Dayan, Schultz,
et al., 2004; Gradin, Baldacchino, Balfour, et al., 2014; Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin,
et al., 2015) and the mPC has direct projections to the striatum (Alexander and
Crutcher, 1990; Alexander, Crutcher, and DeLong, 1991). In addition, a visual cortex
region centred at (-8,-88,-4) (local maximum during reward outcome display; Table
S2) was chosen as the brain region receiving experimentally-controlled inputs. This
visual region and VS were also constrained anatomically using the pericalcarine
and accumbens Freesurfer masks (Reuter, Schmansky, Rosas, and Fischl, 2012). For
each participant we extracted the first principal component of the time series of
12mm spheres which were centred at the above MNI coordinates, but importantly
were further constrained by liberal individual activation thresholds as well as the
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above mentioned anatomical masks, meaning signals were only extracted from a
subset of the voxels contained in the spherical regions of interest.
A bilinear DCM with one state per region and no stochastic effects was assumed and
a fully connected model of 9 connections including inhibitory self-connections was
fitted. There are known direct excitatory glutamatergic projections from the anterior
cingulate to the striatum (Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Alexander, Crutcher, and
DeLong, 1991) and the possible effects of depression symptoms on this direct top-
down connection were of particular interest. All other connections were assumed to
be indirect. Four outcome types (“reward” [choice + no-choice trials], “no-reward”
[choice + no-choice], “choice” [reward + no-reward], “no-choice” [reward + no-
reward]) were used as driving inputs to the visual cortex (“outcome display”); see
Supplementary material for control analyses using an alternative input specification.
It was assumed that each of these four outcome conditions could also modulate
each of the intrinsic (endogenous, task-invariant) connections. The display of
choice / no-choice cues served as additional inputs to the visual area and responses
(choice / no-choice condition button presses) drove activity in any region. Inputs
were mean-centred so that parameters of the endogenous (“A” matrix) connectivity
specified the average effective connectivity between regions and the modulations
(“B” matrix) added or subtracted from this average.
For each participant, the full DCM was fitted to the data and the percentage of the
variance explained was calculated. As recommended in the SPM documentation
and online SPM discussion groups (Zeidman, 2019), we only included participants
for which the variance explained by the model was at least 10% (Supplementary
material). The Parametric Empirical Bayes (PEB) framework (Friston, Litvak, Oswal,
et al., 2016) was used to model commonalities and differences across participants.
The group-level between-subject PEB design matrix included a column of ones,
corresponding to the mean connectivity across participants, and a zero-mean cen-
tred column of our covariate of interest (QIDS depression scores). Five additional
mean-centred covariates included HADS anxiety scores, age, sex, collection site
and current MDE diagnosis (see Supplementary material for additional analyses
without these covariates). The group-level within-subject design matrix was defined
as the identity matrix, which means we assumed the covariates could potentially
have an effect on every within-subject DCM parameter. The full PEB model was
inverted to obtain parameter estimates and the model’s “free energy”.
Bayesian Model Reduction (Friston, Litvak, Oswal, et al., 2016) was employed to
rapidly estimate different reduced PEB models within which certain parameters
were “switched off”. An automatic “greedy” search procedure was used to iteratively
prune parameters that did not contribute to the free energy. The models identified
at the final iteration were combined using Bayesian Model Averaging (Figure 5.4A)
(Penny, Mattout, and Trujillo-Barreto, 2006). Our main analysis focussed on a PEB
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model including 9 DCM (“A” matrix) parameters (see Supplementary material for
additional analyses).
To increase confidence in our results, a large number of control analyses were per-
formed (Supplementary material). Most notably, during these analyses different
variance-explained thresholds were used, and different covariates were included
in the second level design matrix (e.g., only QIDS was included as covariate). Ad-
ditional control analyses also included an analysis of individual symptoms (as
opposed to the QIDS sum of individual symptom scores) to address both a skew in
overall QIDS scores and the possibility of correlation effects being influenced by a
group-level (i.e. never-depressed healthy participants versus MDE subjects) effect.
This is described in detail in the Supplementary material. Bootstrap split-sample
replication was used to test the effective connectivity hypothesis.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Behavioural analyses
There was no significant Spearman’s correlation between QIDS depression score
and number of rewards gained (Spearman’s ρ(475) = 0.064, p = 0.164) on the task,
or between QIDS score and number of missed trials (Spearman’s ρ(475) = 0.064,
p = 0.164), facilitating interpretation of the imaging results. Formal model com-
parison identified model 3, which assumed subjects learned at different rates from
choice and no-choice outcomes, as the most parsimonious description of decision
making behaviour (Supplementary material). Learning rates for choice trials were
larger than learning rates for no-choice trials for most (440 of 475, 93%) partici-
pants. These results indicate that whilst participants learned from all outcomes,
they learned most from outcomes over which they had more control. However
there were no significant Spearman’s correlations between parameter estimates and
mood scores (Supplementary material). We repeated this correlation analysis using
a “default” Bayesian hypothesis test and found strong evidence for the absence of a
correlation between depressive symptom severity scores and each of the three pa-
rameters (1/30 < BF10 < 1/10, (Wetzels and Wagenmakers, 2012)) (Supplementary
material).
5.3.2 GLM voxel based fMRI analyses
As expected, across all 475 participants, significant reward activations were identi-
fied in areas including the VS (-12,10,-14) (10,8,-10), ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(-4,52,-10), orbitofrontal cortex (-24,34,-20) (30,34,-16) and mPC (-10,28,0), as well
as activations in the occipital lobe visual areas (10,-86,-6) (-10,-88,-8). As hypothe-
sised, significant negative correlations between reward activation magnitude and













       positive





































FIGURE 5.2: Correlations between depressive symptom scores and re-
ward signal encoding. Higher depressive symptoms were associated
with lower striatal reward response. (A) decreased reward activation
/ RPE encoding signal in putamen / ventral striatum, (B) increased
deactivation / negative RPE encoding signal in caudate and insula,
(C) decreased RPE encoding signal in midbrain, (D) increased reward
activation / RPE encoding in occipital lobe, with regions significant
at p < 0.001 whole-brain corrected. (E) Negative correlation of QIDS
scores with striatal activity (26,4,0) (Spearman’s ρ = −0.16, p < .001).
(F) Negative correlation of QIDS scores with striatal activity (-16,10,6)
(Spearman’s ρ = −0.20, p < .001).
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FIGURE 5.3: Activations comparing choice with no-choice conditions.
Activated regions during reward outcomes during choice compared
to reward outcomes during no-choice conditions: (A) insula, (B)
amygdala, (C) medial prefrontal cortex. Regions significant at p <
0.001 whole-brain corrected.
(-10,8,22) (-16,12,4), and also in the insula (-34,18,-12) (30,16,-16) and dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex (-4,30,50). Additionally, a positive correlation with QIDS scores
was found in the occipital lobe (10,-86,20) (-8,-90,10).
A conjunction analysis of correlations with group-level activations and deactiva-
tions was done revealing that higher depressive symptoms were associated with
decreased activation in the ventral striatum, and increased deactivation in caudate
/ dorsal striatum, anterior insula and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. Results of
RPE signal encoding correlations were as expected very similar (Supplementary
material), due to a correlation between the RPE signal and simple binary reward
outcome signals. Notably though, higher depressive symptoms were associated with
decreased RPE signal encoding (only) in two additional areas: midbrain / ventral
tegmental area (VTA) (-2,-16,-16) and mPC (-2,34,14). These results are shown in
Figure 5.2. Figures 5.2A-D show the results of the initial whole-brain analyses, while
Figures 5.2E-F show subsequent ROI analyses. For the ROI analyses we extracted
local maxima voxels from the estimated contrast-beta values (see also Table S10).
The primary purpose of these follow-up ROI analyses was not to show the signifi-
cance of the results (which was always done on a whole-brain level), but to depict
the correlation results and the distribution of the individual beta and QIDS values
in more detail.
Across participants, reward activations were significantly larger during choice com-
pared to no-choice conditions in regions including mPC (0,52,16), insula (36,18,-
12) (-28,18,-14) and amygdala (-22,-6,-14) (22,-4,-12) (Figure 5.3). Higher depres-
sive symptoms were also associated with decreased choice vs. no-choice response
difference in regions including the precuneus (0,-46,36) and increased response
difference in regions including left insula (-36,16,0) and subgenual ACC (4,28,0).
Additional results are presented in the Supplementary Materials.
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5.3.3 Dynamic causal modelling of event-related effective connectivity
The mean of the explained variance across the 165 participants with sufficiently
strong fMRI signals was 21.90%. There were no statistically significant differences
in mean QIDS scores between the 165 participants with explained variance greater
than 10% (mean QIDS = 4.6) and excluded (mean QIDS = 4.4) participants (Welch’s
t-test: p = 0.618). Additional analyses showed that alternative variance thresholds
led to similar DCM results (Supplementary material).
At the group level and consistent with known anatomy, there was insufficient ev-
idence for effective connectivity from V1 to VS and from VS to mPC, but all other
connections had a high probability. Details about group-commonalities are pre-
sented in the Supplementary material; here we focus on associations with QIDS
mood symptoms. Of particular interest was the directed influence (connectivity)
from the mPC to the VS. This was found to be negatively correlated with mood
symptom scores (Figure 5.4B); higher depression scores were related to a decreased
top-down mPC to VS influence. Notably, we did not find this association with
anxiety scores (Supplementary material). The analyses also revealed complicated
indirect interactions between the visual cortex and both cortical and subcortical
regions. Specifically, higher depressive symptoms were negatively associated with
the connection from the accumbens and positively associated with the connection
to the mPC.
Additional control analyses were done to verify that our results did not depend on
the exact specifications of the model, covariates and variance threshold criteria. The
negative association between depressive symptom severity and directed influence
from the mPC to VS was found for each analysis strategy (Supplementary material).
We investigated the association of connection strengths with individual symptoms
assessed with QIDS (rather than the sum-of-scores) and also performed this anal-
ysis after excluding current and past MDE participants. This exploratory analysis
revealed a more specific negative association between symptoms of “concentration
or decision making difficulties” and the top-down connection from mPC to VS and
this result was replicated after a stepwise exclusion of current MDE and past MDE
participants (Supplementary material).
5.3.4 Bootstrap split-sample replication of mPC to VS effective connec-
tivity correlation
The dataset was randomly split into two halves repeatedly and the second level PEB
model (without BMR) estimated for each half. Figure 5.5 shows the histogram of
results for 100 splits (200 second level models) of the association between QIDS
and mPC to VS effective connectivity. The association was negative in 98% of cases,
showing the QIDS blunted effective connectivity result can be replicated on a split-
sample basis.
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FIGURE 5.4: Effective connectivity analyses. (A) Individual DCMs
were taken to the second level where BMR was performed to “prune”
connections. BMA was then used to average the DCMs, weighted
by their probabilities. (B) Top-down control of the prefrontal cortex
over the ventral striatum was decreased with increasing depression
symptom severity.
5.4 Discussion
Data from a large community-based study was used to test hypotheses that mood
symptoms were associated with blunted reward signal. Increased depressive symp-
toms were indeed found to be negatively correlated with reward-linked signals in
the striatum, consistent with many independent studies (Forbes, Christopher May,
Siegle, et al., 2006; Steele, Kumar, and Ebmeier, 2007; Kumar, Waiter, Ahearn, et al.,
2008; Pizzagalli, Holmes, Dillon, et al., 2009; Eshel and Roiser, 2010; Gradin, Ku-
mar, Waiter, et al., 2011; Zhang, Chang, Guo, et al., 2013; Pizzagalli, 2014; Johnston,
Tolomeo, Gradin, et al., 2015; Rothkirch, Tonn, Köhler, and Sterzer, 2017; Keren,
O’Callaghan, Vidal-Ribas, et al., 2018; Kumar, Goer, Murray, et al., 2018) and a large
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FIGURE 5.5: Association between QIDS and mPC to VS effective
connectivity. Histogram after 100 random splits in the total data.
community-based studies which used reward anticipation during a Monetary In-
centive Delay task which did not include a decision making component (Stringaris,
Vidal-Ribas Belil, Artiges, et al., 2015; Pornpattananangkul, Leibenluft, Pine, and
Stringaris, 2019). We also tested whether individuals learned differently from out-
comes depending on whether they had control over decisions. Subjects did learn
differently from outcomes depending on whether they had control over their de-
cisions that lead to the outcomes; however, we did not find a clear influence of
depressive symptoms. Matched behaviour but differences in brain function might
indicate a compensatory mechanism. Future studies should consider the possibility
that depression might also alter the interaction between cortico-limbic connectivity
and task-related events such as choice vs. no-choice reward outcomes.
Previous independent clinical studies have reported RPE abnormalities in MDD
(Kumar, Waiter, Ahearn, et al., 2008; Gradin, Kumar, Waiter, et al., 2011; Dombrovski,
Szanto, Clark, et al., 2013; Kumar, Goer, Murray, et al., 2018). Here we found
decreased RPE signal encoding in many of the same striatal areas as decreased
reward responses. It is difficult to disentangle RPE encoding from a binary reward
signal (Chowdhury, Guitart-Masip, Lambert, et al., 2013) in our task as the signals
are correlated which is common. However, we also found the VTA was associated
with an RPE (but not binary) signal which was negatively correlated with mood score,
consistent with an independent study on treatment-resistant depression (Gradin,
Kumar, Waiter, et al., 2011). The VTA is strongly implicated in the brain’s reward
system and RPE signals (Schultz, Dayan, and Montague, 1997) and is a source of
dopaminergic projections to the VS and frontal cortex (Alexander and Crutcher,
1990; Alexander, Crutcher, and DeLong, 1991). Reduced reward-linked effective
connectivity from the VTA to striatum has been reported (Kumar, Goer, Murray,
et al., 2018).
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There is substantial evidence for resting-state connectivity abnormalities in MDD
(Kaiser, Andrews-Hanna, Wager, and Pizzagalli, 2015; Kaiser, Whitfield-Gabrieli,
Dillon, et al., 2016), indicating that this illness is not only associated with abnor-
malities in isolated brain regions but also interactions between these brain regions.
Recent reviews and meta-analyses point towards widespread network dysfunction
in MDD but much of the work has focused on undirected functional connectivity
or connectivity measured during the resting state. Notably, a recent functional
connectivity study using resting-state fMRI data reported decreased cingulo-striatal
connectivity in children related to anhedonia (Pornpattananangkul, Leibenluft,
Pine, and Stringaris, 2019).
Here we identified significant directed medial prefrontal cortex to striatal reward-
linked effective connectivity. This projection has been reported to consist of ex-
citatory glutamatergic neurons from studies on animals(Alexander and Crutcher,
1990; Alexander, Crutcher, and DeLong, 1991). A glutamatergic hypothesis of de-
pression has been proposed (Sanacora, Treccani, and Popoli, 2012) and reduced
glutamatergic projections from the prefrontal cortex to the striatum have been
argued to underlie motivational disorders such as addiction (Kalivas, 2009) and
depression (Russo and Nestler, 2013). Indeed, many prominent theories of MDD
propose a role for abnormal cortical-limbic connectivity such as Beck’s cognitive
model (Disner, Beevers, Haigh, and Beck, 2011), Mayberg’s cortical-limbic dys-
regulation model (Mayberg, 1997), Pizzagalli’s stress interaction model (Pizzagalli,
2014) and Roiser’s neuropsychological model (Roiser, Elliott, and Sahakian, 2012).
Different abnormalities have been reported for the medial prefrontal cortical re-
gion. Mayberg’s deep brain stimulation was applied to the subgenual cingulate
Brodmann area 25 which they found overactive in depression using long timescale
PET imaging (Mayberg, Lozano, Voon, et al., 2005), whilst reward-related activity in
the medial prefrontal region used in our connectivity model has been reported de-
creased using short timescale event-related fMRI (e.g., Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin,
et al. (2015)).
We also found evidence for changes in effective connectivity between the visual
processing area and both nucleus accumbens and cingulate cortex. Alterations
in these indirect connections are more difficult to interpret and we did not have
strong a priori hypotheses about them. As these connections are likely indirect
it is unclear if associations with depression exist between only some or all of the
intermediate regions. It is notable that the connection from nucleus accumbens
to visual region may occur via the amygdala (Dolan, 2002; Amaral, Behniea, and
Kelly, 2003), a region strongly implicated in depression, so it is possible that the back
projection from the amygdala to early visual areas is affected by depression. Areas
in the occipital lobe have been shown to have a much wider range of function than
typically assumed and might play a role in mood and anxiety disorders (Li, Zhang,
Zhang, et al., 2020). Abnormal activity and connectivity involving the occipital
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cortex in anxiety might underlie increased perception of threatening or feared
stimuli (Bruehl, Delsignore, Komossa, and Weidt, 2014; Yang, Liu, Meng, et al., 2019).
Although altered occipital lobe function has sometimes been reported in depression
(Fitzgerald, Laird, Maller, and Daskalakis, 2008), results are inconsistent and likely
depend on experimental context (Müller, Cieslik, Serbanescu, et al., 2017).
Decreased accumbens activity may be due to decreased cortical to striatal connec-
tivity, consistent with prominent theories of depression. Most (95%) accumbens
neurons are GABAergic medium spiney neurons, so a decrease in blood oxygen
level dependent (BOLD) activity during fMRI may reflect a change in the inhibitory
output from the accumbens, with opposite effects for D1-type direct pathway ver-
sus D2-type indirect pathway neurons (Russo and Nestler, 2013). Reward-gain
tasks are controlled by activation of the D1-type direct pathway and punishment-
avoidance tasks by inactivation of the D2-type indirect pathway (Nakanishi, Hikida,
and Yawata, 2014). Here the task was reward-gain similar to our previous indepen-
dent clinical case-control studies (Steele, Kumar, and Ebmeier, 2007; Gradin, Kumar,
Waiter, et al., 2011; Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin, et al., 2015) although we have also
reported punishment-avoidance accumbens abnormalities in treatment-resistant
MDD (Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin, et al., 2015). Striatal BOLD activation in the
present study may therefore predominately have reflected activation of D1-type
direct pathway medium spiney neurons, and blunting of this signal with depressive
symptoms impairment of the direct pathway.
The strengths of this work are between-study replication of blunted reward-linked
striatal signals in a large community based sample and the novel finding of blunted
medial prefrontal cortex to striatal event-related connectivity which was replicated
on a split-sample within-study basis. There are however some limitations as po-
tential avenues for future work. During both computational and imaging analyses
a common model was assumed for all participants although in principle models
could differ between subjects (Stephan, Penny, Daunizeau, et al., 2009). DCM is
a region of interest approach and we chose our regions to test for hypothesised
differences between activated regions. Future studies should consider tasks which
activate additional regions such as the amygdala and hippocampus (Mayberg, 1997;
Drevets, Price, and Furey, 2008; Roiser, Elliott, and Sahakian, 2012; Pizzagalli, 2014;
Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin, et al., 2015; Schmaal, Veltman, Erp, et al., 2016) and
explore trans-diagnostic (Cuthbert and Insel, 2013) constructs such as anhedonia.
We did not have a hypothesis about abnormal connectivity in one hemisphere
compared to another. To maximise the number of included subjects we focused
on the hemisphere which had the strongest signals across subjects. Exploration of
possible covariates was done to determine whether our conclusions about a signifi-
cant negative association could be confounded by such effects, not because we had
specific hypotheses about these. Our conclusions were unchanged (Supplementary
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Material). To make an unbiased estimate of cortico-limbic connectivity it was neces-
sary to include subjects who had sufficient signals to allow valid estimation, despite
depression being associated with reward-signal blunting. When this was done a
significant negative association with depression severity was found, which was not
dependent on the precise criteria used for selecting data. Including all subjects,
even those with the weakest signals, resulted in connectivity estimates being dom-
inated by noise, although a non-significant negative trend remained (Figure S8).
Importantly, none of the analyses suggested significantly increased cortico-limbic
connectivity (Supplementary Material). We did not have a specific hypothesis about
which sub-symptom of depression would be associated with altered cortical to sub-
cortical connectivity and note that our finding of an association with concentration
or decision making difficulties will need to be independently replicated.
In conclusion, using an RDoC positive valence system approach with a large com-
munity-based sample, we found evidence that depressive symptom severity was
related to blunting of reward-linked striatal activity, consistent with a series of
previous studies on MDD. Decreased striatal activity may be due to decreased
cortical to striatal event-related effective connectivity consistent with prominent
theories of depression, and here have resulted in decreased direct pathway basal
ganglia output. Further study of basal ganglia pathophysiology is required to better
understand these abnormalities and develop new treatments.
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Future work
As in Chapter 3, I was not involved in the design of this study. This section briefly
explores a few things that could have been done differently and/or might be fruitful
avenues for future work with regard to the study design.
As mentioned previously, the connectivity results should be viewed as implicitly
conditioned on the experimental (reward learning) context. Future work will need
to address whether depression severity is also associated with a change in top-
down connectivity during other contexts. A study could include multiple contexts,
such as a reward and a punishment or stress context, in which case it could be
tested if depression severity is associated with endogenous connectivity and/or
with modulation of that connection by the experimental context.
We had to exclude a sizeable number of participants because their estimated DCMs
“flatlined”, meaning there was not enough evidence from the data to support a
deviation from the zero-centred prior. I suspect that this was, at least in part, due to
the limited number of trials in this study. As discussed in Chapter 3, fMRI imposes
certain requirements on study design, one of them being trial length of several
seconds which limits the overall number of trials within a study. Nevertheless,
future work should consider increasing the overall length of the experiment and
the number of trials. In an ideal world simulations during the design of a study
could help to reliably estimate the minimum amount of data needed for good DCM
estimability, but at the moment it is not entirely clear how such simulations could
be performed.
The current study included an element of controllability. In half of the trials partici-
pants were allowed to choose freely but instead had to accept the computer’s choice.
Being able to make choices and exerting control over one’s environment has inher-
ent value and affects reward processing (Romaniuk, Sandu, Waiter, et al., 2019). The
theory of learned helplessness posits that prolonged and continues perception of a
lack of control over the environment can lead to depressed behaviour (Chapter 2).
The value of personal choice and its association with depressive symptoms was
previously studied in more detail within a subset of the current data (Romaniuk,
Sandu, Waiter, et al., 2019). They reported striatal activation during the antici-
pation of choice, which was decreased with higher depression symptom severity,
suggesting decreased value of choice. Here we found that participants learned more
from outcomes following their own choices compared to outcomes following the
computer’s choices, but we found no association with depression symptom severity.
It would be interesting to extend the current paradigm to allow for a more direct
measurement of the value of control. For example, in some of the trials participants
might be allowed to “pay” a certain amount of points in order to be allowed to
make their own choice. However, the amount they would be willing to pay would
presumably depend on various things, including their value of control but also
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the expected outcome which in turn would be influenced by their internal value
estimation and their belief about the predictability of the outcomes.
A different variation of the paradigm might allow to improve on this by having the
computer offer the participant a number of points to take away the control from
them (and make a random choice) after a learning period. If current reward contin-
gencies were kept the same (20% or 80% probability of 100 points) and participants
had learned them perfectly, the expected value of their own choice would be 80
points, while the expected value of the computer’s choice would be 50 points. This
means the subject should accept any offer over 30 points if making their own choice
did not have any inherent value. Computational modelling could be used to infer
their estimated internal values of the stimuli and estimated expected value of their
choice. Simulations could be used to estimate the type and amount of data (i.e.
number of trials, reward contingencies, etc.) required for reliable estimates of these
internal values. It might therefore be possible to estimate how much a participant
values having a choice in terms of number of points by combining information
about their acceptance or refusal of various amounts of points with their internal
value estimation.
The paradigm could also be translated into the punishment or loss domain by
simply making the good option be an outcome of zero points and the alternative
be a loss of points. The inherent value of control might not be the same during
reward and punishment processing and/or this asymmetry could be increased in
depression (Chen, Takahashi, Nakagawa, et al., 2015).
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Chapter 6
A generative embedding approach
to detecting lifetime depression
This chapter consists of a “proof-of-concept” study which shows how a “generative
embedding” approach, combining a generative dynamic causal model (Chapter 5)
with a discriminative support vector machine model, can be used for classification of
lifetime depression using functional MRI data.
Supplementary Materials for this chapter are included in Appendix D.
6.1 Introduction
The search for biomarkers of psychiatric disorders is a central goal of computational
psychiatry (Adams, Huys, and Roiser, 2016; Huys, Maia, and Frank, 2016). Imaging
biomarkers might be especially promising, but clinically useful biomarkers have
yet to be found, with unreliable diagnoses and too few replicated imaging findings
posing challenges for precision medicine in psychiatry (Abi-Dargham and Horga,
2016).
Huys, Maia, and Frank (2016) argued that there exist at least two complementary
approaches to computational psychiatry. So far in this thesis I have mainly de-
scribed “theory-driven” approaches. I used prior knowledge from previous research
to inform hypotheses about disease mechanisms. Models at multiple levels of
abstraction, including behaviour, neural activation and functional and effective
connectivity, incorporated this prior knowledge and were then used to test predic-
tions. Alternative “data-driven” approaches do not generally incorporate knowledge
about possible mechanisms (Huys, Maia, and Frank, 2016). Instead, (supervised)
machine-learning methods are trained on the raw data and then used for regression
or classification. This could, for example, be used to predict the outcome of a spe-
cific pharmacotherapy treatment without knowing anything about the underlying
mechanism of the drug (Huys, Maia, and Frank, 2016).
94 Chapter 6. A generative embedding approach to detecting lifetime depression
Using a large sample, Chekroud, Zotti, Shehzad, et al. (2016) showed that a classifier
could be used to predict pharmacological treatment response of MDD patients. A
large number of features from several psychiatric questionnaires as well as infor-
mation about demographics, previous depressive episodes and medication were
included. After training these predictors were ranked based on their weights to
obtain features predictive of remission (e.g. currently being employed, total years of
education) and non-remission (e.g. baseline QIDS-SR severity). However, only few
objective features were available and many of the top 25 predictors were subjective
self-report features.
Mwangi, Ebmeier, Matthews, and Steele (2012) trained a machine learning classifier
on structural MRI scans to classify (carefully defined treatment-resistant) MDD
patients versus healthy controls with high accuracy. Costafreda, Chu, Ashburner,
and Fu (2009) found that structural neuroanatomy could be used to predict treat-
ment response to antidepressant medication but not CBT. Structural imaging data
has several advantages over functional MRI data. It is usually cheaper and quicker
to acquire and does not depend on a specific paradigm as well as participants’
comprehension and cooperation (Mwangi, Ebmeier, Matthews, and Steele, 2012).
However, a patient’s brain may appear normal in terms of structure (at least at the
resolution of MRI) with typical abnormalities only appearing when the brain is
“at work” (Abi-Dargham and Horga, 2016). Studies based on functional MRI have
shown potential for classification of healthy controls versus MDD (Fu, Mourao-
Miranda, Costafreda, et al., 2008) or treatment-resistant MDD (Johnston, Tolomeo,
Gradin, et al., 2015) patients and prediction of treatment response to antidepressant
medication (Mourão-Miranda, Hardoon, Hahn, et al., 2011).
While theory-driven approaches are often used when mechanistic insights are pur-
sued, and machine-learning approaches are generally used when the development
of clinically useful applications is the main goal (Huys, Maia, and Frank, 2016), the
combination of the two approaches might be especially powerful (Huys, Maia, and
Frank, 2016; Brodersen, Schofield, Leff, et al., 2011). A theory-based generative
model can be used to project the raw data into a lower-dimensional space which
can increase efficiency and reliability, while also aiding interpretability, of a subse-
quently trained classifier (Huys, Maia, and Frank, 2016; Brodersen, Schofield, Leff,
et al., 2011).
An early study employing such a “generative embedding” strategy has shown great
promise for its use in psychiatric disease identification. A dynamic causal model
was fitted to fMRI time-series data and a classifier was then trained on the DCM
parameters, achieving near-perfect classification accuracy (Brodersen, Schofield,
Leff, et al., 2011). More recently, Queirazza, Fouragnan, Steele, et al. (2019) showed
that generative embedding, relying on previous knowledge about reinforcement
learning impairments in depression, has the potential to predict CBT treatment
response. A model-based fMRI approach was used to calculate contrasts encoding
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reward prediction errors which were then used as features for classification. Notably,
this generative embedding can lead to the discovery of “mechanistic biomarkers”
which might provide important insights into key pathophysiological processes
(Queirazza, Fouragnan, Steele, et al., 2019).
In previous work (Chapter 5) an association between depression symptom severity
and top-down connectivity from the medial prefrontal cortex to the ventral striatum
was found. Here I extended this work using a generative embedding approach to
test the hypothesis that effective connectivity parameter estimates can be used to
classify never-depressed healthy subjects versus participants with lifetime MDD.
Notably, the main goal of this approach was to determine whether there was enough
information contained solely within estimated connectivity parameters to iden-
tify an individual’s depression status with good accuracy. This means that while
achieving high accuracy was important, the goal was not to build a classifier which
maximises predictive accuracy which could probably be improved by including
additional features such as age, sex, and questionnaire scores. Indeed, in clinical
practice such a classifier would most likely be useless as most clinicians would not
be interested in whether a patient is ill (why else would they be here?), but how to
best help them.
6.2 Materials and methods
Participants and their estimated DCM parameters from earlier work (Chapter 5)
were selected (n=165) and split into two groups of never-depressed healthy sub-
jects (n=112) and lifetime-depression subjects (n=53, of which 12 subjects suffered
from current MDD and 41 participants were identified as having had at least one
past major depressive episode). The Python library scikit-learn (v0.22.1) was used
(Pedregosa, Varoquaux, Gramfort, et al., 2011) to implement the classification task.
6.2.1 Classifier
A soft-margin linear support vector machine (SVM) with elastic net regularisa-
tion was chosen to perform the multivariate classification. An implementation
with stochastic gradient descent learning was used. The maximum number of
iterations was set to 5000 as larger numbers did not change performance. Two
hyper-parameters were optimised: A regularisation parameter, α, which multiplied
the (elastic net) regularisation term and an elastic net mixing parameter, ρ, which
controlled the combination of L1 and L2 penalty.
6.2.2 Cross-validation and performance measures
A nested cross-validation (CV) scheme (Figure 6.1) was used which consisted of
an “inner loop” using repeated under-sampled 5-fold CV and an “outer loop” using
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FIGURE 6.1: The nested cross-validation scheme. The outer loop
is used to estimate the generalisation performance of the whole
pipeline. Feature (and hyper-parameter) selection, and training is
performed in an inner cross-validated loop.
leave-one-out (LOO) CV to estimate generalisation performance.
Before each of the 10 repetitions within the inner CV, the majority class (never-
depressed healthy controls) was randomly down-sampled to the same number as
the minority class (lifetime MDD subjects) due to the slightly imbalanced classes.
Further analysis showed that a repeated stratified 5-fold CV inner loop performed
very similarly (see Supplementary Materials). The inner loop used area under
the receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC-AUC) as the scoring function to
optimise. Selection and standardisation of features and optimisation of hyper-para-
meters were performed within the inner loop to avoid leaking knowledge from the
testing data into the training process.
The outer loop used LOO-CV to maximise the number of subjects during training.
For each left-out subject the whole “pipeline” of feature-selection, feature-scaling,
and classification was estimated using (inner) cross-validation on N-1 subjects and
then applied to the left-out subject. This means we estimated the generalisation
performance of the whole pipeline and for each (left-out) subject we estimated a
whole new (cross-validated) classifier.
The main measures of interest were (balanced) accuracy, sensitivity (the propor-
tion of actual lifetime MDD cases correctly identified as such) and specificity (the
proportion of never-depressed participants correctly identified as such) as well as
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positive and negative predictive value. In addition, the ROC curve for each of the N
classifiers (one per left-out subject) was calculated (on its training data).
We compared the accuracy of our classification with the expected distribution of
accuracies of a random classifier without any features. This classifier was assumed
to know the true frequency of the two classes and a sample was classified as class
C with probability n(C)/N , where n(C) is the number of samples in class C and
N is the total number of samples. After all samples were “classified”, the accuracy
of the whole sample was computed. This procedure was repeated 108 times to
obtain the expected distribution of accuracies. The accuracy obtained from the
SVM classifier was then compared to this distribution to quantify the proportion of
random classifiers it outperformed.
6.2.3 Features
Mean estimates of posterior expectations of dynamic causal modelling parameters
of the single fitted full model for each participant were used as features. Possible
features included (mean) estimates of the intrinsic connectivity (DCM “A” matrix),
modulations (DCM “B” matrix) and inputs (DCM “C” matrix). Importantly, these
estimates were not constrained by the hierarchical group PEB model and therefore
no information about the association with depression severity (or other covariates)
was leaked (see also discussion).
Within the inner loop a (cross validated) grid search over combinations of features
(A only, A+B, A+C, A+B+C) was performed. The addition of estimated variance of
A and B parameters as additional features was explored to test the possibility that
lifetime MDD is associated with a change in precision of estimated connectivity
parameters.
Data were included from two different collection sites using two different scanners
(see Chapter 5) because such a multi-centre approach can improve the generalis-
ability of results. Accuracy performance measures are reported separately for each
location because the number of participants were not balanced across them. For
additional analysis a collection-site-indicator was included as possible feature to
test if explicit information about the site would improve classification performance.
To identify the most important features for classification the weights for each feature
from each classifier were extracted. For each feature the median absolute value of
its weight across classifiers was then calculated (setting a weight of zero when the
feature was not included) and features were then ranked according to these weights.
6.2.4 Alternative classifiers
A linear SVM has the advantage of allowing a straightforward ranking and interpreta-
tion of feature weights. During further analysis a radial basis function (RBF) kernel
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SVM was employed to see if a non-linear kernel would lead to increased accuracy,
essentially trading off interpretability for performance. Finally, a logistic regression
classifier was also tested.
6.3 Results
Using DCM features and a leave-one-out nested CV scheme, a regularised soft-
margin linear SVM classifier achieved a balanced accuracy of 72% (accuracy 70%,
PPV 53%, NPV 85%). The accuracy of 70% was higher than 99.99% of all simulated
accuracies of a random classifier. 76 of 112 (68%) never-depressed healthy subjects
and 40 of 53 (75%) subjects with lifetime depression were classified correctly. Further
inspection showed that 9 of 12 (75%) current MDD subjects and 31 of 41 (76%) past
MDD subjects were classified correctly. ROC curves are shown in Figure 6.2. The
mean ROC-AUC was 0.85.



















Mean ROC (AUC = 0.85 ± 0.01)
± 1 std. dev.
FIGURE 6.2: Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for each
training data set; i.e. a curve is displayed for each trained model after
one subject was left-out. The area under the mean curve was 0.85.
On average, based on the median values of weights, 33 features were used by the
classifier to make predictions (Table 6.1). Interestingly, the only intrinsic (A matrix)
connectivity estimate not included was the connection from the medial prefrontal
cortex to the ventral striatum which is the connection which was found to be
associated with depressive severity.
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The accuracies differed between sites with 74% (N=107) and 64% (N=58). The
addition of explicit information about the collection site decreased the accuracy to
67%. Adding information about estimated parameter variance did not change the
results as selected features did not differ from the original classifier. Performance of
an alternative classifier using an RBF kernel performed was almost identical to the
classifier with a linear kernel, while a logistic regression classifier performed worse
(see Supplementary Materials).
6.3.1 Predictive accuracy
It is likely that predictive accuracy could have been increased by including addi-
tional features and/or exploring the use of different classifiers. Indeed, exploratory
analysis revealed that simply by including questionnaire scores (QIDS-SR, HADS-A,
and neuroticism), age, and sex as additional features the cross-validated balanced
accuracy increased to 76% (accuracy 81%, sensitivity 60%, specificity 91%). However,
it should be noted again that the goal of this work was not to just maximise accuracy
by any means possible but rather to show that estimated connectivity parameters
contain sufficient information about depression status so that a prediction would
be feasible.
6.4 Discussion
A generative embedding approach, combining DCM parameter estimates and a
support vector machine classifier, was shown to be able to predict diagnosis of 53
lifetime depression participants versus 112 never-depressed healthy controls with
a balanced accuracy of 72%. Data were collected at two separate collection sites.
Participants performed a probabilistic reward learning task during fMRI scanning
and a DCM was fitted to their behaviour and neuronal data (Chapter 5). Estimated
parameters were used as features to train a machine learning classifier which re-
sulted in good cross-validated predictive accuracy (70%), sensitivity (75%), and
specificity (68%). The results show that estimated effective connectivity parameters
contain information about depression status.
The identification of reliable and clinically useful biomarkers for objective diag-
noses is an important goal in the field of computational psychiatry (Adams, Huys,
and Roiser, 2016; Huys, Maia, and Frank, 2016). Neuroimaging has a lot of poten-
tial in this regard (Abi-Dargham and Horga, 2016; Stephan, Iglesias, Heinzle, and
Diaconescu, 2015), and the current generative embedding work provides a proof-of-
concept of how task-based fMRI data could be used for objective diagnosis.
In a clinical setting, it would arguably be most practical to use T1-weighted struc-
tural scans for prediction. They are very quick to acquire (<5 minutes), do not
require cooperation or understanding from the participant (other than not moving)
and the necessary equipment and trained staff are already in place at sites with an
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MRI scanner (Steele and Paulus, 2019). Using structural MRI scans, Costafreda, Chu,
Ashburner, and Fu (2009) reported a diagnostic accuracy of 68% for 37 depressed
patients versus 37 healthy controls. Predicting remission or non-remission after
eight weeks of treatment of 18 patients who received antidepressant medication was
possible with 89% accuracy. Prediction of CBT treatment outcome of 12 patients
was however not possible (Costafreda, Chu, Ashburner, and Fu, 2009). A study
including 23 refractory depressive disorder, 23 non-refractory depressive disorder,
and 23 healthy control participants reported accuracies between 67% and 76% for
the three between-groups classifiers (Gong, Wu, Scarpazza, et al., 2011). Using struc-
tural scans from two different sites, trained machine learning models were able to
distinguish between 30 MDD patients and 32 controls with 90% accuracy (Mwangi,
Ebmeier, Matthews, and Steele, 2012), and were able predict the patients’ illness
severity well (Mwangi, Matthews, and Steele, 2011). Johnston, Steele, Tolomeo, et al.
(2015) reported 85% accuracy for the classification of 20 participants with lifetime
depression versus 21 never-depressed controls using structural MRI.
Although these studies show there is promise in this approach, Abi-Dargham and
Horga (2016) argued that many pathological features of psychiatric disorders may be
elusive and not detectable using current neuroimaging techniques. While a diseased
brain may appear typical at rest it may display abnormalities while performing a
task (Abi-Dargham and Horga, 2016)—for example, effective connectivity may play
an important role in depression (Chapter 5).
Task-based fMRI studies using whole brain functional images as features for ma-
chine learning have shown potential for diagnostic classification. An early study
using the brain activity pattern during a sad-faces processing achieved 86% accuracy
in the classification of 19 MDD patients versus 19 controls (Fu, Mourao-Miranda,
Costafreda, et al., 2008), and in a subset of the data it was shown that 7 patients
who responded to CBT could be distinguished from 7 non-responders with 79%
accuracy (Costafreda, Khanna, Mourao-Miranda, and Fu, 2009). A later study in-
cluded 19 treatment-resistant MDD patients and 21 healthy controls performing
an instrumental reinforcement learning task (Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin, et al.,
2015). They showed that diagnostic classification based on fMRI contrast images of
both win and loss events was possible with 84% and 97% accuracy respectively. A
recent study by Bürger, Redlich, Grotegerd, et al. (2017) included 36 bipolar and 36
unipolar depressed patients and 36 healthy controls who performed an emotional
face matching task. Classifiers based on contrast images achieved between 63% and
72% accuracy in distinguishing unipolar depressed participants from depressed
bipolar patients or healthy controls (Bürger, Redlich, Grotegerd, et al., 2017).
It is worth noting that small studies often include homogeneous patient groups
and confidence in the accuracy of the diagnosis can be high. Studies including
large samples will usually include more heterogeneous groups which can increase
generalisability to real world data even though accuracy will often be lower (Schnack
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and Kahn, 2016). However, it is also worth emphasising that quality control is crucial
which might sometimes be neglected in large studies (Johnston, Mwangi, Matthews,
et al., 2013). While a routinely collected image may be acceptable for radiologists,
small artefacts in the image, which can be caused by a participant’s movement or
non-optimal scanner setup, can have large effects on machine learning classifiers.
Artefacts can increase inter-subject variance and might not be balanced between
groups (Johnston, Mwangi, Matthews, et al., 2013).
The current study included a far greater number of participants than most previous
studies and the data was collected at two different sites, making the results poten-
tially more generalisable than previous work. It focused on the identification of
lifetime (past or current) MDD rather than just current depression and highlighted
that differences in effective connectivity may be a an important feature of depres-
sive illness; perhaps indicating that abnormal connectivity is either a vulnerability
factor or a (permanent) consequence of the disease. As the mean age of our sample
was almost sixty (Table 5.1), and the typical age of onset of depression is much
younger (Kessler and Bromet, 2013), it is tempting to conjecture that almost all
lifetime MDD cases have already materialised.
To assess the importance of individual features we inspected the weights the classi-
fier assigned to them. Results showed that a large number of network parameters
were important for the diagnostic classification. A linear relationship between de-
pression symptoms severity and the task-independent top-down connectivity from
prefrontal cortex to ventral striatum was found using a hierarchical DCM approach
(Chapter 5). Here, feature ranking indicated that this connection was not important
for the prediction of lifetime depression. This might be surprising as both remitted
and currently depressed patients usually report higher depressive severity, but no-
tably, the correlation found in Chapter 5 was found to not just be an effect of group
and the results in this chapter further support this notion.
Although the number of current-MDD patients was limited, we found that predictive
accuracy was very similar for patients who were currently depressed and subjects
who had previously experienced depression. This indicated it was not “easier” for
the classifier to predict MDD (or greater severity of depression symptoms) and
feature weights likely represent a more fundamental difference between never-
depressed healthy participants and lifetime sufferers. Changes in connectivity
might be related to greater susceptibility to depression or a consequence of the
illness, but with the available data it is not possible to distinguish between these
possibilities. Notably, compared to other clinical studies the severity of depression
in our sample was mild and very few volunteers were long term patients. For
example, Mwangi, Ebmeier, Matthews, and Steele (2012) only recruited treatment-
resistant MDD patients with severe and enduring illness, making (identification
of) brain structure abnormalities (c.f. Schmaal, Veltman, Erp, et al., 2016; Schmaal,
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Hibar, Sämann, et al., 2017) more likely and therefore perhaps more applicable for
automatic classification.
It is important to point out that the DCM region selection was performed using
a combination of individual activation and brain anatomy but also whole group
activation. This means left-out data influenced the region selection and therefore
(indirectly) DCM parameter estimation of the training data. To get a completely
unbiased estimate it would have been necessary to repeat region selection and
DCM estimation for each left-out participant, which would have resulted in the
estimation of 1652 = 27225 models. Given our large sample, the substantial compu-
tational time required (≈ 15 minutes to fit a single model), and the likely very small
influence every individual participant had on region selection we did not go down
this route. Importantly, the whole brain contrasts used for region selection were
activations and not QIDS correlations and therefore did not include any information
about depression severity or status. In Chapter 5 we included information about
depression at the second level. For each participant we first estimated a single full
DCM which included parameters for all the connections and modulations. We then
took these parameter estimates to the group level where we included information
about depression severity. QIDS was included as covariate and model comparison
(and model reduction) was performed on the second level, meaning models with
and without associations of connections with depression severity were compared.
In the current chapter we only used the estimated DCM parameters from the full
DCM of each participant without going to the group level.
We could have also incorporated a group model into the current work by first
estimating a group model (with or without additional covariates such as QIDS) for
each training fold and then using individual estimates constrained by this group
prior as features for the classification. For each left out subject we would then first
apply the group prior to re-estimate their DCM before using the parameters as
features. This might be a fruitful path for future studies including less data. It should
be noted that this makes the assumption that subjects are sampled from a single
population distribution.
A fundamental challenge to the development of clinically useful biomarkers for
psychiatry is the lack of gold standards for diagnoses (Abi-Dargham and Horga,
2016). In our case this issue might be further compounded by the fact that past
or remitted MDD are even more difficult to diagnose accurately. Mourão-Miranda,
Hardoon, Hahn, et al. (2011) showed how one approach to this might be to use
a one-class approach in which patients are modelled as “outliers”, although this
does not provide any information about the specific diagnosis. Possibly the most
promising approach for future work might be to include multiple groups displaying
different pathological phenotypes.
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Increasing evidence points towards connectivity abnormalities in the brain in de-
pression (Chapter 5). Our work indicates that information about an individual’s
connectivity profile during a reward-based decision-making task could be used
to predict their diagnosis with high accuracy. Importantly, it provides additional
evidence for the importance of connectivity in the disease and highlights the po-
tential of currently available data-driven approaches (see also Steele and Paulus,
2019). It also indicates that a patient’s connectivity profile might contain other
vital information related to their depression, for example which therapy would best
be suited for them. Although that question would be of much greater interest to
clinicians, the current data can not help answer it. However, the novel generative
embedding approach incorporating effective connectivity parameters could readily
be applied to a suitable data set. A longitudinal study might be a good way to ap-
proach this. Data collected at different time points, for example before the start of
(different types of) treatments and a year later, could be used to train a model to
predict an individual’s probability of recovery given a specific treatment. Ethical
concerns aside, this could then be used in a randomised doubly blinded control trial
in which clinicians and the model prescribe treatment for different sets of patients
to compare outcomes.
In conclusion, we found support for our hypothesis that a generative embedding
approach to detecting lifetime depression is viable. A generative model (DCM)
was fitted to fMRI data and its parameters were then used for diagnostic classifi-
cation. Results showed that for best performance a large number of connectivity
estimates were included during feature selection, indicating that lifetime depression
is related to a large number of changes in whole-brain connectivity. Generative
embedding approaches, combining effective connectivity models with machine
learning models, might be promising not only for diagnosis but also prognosis of
treatment outcomes.
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Rank Weight (median) Feature
1 0.39 B(VA to VA, no-choice)
2 0.34 A(VA to VA)
3 -0.33 B(mPC to mPC, no-choice)
4 -0.32 B(VS to mPC, choice)
5 0.30 A(VA to mPC)
6 -0.24 B(VA to mPC, no-reward)
7 -0.24 B(VS to mPC, reward)
8 -0.24 A(VS to VA)
9 0.21 B(VA to VA, reward)
10 -0.20 B(mPC to mPC, no-reward)
11 0.19 B(VA to VS, no-choice)
12 -0.18 A(mPC to VA)
13 0.18 B(VS to mPC, no-choice)
14 0.16 B(VA to mPC, reward)
15 0.15 A(mPC to mPC)
16 -0.14 B(VA to VS, choice)
17 0.13 B(mPC to VS, choice)
18 -0.12 B(mPC to VA, reward)
19 -0.12 B(mPC to VA, no-choice)
20 -0.11 A(VA to VS)
21 0.10 B(VA to VA, no-reward)
22 -0.10 B(VA to VS, no-reward)
23 -0.08 B(VS to VA, no-choice)
24 0.08 B(VA to VA, choice)
25 -0.07 A(VS to mPC)
26 0.06 B(VA to mPC, choice)
27 -0.06 B(VA to mPC, no-choice)
28 -0.05 B(VS to VA, reward)
29 -0.04 B(VS to VS, reward)
30 -0.04 A(VS to VS)
31 0.04 B(VA to VS, reward)
32 0.03 B(VS to VS, no-reward)
33 0.03 B(mPC to mPC, choice)
TABLE 6.1: Ranking of features. Median weights were calculated
across classifiers and features were then ranked according to the





In this thesis I described my contributions towards improving the scientific under-
standing of depression. A computational approach was used, employing mathemat-
ical models to describe decision making behaviour and neuronal activity. Evidence
was reported supporting the notion that depressive symptomatology is associated
with individual differences in behaviour and brain function.
Chapter 2 reviewed the literature from a computational perspective, aiming to
be accessible for students. Major depression, its symptoms and diagnosis, and
theories about biological bases were described. Previous studies incorporating
computational models, including neural network, drift diffusion, and reinforcement
learning models, were then reviewed. A case study, relating reward learning to the
core depression symptom anhedonia, was described in detail.
Chapters 3-4 described the investigation of value-based decision-making abnor-
malities in major depressive disorder. A novel experimental task was performed
by a group of unmedicated patients suffering from major depressive disorder and
a group of matched healthy control participants during fMRI scanning. Fractal
images were displayed, followed by a binary outcome picture indicating “reward”
or “no-reward”. Based on four observations for each type of fractal, subjects were
asked to estimate the probability of reward. For example, if a fractal was followed by
reward three times and followed by no-reward once, they were expected to estimate
the probability of reward as 3/4 = 75%. During intermittent decision trials a choice
(in favour of the higher number) between this estimated probability and an explicit
probability, for example 65%, had to be made. In Chapter 3 the behavioural and
computational modelling analysis was described. Multiple models, representing
distinct hypotheses about participants’ learning, were fitted to the data and the
best model was chosen using formal model comparison. Results indicated that
the patient group was characterised by behavioural impairments during both the
passive observation (value estimation) phases and the active decision making trials.
Depressed subjects displayed lower memory or increased discounting of previous
value estimations and their ability to use their value estimations to make decisions
appeared diminished.
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The following Chapter 4 was devoted to the analysis of the neuronal basis of the
groups’ behaviour. Model-free fMRI analysis was used to replicate results of pre-
vious studies showing blunted reward activation in the striatum in depression. At
decision time a mid-cingulate cortex (aMCC) region, an area crucial for decision
making, showed increased activity in depression. The best-fitting computational
model of behaviour was simulated, given the estimated parameters of individu-
als, to generate value signals for use in model-based fMRI analysis. Positive value
encoding was larger in controls compared to patients in areas notably including
(para-)hippocampus and rostral anterior cingulate (rACC). Within the latter region
there was a significant negative correlation between patients’ illness severity and
the strength of their value encoding signal. A logistic regression classifier was able
to correctly predict diagnostic status of 27 out of 34 (79%) participants just from
the encoding signal strength of the two regions. Importantly, there is compelling
evidence for the involvement of prefrontal regions in internal value representation
in healthy subjects (Gläscher, Hampton, and O’doherty, 2008; Bartra, McGuire, and
Kable, 2013). Decisions were modelled, as is common, by assuming that a choice
between two options depended on the difference between the values of the two
options. This was formalised by applying a softmax decision function, including
a steepness of temperature parameter, to the difference of individuals’ estimated
fractal value and the alternative explicit numeric probability value. Further link-
ing the behavioural model to localised brain function, there were significant value
difference encoding signals in aMCC and rACC across participants. MDD patients
displayed reduced connectivity between aMCC and rACC regions, suggesting im-
pairments in the communication and use of reward value estimates related to these
rostral and dorsal prefrontal regions in depression.
Hence Chapters 3 and 4 provided support for the hypotheses of abnormal reward
learning function in major depressive disorder. Behaviour and fMRI revealed group
differences which were related to abnormal reward valuation in MDD. A number of
brain regions were highlighted, prominently including ventral striatum and ventral
and dorsal prefrontal cortex regions.
Chapter 5 included data from a large community-based sample of individuals who
performed a novel reward-based learning task. In each trial participants had to
choose between a yellow and a blue square stimulus which were associated with
different reward probabilities. However, subjects were only allowed to choose for
themselves in half of the trials and had to follow the computer’s choice otherwise. A
dimensional approach was chosen for the analysis, in line with recommendations
from the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC; Insel, Cuthbert, Garvey, et al., 2010),
looking at variation across different levels of illness severity. Replicating a number of
previous studies, it was found that increased mood symptoms were associated with
decreased reward signals in regions including the striatum. Results of a Dynamic
Causal Modelling (DCM) analysis showed that effective connectivity between basal
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ganglia and prefrontal cortex was related to mood symptoms. Specifically, increased
depression symptom severity was associated with decreased top-down medial
prefrontal cortex to ventral striatum connectivity. Importantly, various theories
about depression have proposed that abnormal cortical-limbic connectivity plays
an important role and these results provided important supporting evidence using
an effective connectivity analysis based on a community-based sample.
Chapter 6 presented a novel generative embedding approach to detecting life-
time depression. Estimated DCM parameters were used as features for a support
vector machine classifier which achieved a balanced accuracy of 72%. The proof-
of-concept study showed how combining a theory-driven model with machine
learning methods may allow for accurate prediction of diagnoses. Furthermore, it
also provided novel support for the supposition that major depression is related to
(information contained within) effective connectivity. The identification of objec-
tive biomarkers is an important goal of computational psychiatry and neuroimaging
based biomarkers are especially promising in a clinical setting (Abi-Dargham and
Horga, 2016). It is conceivable that parameters of computational models of be-
haviour showing abnormalities in MDD (c.f. Chapter 3) might be especially useful
in other settings. For example, automated assessment or screening to decide who
should come into the clinic for further assessment.
It is worth highlighting a few shared limitations. Depression comes in many shapes,
forms and severities. Two MDD patients could experience almost entirely different
sets of symptoms owing to the fact that a standard diagnosis is mostly based on
clinical consensus without good understanding of the biological basis (Chapter 2).
While mild depression can be difficult to distinguish from normal everyday mood
swings, patients with moderate to severe depression will display more symptoms
with higher impact than what is required as minimum for diagnosis. It is crucial
to study the full range of emotions as is emphasised by approaches such as RDoC
and it is also important to realise that severe and/or treatment-resistant depression
might be more than just “mild depression but slightly more extreme”. There might be
similar differences between mild and severe depression as there are between healthy
and mild-moderate depression (Otte, Gold, Penninx, et al., 2016) and there are
discussions about the possibility that treatment-resistant MDD might be a unique
subtype of depression (Fagiolini and Kupfer, 2003). While both pharmacotherapy
and psychotherapy are recommended treatment options for mild and moderate
depression, only medication treatment might be effective and is recommended for
patients with severe depression (Otte, Gold, Penninx, et al., 2016; National Institute
for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), 2010). It is therefore worth emphasising
that the results in this thesis are based on moderate depression (Chapters 3-4) and
mild/subthreshold depression symptoms (Chapters 5-6).
Severely depressed patients are especially hard to recruit into studies because
they are less common and by definition very unmotivated. In addition they are
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usually medicated and it would be unethical to stop the therapy, and comor-
bidity is likely (Otte, Gold, Penninx, et al., 2016). This means studies including
treatment-resistant severely depressed patients (e.g. Steele, Kumar, and Ebmeier,
2007; Mwangi, Ebmeier, Matthews, and Steele, 2012) necessarily include small-
er samples but confidence in diagnosis is increased and the group will be much
more homogeneous. The likelihood of detectable brain function and structure
abnormalities is also higher which might be a partial explanation for higher di-
agnostic accuracy (e.g. Mwangi, Ebmeier, Matthews, and Steele, 2012) in smaller
machine learning studies (Schnack and Kahn, 2016). However, larger machine
learning studies such as the one described in Chapter 6 which included a rela-
tively heterogeneous1 sample will have larger generalisability at the cost of lower
accuracy (Schnack and Kahn, 2016; see also discussion in Chapter 6).
The analysis of fMRI relied on many underlying assumptions and parameter settings.
For example, it was assumed that BOLD signal reflects cognition and that the general
linear modelling approach is sensible. Parameter settings affect a variety of things
such as the amount of spatial smoothing or which brain template to use for spatial
normalisation. In this thesis standard SPM settings (and its subjacent assumptions
about neurophysiology and analysis strategy) were used as much as possible and it
is reassuring that when alternative settings were explored they usually yielded very
similar results. Regarding the computational modelling of behaviour we made the
assumptions that all participants’ parameters were sampled from the same group
prior which was empirically estimated (see Chapter 3 and Appendix A for details).
One big advantage of this approach is that it can improve parameter estimation
and suppress outliers. However, it would also be reasonable to assume that, for
example, patients and controls would be better modelled using separate prior
distributions. In principle this would be straightforward to address using formal
model comparison (i.e. comparing a model using a single prior versus a model
using two separate priors). In practice this raises questions whether there should
be also be different priors for individual parameters (as opposed to the whole set
of parameters) and how to address the co-variance of parameters across different
priors. In addition, studies, such as the one described in Chapter 5, might include
participants which would not clearly fall into either a patient or a control group.
This thesis was written within the context of the brain’s positive reinforcement
or reward system. As discussed in Chapter 2, depression is strongly associated
with abnormalities in reward processing and its sub-domains. However, there
is good evidence that aversive processing is also impaired in depressive illness.
Although an omission of an expected reward may be felt as punishing, reward and
punishment processing likely involve different neuronal bases (Chen, Takahashi,
Nakagawa, et al., 2015). It has been suggested that in addition to decreased reward
1The study included subjects with a range of depression symptom severities but was still homoge-
neous in the sense that it primarily included “old, white, Scottish” participants.
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processing depression is also characterised by increased aversive processing (Chen,
Takahashi, Nakagawa, et al., 2015; Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin, et al., 2015). Indeed,
most initial major depressive episodes follow a major negative life event (Pizzagalli,
2014). The most common antidepressants work by altering serotonin levels in the
brain (Eshel and Roiser, 2010) and the neurotransmitter has long been implicated
in aversive processing (Deakin, 2013). The presented results should therefore be
seen as implicitly conditioned on a reward processing context. For example, the
DCM analysis focused on “task-independent” connectivity, as opposed to the “task-
dependent” driving inputs and modulations, but although the DCM framework
(attempts to) divide connectivity in this way, the results are still dependent on the
context of the task.
In the case study (Chapter 2) I described how the absence of expected reward could
be perceived as punishment. Huys, Pizzagalli, Bogdan, and Dayan (2013) included
this in one of their models by adjusting the reward prediction error depending
on presence or absence of reward. The model included two separate sensitivity
parameters scaling reward and no-reward outcomes. Similarly, Chapter 3 included
models which tested whether learning was different following reward versus no-
reward (“punishment”). Two different learning rate parameters were included which
scaled the prediction error depending on the outcome. These experiments could
potentially be translated into the punishment domain in a straightforward way, by
changing the outcome to zero points (positive outcome) or a loss of points (negative
outcome).
Depression seems to be characterised by an abnormal response to negative feed-
back (Eshel and Roiser, 2010). This reaction can either be a hypersensitivity or a
“catastrophic response” to failure (Beats, Sahakian, and Levy, 1996; Tavares, Clark,
Furey, et al., 2008), or it could indicate a difficulty to learn from negative out-
comes (Eshel and Roiser, 2010), depending on the context or type of punishment.
However, associations between increased decision-making performance during
tasks with the goal of punishment minimisation have also been reported (Beevers,
Worthy, Gorlick, et al., 2013). Katz, Matanky, Aviram, and Yovel (2020) reported
meta-analytic evidence for enhanced punishment sensitivity in both depression
and anxiety, but altered reward sensitivity only in depression. Depression and
anxiety are highly comorbid (Watson, 2009), and anxiety is especially common in
more severe depression (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, and Walters, 2005). The two disor-
ders also represent risk factors of each other, and share some symptoms and basic
mechanisms (Katz, Matanky, Aviram, and Yovel, 2020).
As discussed in Chapter 1, analysis of the brain can be done at different levels of
analyses. Although largely ignored in this thesis, biophysical computational models
of major depression do exist (Mäki-Marttunen, Kaufmann, Elvsåshagen, et al., 2019).
For example, Ramirez-Mahaluf, Roxin, Mayberg, and Compte (2017) showed how a
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change in neurotransmitter uptake could cause aberrant activity in cortical regions,
and how simulated clinical treatments could counteract this.
Other environmental conditions and lifestyle factors not discussed in this thesis
have been shown to influence (and be influenced by) depression symptoms. For
example, sleep, diet, and exercise play important roles in the development, progres-
sion and treatment of depression (Lopresti, Hood, and Drummond, 2013). Treat-
ment of insomnia may prevent the development of depression (Alvaro, Roberts, and
Harris, 2013). Depression symptoms have been shown to be associated negatively
with Mediterranean diet and positively with the high consumption of sweets, fast
food, and processed pastries (Lopresti, Hood, and Drummond, 2013). Although
inconclusive, there is some evidence for the efficacy of exercise as therapy for de-
pression (Cooney, Dwan, Greig, et al., 2013).
In this thesis variations of a “two-alternative forced choice” task were used, in com-
bination with reinforcement learning, to study decision making. Participants were
presented with two options and had to choose one of them within a small time
frame. An outcome was then presented from which subjects could learn. An associ-
ation between major depression and behavioural differences in one of the tasks was
found (Chapter 3), but there did not appear to be an association between depression
symptom severity and performance during a different task (Chapter 5). Notably, a
number of previous fMRI studies reporting significant differences in brain activity
did not find behavioural differences between groups of MDD patients and healthy
controls (Gradin, Kumar, Waiter, et al., 2011; Johnston, Tolomeo, Gradin, et al., 2015).
Differences in brain function in the absence of (statistically significant) behavioural
effects might indicate compensatory mechanisms but it is unclear when and how
exactly such mechanisms work—and why sometimes they do not. Furthermore it is
not always obvious how behaviour during studies within an artificial experimental
environment maps onto behaviour in the real world. This artificial nature of tasks
might be especially pronounced during fMRI scanning where subjects are put into a
tight, uncomfortable tube, commonly with their head fixed and are asked to lie very
still (Muehlhan, Lueken, Wittchen, and Kirschbaum, 2011). It is also possible that
the effects of such an aversive environment are greater for MDD patients compared
to healthy participants.
It will be important to study depression in ecologically valid environments. A recent
study utilised smartphones to collect data during real world activities and showed
how this data may be used to predict changes in users’ depression symptom severity
(Canzian and Musolesi, 2015). Smartphone applications have great potential for
disease screening, monitoring and managing (BinDhim, Shaman, Trevena, et al.,
2015) although in their review about mobile apps offering support for depressed
users Huguet, Rao, McGrath, et al. (2016) found that current efficacy is questionable.
Further studies about how to improve effectiveness and usability while increasing
participants’ engagement and minimising dropout are needed.
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Ultimately one of the most important goals of depression research is to develop
effective treatments but better understanding of the disease is needed. Neural
substrates and associated abnormalities need to be reliably identified in patients so
they can be translated to animal models. These can then be used to screen novel
antidepressants. The computational psychiatry approach promises to lead to many
new insights into neurobehavioural mechanisms and aid in the discovery of novel
therapeutic targets. While applied computational psychiatry and drug discovery
will likely still require many years of research, it has been argued that currently
available neuroscience techniques can and should be used today (McGuire, Sato,
Mechelli, et al., 2015; Steele and Paulus, 2019). This requires additional training for
psychiatrists and a collaborative effort with stakeholders, politicians and funding
agencies and a general cultural change (Steele and Paulus, 2019; McGuire, Sato,
Mechelli, et al., 2015). Importantly, this also means that NHS psychiatric services
need to routinely collect quantitative data from individual patients (Steele and
Paulus, 2019). Objective clinically useful predictions for individual patients are
possible using machine learning techniques (Steele and Paulus, 2019) and they,
maybe for the first time in over half a century, give hope for tangible clinical progress.
And so I will end this thesis the same way it began; with a quote from William Styron.
But this time it endows us with hope. The hope that depression is not the end. The
hope that restoration is possible. The hope of a return to the shining world.
“For those who have dwelt in depression’s dark wood, and known its
inexplicable agony, their return from the abyss is not unlike the ascent of
the poet, trudging upward and upward out of hell’s black depths and at
last emerging into what he saw as ‘the shining world.’ There, whoever has
been restored to health has almost always been restored to the capacity for
serenity and joy, and this may be indemnity enough for having endured
the despair beyond despair.
E quindi uscimmo a riveder le stelle.
And so we came forth, and once again beheld the stars.”






This chapter contains the Supplementary Materials for Chapter 3 which was pub-
lished as S. Rupprechter, A. Stankevicius, Q. J. M. Huys, J. D. Steele, et al. (2018).
“Major Depression Impairs the Use of Reward Values for Decision-Making”. In:
Scientific Reports 8.13798.
Supplement 
Major depression impairs the use of reward values
for decision-making
S. Rupprechter, A. Stankevicius, Q. J. M. Huys, J. D. Steele, P. Seriès
Experiment Details
First, personality and clinical questionnaires were filled out and an interview was conducted, which
lasted approximately one hour. This was followed by a training session lasting between 10 and 20
minutes. Final 15 minutes of preparation included subjects changing and a safety check by the NHS
personnel. Scanning lasted approximately 50 minutes and the experiment ended with a 5 minutes
debriefing session and monetary reimbursement. Every participant was paid £20. Their scores were
converted into a percentage and rounded up. Performance-dependent bonus was defined as that
percentage number divided by ten, so for example if they correctly responded in 66% of trials, they
would receive an additional £7.
The 60 trials were divided into 4 periods, which again were split into three blocks each. After each
period (every 15 minutes), there was a brief rest period. In each block, participants observed five
different  fractals  exactly  four  times  and made  5  decisions.  Fractals  were  presented  for  3  to  4
seconds and outcomes for 2.5 to 3.5 seconds. Decisions had to be made within 5 seconds. Null
events (blank screens without interaction) and decisions (responding to a simple response prompt)
were sometimes displayed  (between 1.25 and 7.5 seconds) to obtain a baseline of brain activity.
Other modifications from the original task of Stankevicius et al.  (6) included the display of the
reward as a pound symbol instead of a treasure chest and simplified instructions that were more
accessible to people suffering from depressive symptoms.
Rupprechter et al., 2018 1
114 Appendix A. Supplementary Materials for Chapter 3
Figure  S1. Correlation  matrix  of  questionnaire  scores  of  the  fMRI  dataset.  As  expected,
questionnaire scores are often correlated with on another. See the section about additional analysis
details  below  for  more  information  about  correlations  between  beta,  neuroticism  and  other
questionnaire scores.
Figure S2. Average reaction times of participants in the fMRI dataset. Error bars represent standard
errors. Mean response times were not significantly different between groups (Welch’s t-test; t(26.6)
= 0.692, p = .495).
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Questionnaire Patients Controls Score Range p-value
fMRI dataset
BDI 24.7 ± 13.1 4.2 ± 5.6 0 – 63 < 0.001
BDA 4.8 ± 2.9 0.5 ± 0.9 0 – 12 < 0.001
BDI\A 19.9 ± 10.8 3.7 ± 4.8 0 – 51 < 0.001
DSAB 15.0 ± 4.0 18.1 ± 2.7 0 – 24 0.013
HAD-A 12.3 ± 5.2 4.2 ± 2.3 0 – 21 < 0.001
HAD-D 8.6 ± 4.8 1.4 ± 2.1 0 – 21 < 0.001
HAMA 17.3 ± 7.0 1.4 ± 2.6 0 – 56 < 0.001
LOT-R 9.1 ± 5.5 18.4 ± 3.1 0 – 24 < 0.001
MADRS 17.7 ± 6.6 1.4 ± 2.6 0 – 60 < 0.001
NART 46.8 ± 4.2 46.6 ± 3.2 0 – 50 0.873
RSE 13.5 ± 6.9 24.5 ± 4.9 0 – 30 < 0.001
SHAPS 37.8 ± 8.5 49.6 ± 6.0 14 – 56 < 0.001
Agreeableness 39.5 ± 7.2 46.7 ± 5.9 12 – 60 0.004
Conscientiousness 36.3 ± 10.5 45.1 ± 7.0 12 – 60 0.008
Extraversion 30.5 ± 8.1 44.5 ± 5.2 12 – 60 < 0.001
Neuroticism 46.3 ± 7.1 29.8 ± 8.0 12 – 60 < 0.001
Openness 41.1 ± 5.1 46.5 ± 4.4 12 – 60 0.003
Pilot dataset
BDI 27.7 10.1 ± 12.2 0 – 63 -
DSAB 13.7 14.8 ± 3.9 0 – 24 -
HAD-A 9.0 11.1 ± 3.5 0 – 21 -
HAD-D 7.3 8.4 ± 1.5 0 – 21 -
HAMA 18.0 5.1 ± 7.1 0 – 56 -
LOT-R 9.3 14.5 ± 5.5 0 – 24 -
MADRS 18.0 5.1 ± 7.1 0 – 60 -
NART 45.3 44.0 ± 11.3 0 – 50 -
RSE 18.7 9.5 ± 6.6 0 – 30 -
SHAPS 7.7 7.0 ± 1.1 14 – 56 -
Agreeableness 43.0 45.0 ± 5.8 12 – 60 -
Conscientiousness 32.0 43.3 ± 8.2 12 – 60 -
Extraversion 27.7 41.6 ± 6.9 12 – 60 -
Neuroticism 50.7 34.4 ± 11.5 12 – 60 -
Openness 46.7 46.2 ± 6.3 12 – 60 -
Rupprechter et al., 2018 3
116 Appendix A. Supplementary Materials for Chapter 3
Table S1. Summary of questionnaire scores of participant groups and p-values for Welch’s t-tests
(fMRI dataset). Due the small number of patients included in the Pilot dataset, we did not calculate
standard deviations for them and did not perform t-tests. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; DSAB
= Digit Score Part B; HAD = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; HAMA = Hamilton Anxiety
Rating  Scale;  LOT-R  =  Life  Orientation  Test  –  Revised;  MADRS  =  Montgomery-Åsberg
Depression Rating Scale; NART = National Adult Reading Test; RSE = Rosenberg Self-Esteem
Scale; SHAPS = Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure Scale; Scores displayed as mean ± std.
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Figure S3. Boxplots of four questionnaires assessing depressive symptom severity (fMRI dataset).
Patients  had significantly  higher  scores  than  controls  on  the  three  scales  measuring  depressive
severity  (BDI,  HAD-D,  MADRS)  and  significantly  lower  scores  on  SHAPS,  which  measures
pleasure (see Table S1). 
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Figure S4. Boxplots of four questionnaires assessing depressive symptom severity (Pilot dataset).
Note that the Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure Scale (SHAPS) was scored differently here: Each answer
was scored either as zero (for two of the four possible answer options) or one (two alternative
options), instead of scoring it one through four.
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Additional Analyses Details
For our winning model we also tested whether our groups were better described using a shared
population prior or separate priors for each group.  Our data (fMRI dataset) was best described
using a single population prior (∆iBIC = 13.5).
Estimated model parameters were compared between groups using a Wilcoxon rank sum test which
does not require an assumption of normality. (We used MATLAB’s  jbtest and  lillietest to test for
normality. In both cases the tests rejected the null hypothesis that the data comes from a normal
distribution for the memory parameter for one of the groups, but not for the beta parameter. Using
Welch’s t-test instead gave us an almost identical result in terms of p value for the beta parameter.)
Pearson correlation analysis across groups was performed, for which we reported classical p values.
Below, we additionally used a Bayesian hypothesis test (1).  A Bayes factor (BF10) larger than 3
indicates substantial evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis (presence of a correlation).
Classical  p  values  may overestimate  the  evidence  against  the  null  hypothesis  (2),  but  are  also
reported.  All analyses were performed in MATLAB (R) R2017a (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick,
MA).
Additional correlations with beta
Neuroticism was significantly negatively correlated with the inverse temperature parameter (r =
-0.491, p = .004) across groups in the fMRI dataset (Figure S5). Because it is possible that this
correlation is a function of group differences, we performed additional analyses taking into account
group and also included our Pilot dataset after separately fitting the Leaky model. After controlling
for  group  in  the  fMRI  dataset,  there  was  a  non-significant  but  trending  negative  relationship
between beta and neuroticism (r=-0.301, p=.100). This is unsurprising because the majority of our
controls scored low in neuroticism, while most of our patients scored high. After controlling for
group in the Pilot dataset, there was a significant negative correlation between beta and neuroticism
(r=-0.433, p=0.039). Note that this dataset includes several control participants who scored high on
neuroticism. In the pooled data, we again found a significant negative relationship between beta and
neuroticism (t=-2.986, p=.004) after controlling for group and dataset version. Similarly, there was a
significant negative relationship between beta and neuroticism (t(35)=-2.679, p=.011) combining
only the control participants of both datasets, controlling for dataset version (reported in the main
text). There was no significant correlation within the combined patients after correcting for dataset
version (t(15)=-1.082, p=.297).
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In  the  fMRI  dataset  (but  not  the  Pilot  dataset)  there  were  also  (weaker)  positive  correlations
between β and extraversion (r = 0.423, BF10 = 2.46, p = .016), RSE (r = 0.410, BF10 = 2.01, p = .
020), and LOT-R (r = 0.382, BF10 = 1.38, p = .031) scores, with this being at an “anecdotal” level
of evidence (BF10 < 3). Since these scores were negatively correlated with neuroticism (Figure S1),
we performed additional analyses to check whether neuroticism was the driving factor in these
correlations and concluded that it was indeed so:
We  fitted  an  additional  general  linear  regression  model  (using  MATLAB’s  fitglm)  including
coefficients for neuroticism, extraversion, RSE, LOT-R, group membership and dataset version to
the combined dataset. None of the coefficients were significant, but the p-value for neuroticism
shows  a  trend  (t=-1.826,  p=.074),  while  all  other  coefficients  were  non-significant  (p  >  0.6),
indicating that neuroticism should be the variable of interest (Table S2).
Model 1: Beta ~ 1 + Neuroticism + Extraversion + RSE + LOTR + Group + Dataset
We then created a linear regression model by stepwise regression (stepwiseglm), starting from the
above Model 1, using the differences in the deviances of models as the criterion. Predictors where
removed (stepwise) if the deviance was greater than 0.05 and only neuroticism remained in the final
model (t=-3.286, p=.002):
Model 2: Beta ~ 1 + Neuroticism
This shows that indeed neuroticism is the variable of interest and was the driving factor for the
correlations between the other variables and beta in the fMRI dataset and suggests a possible link
between participants' neuroticism and their difficulty in making decisions based on their internal





LOT-R  0.367 0.715
Group -0.437 0.664
Dataset Version -0.510 0.612
Table S2. Results of t-tests on individual coefficients of Model 1.
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Optimism and previous results
The original Life Orientation Test (LOT) was revised (3) to the current form (LOT-R) after criticism
that LOT scores could not be distinguished from neuroticism scores and correlations with optimism
disappeared when controlled for neuroticism (4).  However, it has been shown that even these LOT-
R scores are not independent from neuroticism scores (5).  After re-analysing the published data
from Stankevicius et al. (6) using the methods described here (see Model Fitting Procedure), we
were not only able to confirm that LOT-R scores corresponded to a prior belief about rewards (r = .
524, p < 0.001), but also found that neuroticism was similarly related to a (negative) prior belief (r =
-.327, p = 0.019). 
In the present fMRI data,  the prior mean did not significantly correlate with LOT-R (r=-0.255,
p=.159)  nor  with  neuroticism (r=0.322,  p=.072),  nor  with  the  first  principal  component  of  our
questionnaires  measuring  depression  severity  (r=0.115,  p=.532),  nor  with  any of  the  individual
depression  questionnaire  scores  (BDI,  HAD-D,  MADRS,  SHAPS),  suggesting  that  neither
optimism, nor neuroticism, nor depression biased participants towards choosing a certain option.
We do not know for certain why we were unable to directly replicate previous results, but we have
several  hypotheses  and are  planning to  address  this  in  future  work.  Overall,  we think  that  we
introduced too  many important  changes  from the  original  experiment  and so  the  tasks  are  not
directly comparable any more: In our Pilot and fMRI experiments, trials lasted a lot longer than in
the published task (several seconds instead of fractions of a second). This was necessary to be able
to capture the BOLD response during scanning, but initially made the task too easy. We tried to
compensate for that by reducing the space of possible differences between the probability of reward
associated with the two targets (-30% to 30% instead of -100% to 100%), which introduced much
more uncertainty in the decisions. It is likely that the scanner induced additional uncertainty and
pressure and so overall the task was very hard. 
There were other differences as well: Each fractal was observed a variable number of times in the
published  data,  while  in  the  novel  tasks  each  fractal  was  observed  exactly  four  times.  While
participants only performed a short trial version of the task in the original version, here we trained
our subjects extensively (between 10 and 20 minutes) before the main experiment. In addition, (a)
there might be trait-cohorts interactions, (b) we might not have enough participants to reliably find
the effect, (c) the saliency of the rewards might have been different (empty or full treasure chest
versus a pound symbol or empty screen),  and (d) the performance-related monetary reward the
participants received after the experiments was different and likely led to differences in motivations.
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Figure  S5. A scatter  plot  of  neuroticism and  β,  a  parameter  in  our  best  fitting  Leaky  model
capturing  participants'  ability  to  follow  internal  value  estimations,  and  their  correlation  across
patients  and  control  subjects  of  both  datasets  (shown without  controlling  for  group  or  dataset
version: r=-0.408, p=.002; regression line with 95% confidence interval; after controlling for both
group  and dataset version: t=-2.986, p=.004). 
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Figure  S6. A scatter  plot  of  neuroticism and  β,  a  parameter  in  our  best  fitting  Leaky  model
capturing  participants'  ability  to  follow  internal  value  estimations,  and  their  correlation  across
control subjects of both datasets (without controlling for dataset version; regression line with 95%
confidence interval).
Bayesian model
The Bayesian model was introduced in detail by Stankevicius et al. (6). We briefly describe it here
for completeness:
At each decision point, participants are assumed to know how often the fractal i used in the decision
was shown ( N i ) and how often it was followed by reward ( ni ). It is further assumed that
subjects behave as Bayesian observers and use Bayes rule to compute a posterior, from which they
extract the mean to make decisions.  The prior is modelled as a Beta distribution, which is conjugate
to the binomial distribution. It can be shown that the posterior mean takes on the following form: 
where alpha and beta control the shape of the Beta distribution. The mean is then plugged into a
softmax function to obtain the probability of choosing fractal i as in the other models:
Rupprechter et al., 2018 11
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Reward Sensitivity
In  previous  work  (12),  the  inverse  temperature  parameter  has  also  been  interpreted  as  reward
sensitivity and it has been argued that in some cases it can be substituted exactly for a reward
sensitivity parameter (9) in a RL model.  This however only holds when all options in the softmax
are estimated from observed rewards, which is not the case here, as we show in an example:
In our model, on the first timestep we will have  V (1 )=ρ r1 . After the second timestep we will
have V (2 )=A V (1 )+ρ r ( 2)  which we can rewrite as V (2 )=ρ ( A r (1 )+r (2) ) . In general, after each step
we will have a  V  value that is a combination of  A  and  r  scaled by  ρ . Within the
softmax function there is a subtraction term  x – y  which is multiplied by  β .  This can be
rewritten as β x − β y , which means that the β  parameter scales both x  and y , just as
ρ  would scale each of the variables if they are both estimated on a trial-by-trial basis. However,
if one of these values is instead fixed (as is the case for our explicit probability),  ρ  will only
scale one of the variables, while  β  will still scale both of them, which makes the parameters
distinguishable.
Our beta parameter should therefore not be interpreted as being equivalent to a reward sensitivity
parameter. In our model, a high inverse temperature likely indicates that participants were able to
perform better in the highly uncertain environment and put more trust in their own estimations.
Lower  beta  values  indicate  that  participants  put  less  trust  in  their  estimations  and chose  more
randomly. It is perfectly possible (and given previous research it is indeed likely) that patients were
less  reward  sensitive  than  controls,  and  some  of  this  difference  may  be  captured  by  the  beta
parameter. It is, for example, possible that patients put less trust in their estimations because they
were less sensitive to the rewards in the first place, but this is not explicitly modelled here. To
reliably distinguish beta from reward sensitivity, we would need an additional reward sensitivity
parameter, which we included in one of our models (Leaky-rho). However, model comparison did
not reveal this to be the most parsimonious model and so we did not pursue this further.
Model Simulations
We provide additional mesh plots where we simulated data using the model while we systematically
varied both parameters (Figure S7). The plots show that variations in the two parameters lead to
different  effects:  While  the  number  of  correct  responses  alone  can  not  be  used  to  distinguish
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between the parameters, the effects are very different when separately looking at trials on which a
fractal response was correct and trials on which an explicit probability response was correct.
There is a clear positive correlation between the beta value and the (average) number of correct
responses on trials on which the explicit option was correct. Variations in the memory parameter
have little effect in that case. However, the memory parameter is important on trials on which the
fractal was the correct choice and higher values lead to more correct choices. The beta parameter
modulates  this  relationship  between  memory  and  number  of  correct  choices.  High beta  values
results in a large effect of memory on the number of correct responses, while low beta values flatten
out this effect.
Rupprechter et al., 2018 13
126 Appendix A. Supplementary Materials for Chapter 3
Figure  S7. Simulations  of  our  model  using  different  parameter  values  for  memory  (discount
parameter A) and β. The number of correct responses averaged over 100 simulations is shown. The
left column (A-C) shows the number of correct choices on trials for which ‘fractal’ was the correct
response as a function of the two parameters from different viewpoints of the grid. The right column
(D-F) shows the same for the number of correct choices on trials for which the explicit probability
was the correct response.
Rupprechter et al., 2018 14
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Model Fitting Procedure
We used model fitting and comparison procedures that have been used previously by Huys et al. (7,
8, 9). For completeness, we will describe them here in detail.
The goal of the model fitting procedure is to find estimates of the parameter vector θi for each
participant i. This can be done by maximizing the probability that the observed choice data Ci came
from the distribution governed by this θ:
Repeating this procedure for each participant separately without any constraints can however lead to
poor estimates and ignores the fact that we would expect parameters of different individuals to be
comparable (e.g. to be of the same order of magnitude). One simple way to deal with this would be
to  enforce  hard  constraints  on  the  parameter  estimates,  but  a  more  principled  way is  to  use  a
maximum a posteriori estimate and add a prior with information about the likely range of parameter
values (10):
One option for such a prior is to estimate it from the data. Making the random effects assumption
that  parameters  of  individuals  are  samples  from  an  overall  group  distribution  and  that  this
distribution  is  a  Normal  distribution  with  mean  μ  and  variance  Σ,  we  can  use  Expectation-
Maximisation to simultaneously estimate group and individual parameters (7, 8, 9).
In the E-step (kth iteration) a Laplace approximation (mean mu and variance V) is used to estimate
the parameters of individuals:
In  the  M-step  the  population  parameters  are  updated,  taking  into  account  the  uncertainty  of
parameter estimations of individuals (weighted mean vector and covariance matrix):
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To enforce constraints, parameters were transformed through non-linear functions with support on
the real line. To avoid falling into local minima, multiple random initialisations were used. The
procedure  proved  to  be  quite  stable  over  multiple  runs,  repeatedly  estimating  very  similar
parameters.
Model Comparison Procedure
Having fitted our models, we want to find out which model has the highest probability of being the
correct model given our data (11). This means that for some model M we are interested in finding
its posterior probability
The probability of the choice data P(C) will be the same under all models and since we have no
prior preference for any of the models, P(M) will also be equal for all models, which means that
when we take  the  ratio  of  posterior  model  probabilities  they  will  both  cancel  out.  The model
evidence remains and can be rewritten as
which we then approximate (7, 8, 9) with
where |M| is the number of fitted prior parameters, |C| is the overall number of choices and the
difference in iBIC values of two models will be an approximation to the log Bayes Factor (9). The
“i” in front of BIC stands for “integrated”, because to compute log(p(C| , M)) we integrate overθθ
parameters so that
This can be approximated by sampling from our estimate prior and averaging over those samples (7,
8, 9):
For our winning model we also tested whether our groups were better described using a shared
population prior or separate priors for each group. For this, iBIC values of the fits of separate group
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priors were added and compared to the iBIC value of a single population prior. Our data was best
described using a single population prior (∆iBIC = 13.5).
Simulations
It is important to check that models can be recovered given the available data and so we performed
model  recovery  simulations.  Models  were  simulated  to  produce  the  same  amount  of  actually
available data (32 subjects, 60 decisions) and then the generating model and an alternative model
were fit to the data and standard model comparison was used to decide which model produced the
better fit.
These simulations showed that Leaky and Leaky-ρ could not reliably be distinguished with the
amount of data we have and Leaky was often selected as best model even when Leaky-ρ produced
the data.  Importantly,  however,  our second and third best-fitting reinforcement  learning models
could reliably be recovered from data they generated in most simulations as shown in Table S3.
Bayesian RL-basic RL-learning RL-unbiased RL-learning-unbiased
12/15 12/15 15/15 14/15 15/15
Table S3. Model recovery table showing how often each model was recovered from data they had
generated (15 simulations) against the Leaky model. Leaky always had the lower iBIC value (15/15
against all models) when fitted to data it had generated.
To check whether  the model  fitting procedure is  actually  able  to  recover  parameters  given the
amount of data available to us, we simulated 32 participants with 60 decisions each from known
parameters. To get sensible parameter values, we randomly sampled from the estimated group prior.
Errors were consistently lower for our procedure than standard maximum likelihood estimations
and  our  procedure  also  avoids  outliers  sometimes  produced  by  MLE  by  pushing  estimations
towards the group mean. Figures S8 and S9 show a first example of the recovery of memory A and
inverse temperature β parameters for the model Leaky, while Figures S10 and S11 show the same
for a second example and Figures S12 and S13 for a third example. Simulations of other models
showed similar parameter recovery.
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Figure S8.  Example 1 (A): Parameter recovery simulation of the memory parameter A using a
group prior  (MAP) and simple maximum likelihood (ML). The red line shows the values  with
which the data was actually generated. Note how MAP estimation leads to improvements over ML
estimation, in particular by eliminating the outlier lying on the zero boundary.
Figure S9. Example 1 (β): Parameter recovery simulation of the inverse temperature parameter β
using a group prior (MAP) and simple maximum likelihood (ML). The red line shows the values
with which the data was actually generated.
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Figure S10. Example 2 (A): Parameter recovery simulation of the memory parameter A using a
group prior  (MAP) and simple maximum likelihood (ML). The red line shows the values  with
which the data was actually generated.
Figure S11. Example 2 (β): Parameter recovery simulation of the inverse temperature parameter β
using a group prior (MAP) and simple maximum likelihood (ML). The red line shows the values
with which the data was actually generated.
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Figure S12. Example 3 (A): Parameter recovery simulation of the memory parameter A using a
group prior  (MAP) and simple maximum likelihood (ML). The red line shows the values  with
which the data was actually generated.
Figure S13. Example 3 (β): Parameter recovery simulation of the inverse temperature parameter β
using a group prior (MAP) and simple maximum likelihood (ML). The red line shows the values
with which the data was actually generated.
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Parameter correlation
There was a trend suggesting a correlation between parameter estimates (r = 0.349, BF10 = 0.91, p
= .051). We performed additional parameter recovery simulations (Figures S14, S15, S16) in which
we systematically varied parameters to further convince ourselves that parameter correlations did
not systematically influence the fitting of parameters. We simulated individual participants, with
one of the values fixed to be the same for everybody (e.g. setting the memory A=0.9) while varying
the other parameter across participants (e.g. have participants with betas in the range of 4 until 9).
Most  importantly,  for  the  beta  parameter  we  did  not  find  that  different  realistic  values  of  the
memory parameter had a systematic influence on the quality of the parameter recovery (Figure
S14).
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Figure  S14. Recovery  of  the  beta  parameter,  while  fixing  the  memory  parameter  A to  certain
realistic values: (A) A=0.80, (B) A=0.85, (C) A=0.90, (D) A=0.95, (E) A=0.99. Subfigure (F) shows
(A-E) combined. For each recovery plot, 68 participants were simulated, making 120 decisions. It
can be seen that the parameter recovery of the beta parameter is not systematically influenced by the
setting of the memory parameter.
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Figure S15. Recovery of the memory (A) parameter, while fixing the inverse temperature parameter
β to certain values: (A)  β=2, (B)  β=4, (C)  β=6, (D)  β=8, (E)  β=10. Subfigure (F) shows (A-E)
combined. For each recovery plot, 68 participants were simulated, making 120 decisions. For very
low  (and  probably  mostly  unrealistic)  β  values,  the  recovery  of  the  memory  parameter  was
noticeably worse than for all the other more realistic values of 4 and above.
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Figure S16. Recovery of the fixed parameters. (Left) Beta parameters were fixed at values 2, 4, 6,
8, and 10 and recovered well. The corresponding recoveries of the systematically varying memory
parameters are shown in Figure S14. (Right) Memory parameters were fixed at values 0.80, 0.85,
0.90, 0.95, and 0.99 and recovered well. The corresponding recoveries of the systematically varying
beta parameters are shown in Figure S15. 
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Abnormal Reward Valuation and Event-Related Connectivity in Unmedicated 
Major Depressive Disorder
Experiment Details
Written informed consent was obtained then, questionnaires and an interview conducted which
lasted  an  hour,  then  task  training  for  10-20  minutes  followed  by  50  minutes  scanning  then
debriefing lasting 5 minutes. Participants were paid £20 plus a performance dependent bonus of
up to £10. Final scores were converted into a percentage.
    Subjects passively observed fractals; each was always followed by either a reward symbol (£)
indicating ‘value’ or a blank screen indicating ‘no value’.  After each fractal was observed on four
occasions it appeared, at some later time, in a single decision trial where subjects were asked to
choose the higher reward probability; their internally estimated value for the fractal or an explicit
numeric value. Either option could have a value 10% 20% or 30% higher than the other or equal
value.  This means a total  of 240 fractals (60x4) were observed with 60 decisions being made.
Fractals were presented for 3 to 4 seconds. Outcomes were presented for 2.5 to 3.5 seconds.
Decisions had to be made within a 5 second response window. Null events (blank screens) and null
decisions  (requiring  a  button  press  in  response  to  a  cross  in  the  centre  of  the  screen)  were
randomly interspersed throughout the experiment.  The sequence of observations and decisions
were interleaved in a pseudo-random order and identical for all subjects. The study was divided
into 4 sessions of 15 min each between which there were periods where participants could briefly
rest. Each session was split into 3 blocks and during each block participants made 5 decisions.
Participants  did not  receive feedback  during the task  but  were told their  performance scores
would be converted into money they would receive at the end of the experiment. The task is
summarised in Figure 1 (main text).
Behavioural modelling
We recently published a detailed computational modelling analysis of participants’ behaviour on
the task (Rupprechter et al., 2018). Here we summarise the approach and main findings. We fitted
seven different models, representing distinct hypotheses about participants’ decision-making, to
the data. All models assume that participants estimate an internal value for each fractal stimulus
and compare this internal value to the explicit value at decision time. To model the probability of
choosing an action, the value difference was passed into a standard softmax function, which also
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included an  inverse  temperature  parameter  β.  Higher  values  of  β lead  to  more  deterministic
decision-making. The parameter can be interpreted as an individual’s ability to use their internal
value estimations to make decisions.
    Four different variations of reinforcement learning (RL) models were defined. These models
incorporate  trial-by-trial  prediction  errors  and  learning  rate  parameters.  After  an  outcome  is
observed, the expected value of the fractal that was displayed is updated by adding the prediction
error (difference between expected value and reward outcome coded as 1 or 0) scaled by the
learning rate. The initial value was either set to a fitted initial value parameter (in two of the RL
models) or fixed at 0.5 corresponding to a prior belief that reward was equally likely from either
option. Two models included separate learning rates for separate reward outcomes, aiming to test
whether  learning  would be different  following  rewards  versus  no-rewards.  We also fitted the
winning  model  of  the  original  study  by  Stankevicius  et  al.  (2014)  which  tested  the  Bayesian
observer hypothesis. This model assumed that participants would count the number of times each
fractal was followed by reward and combine this evidence with a prior belief about the probability
of rewards associated with fractals. The model does not explicitly model the observation phase of
the  experiment  and instead assumed at  the decision  time perfect  counting had occurred.  To
overcome these limitations, we fitted two additional models (‘Leaky’ and ‘Leaky-ρ’) which also
assumed participants would count the number of times a fractal was followed by reward, but this
was  modelled  on  a  trial-by-trial  basis.  In  addition,  a  memory  or  discounting  parameter  was
included, which assumed that subjects forgot about some of the previously observed values.
    Model  fitting was based on maximum  a posteriori estimates,  which included an empirical
Gaussian prior  estimated from the data.  Parameters were initialised with maximum likelihood
estimates and then an expectation-maximization procedure applied to iteratively update these
estimates until  convergence.  The integrated  Bayesian  Information Criterion (iBIC)  was used to
identify the model that best fit the data while also penalizing for model complexity. 
    The best fitting model according to iBIC was the  Leaky model, which updated the value for
fractal i on trial t as where A is a memory parameter and smaller A reflected increased forgetting
or retrospective discounting, and r was unity if a £ reward symbol was observed and zero 
otherwise.
As  above,  the  probability  of  choosing  a  fractal  i was  calculated  using  a  softmax  function
incorporating estimated value (V) and explicitly presented values (phi)
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where  f(x) = x/4 is a transformation of the internal value estimate comparable to the explicitly
displayed reward probability.
    We identified differences between the groups in both memory parameter (z = −2.15, p = 0.031;
A patients μ ± σ =0.90 ± 0.04, median = 0.91; A controls μ ± σ = 0.92 ± 0.09, median = 0.96) and
softmax  β parameter (z = −2.34, p = 0.019; β patients μ ± σ = 4.67 ± 1.45, β controls μ ± σ = 5.89 ±
1.33). This indicates MDD patients discounted more of their estimated values and found it harder
to follow their internal value estimations.
Logistic Regression
Logistic regression models were fitted using glmfit in MATLAB to the data of all participants except
one, which was then used to predict the group of the left-out participant (using  glmval and a
threshold  of  0.5).   This  was  repeated  all  participants.  Overall,  we  were  able  to  classify  27
participants (14 patients, 13 controls) correctly, which corresponds to an accuracy of 79% (27 out
of 34, precision=76%, recall=81%). The area under the ROC curve, for which the p threshold was
varied between 0 and 1 and true and false positive rates were calculated, was approximately 0.86
(Figure S5).
Value difference signal encoding: Group comparison
Beta  values  were extracted from the first  level  contrast  images  of  each  participant  and then
compared between two groups. We did not find a group difference with betas extracted from a
5mm sphere within the aMCC region identified as being active during decision making (-2,14,50)
for  value  difference  (t(29.09)=-0.30,  p=0.764)  or  absolute  value  difference  (t(29.28)=-0.990,
p=0.330) signal encoding. We also did not find a group difference of value difference encoding in
slightly  different  aMCC  ROIs  ([-14,16,48]:  t(23.47)=-1.33,  p=0.197;  [12,24,28]:  t(24.32)=0.42,
p=0.682). Neither did we find a group difference of absolute value difference encoding in different
aMCC ([-4,24,46]: t(23.92)=-0.69, p=0.498; [10,10,46]: t(28.49)=-1.55, p=0.132) or rACC ([-16,42,8]:
t(29.72)=-1.21, p=0.237; [-4,50,-14]: t(29.04)=-1.86, p=0.074) regions of interest.
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Connectivity analysis
The  conditions  included  in  the  gPPI  analysis  were  outcome  time,  fractal  presentation  time,
decision prompt time, button press time, and null events.  Event-related connectivity methods are
not as well established as some other areas of neuroimaging,  so we also explored beta series
correlation analysis (BASCO toolbox; Göttlich et al. 2015), as an additional method to infer event-
related  functional  connectivity  between  a  dACC  seed  region  and  other  brain  regions.
Encouragingly, we obtained a similar result as gPPI, with controls showing stronger connectivity
between dACC and rACC than patients at the decision-time (Figure S6).
Structural differences
To address the possibility of structural differences influencing our results (see discussion in main
text),  we  performed  additional  analyses.  For  every  participant,  we  obtained  a  grey  matter
probability  image  (c1*.nii  in  SPM)  during  preprocessing  of  the  T1  structural  image  and  an
estimated forward  deformation  field  image  (y_*.nii  in  SPM)  used  to  normalise  the  functional
images.  The deformation field was used to normalise the grey matter probability image, including
a resampling of voxels in the same way as was done for the functional scans;  giving for each
resampled voxel, an estimate of the probability that a voxel was grey matter. We then multiplied
beta values in the hippocampal and rACC ROIs (5mm) of contrast images for value encoding at
fractal presentation time by these grey matter weights.  From each ROI the mean values were
calculated and between group Welch’s  t-tests  done.  The results  still  showed significant  group
differences  after  these  adjustments  (L  hippocampus  (-36,-32,2)  t(21.36)=3.313,  p=0.003;   R
hippocampus (48,-26,4) t(31.03)=2.501, p=0.018; rACC (14,50,-10) t(31.19)=2.890, p=0.007)
Interpretation of Results
We were cautious in interpreting our results:  i) At a behavioural level we found decreased ‘value
memory’ and at an imaging level we found decreased ‘value encoding’ in the brain. Theories of
decision making posit that value estimations are used as the basis of decision making.  Therefore,
altered value encoding could have been the cause of  the observed behavioural  abnormalities.
However,  as  both  behaviour  and  brain  encoding  were  abnormal  we  were  cautions  about  a
possible circular argument in interpreting our data further than we have in the main text.   ii)
Regarding abnormalities in decision-making, we made the prediction that we would find both an
activation across participants and a group difference in cortical signals at the decision time. We
further hypothesized a signal encoding ‘value difference’ because in our behavioural model, this is
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the variable  which enters at  the decision event  time.  Importantly  though,  these variables  are
related. While it would be possible to test for a direct correlation between the signal encoding and
estimated inverse temperature parameters at the second level, interpretation with our data would
be difficult.
Control analyses
We  repeated  our  analysis  using  a  decreased  individual  voxel  threshold  (p<0.01)  for  multiple
comparison corrections and reproduced the figures from the main text (Figures S1-S4). Results
were  broadly  similar,  with  the  exception  of  negative  value  difference  encoding  signal  across
participants which was not significant (Figure S4). Additional Monte Carlo simulations showed that
with an assumed individual voxel type 1 error of p=0.01 a smaller cluster size of k=102 would be
needed to correct for multiple comparisons at the same cluster correction threshold of p<0.01.
The  script  (cluster_threshold_beta.m)  can  be  found  on  the  author’s  webpage
(https://www2.bc.edu/sd-slotnick/scripts.htm).
Figure S1.  Decreased reward activation in MDD participants compared to healthy controls in the
striatum. Display threshold p<0.01 and k=108; c.f. Figure 2B.
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Figure S2.  Reward value encoding at fractal presentation time. (A) Positive value encoding within
healthy controls. Note that the cluster size here is k=66; c.f. Figure 3A. (B) Negative value encoding
in depressed participants.  Display threshold p<0.01 and k=108; c.f.  Figure 3B.  (C)  Larger value
encoding in healthy controls compared to MDD participants in hippocampus. Display threshold
p<0.01 and k=108; c.f. Figure 3B – left. (D) Larger value encoding in healthy controls compared to
MDD participants in rostral ACC. Note that the cluster size here is k=91; c.f. Figure 3B – right. 
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Figure S3.  Activation during decision making. (A) Larger activations in MDD compared to controls.
Note that the cluster  size  here is  k=103; c.f.  Figure 4B.  (B)  Negative absolute value difference
encoding signal across participants. Display threshold p<0.01 and k=108; c.f. Figure 4D. (C) Positive
absolute value difference encoding signal across participants. Note that the cluster size here is
k=97 and the cluster size for the second cluster further down (ventral) is k=144; c.f. Figure 4E. (D)
Decreased  event-related  connectivity  in  depression  between  dorsal  cingulate  region  and  other
cingulate regions. Display threshold p<0.01 and k=108; c.f. Figure 4F.
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Figure S4.  Negative value difference encoding signal across participants was not significant in the
anterior mid-cingulate region at an individual voxel threshold of p<0.01; c.f. Figure 4C.
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Figures
Figure S5.  The ROC curve (AUC = 0.86) of our logistic regression classifier.
Figure S6. Functional connectivity. Significantly higher functional connectivity in HC compared to
MDD subjects between a dACC seed region with rostral ACC and PCC, obtained using beta series
correlations (Göttlich et al., 2015).
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Tables
Questionnaire Patients Controls
BDI 25.9 ± 12.9 5.4 ± 5.6
DSAB 15.1 ± 4.0 16.9 ± 2.4
HAD-A 12.7 ± 5.1 4.3 ± 2.5
HAD-D 8.6 ± 4.6 1.8 ± 2.0
HAMA 18.8 ± 6.9 1.8 ± 2.7
LOT-R 9.0 ± 5.1 18.4 ± 3.1
MADRS 18.8 ± 6.9 1.8 ± 2.7
NART 45.8 ± 4.5 47.3 ± 3.6
RSE 13.3 ± 6.9 23.7 ± 4.6
SHAPS 38.6 ± 8.7 49.2 ± 5.9
Agreeableness 39.6 ± 6.5 45.6 ± 5.7
Conscientiousness 36.4 ± 10.0 44.8 ± 7.2
Extraversion 31.2 ± 7.6 43.3 ± 4.2
Neuroticism 46.9 ± 7.1 31.4 ± 6.9
Openness 41.5 ± 5.4 45.8 ± 5.3
Table S1. Clinical characteristics of participants. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; DSAB = Digit
Score Part B; HAD = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; HAMA = Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale;
LOT-R = Life Orientation Test – Revised; MADRS = Montgomery-Åsberg Depression Rating Scale;
NART = National Adult Reading Test; RSE = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; SHAPS = Snaith-Hamilton
Pleasure Scale; Scores displayed as mean ± std.
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Participant Details
Table  1 (in  the main text)  and Table  S23 contain details  about  participants’  demographics and clinical
information. Diagnostic screening showed that our sample included 20 participants satisfying criteria for
MDD,  110  participants  matching  remitted  MDD,  and  345  never-depressed  subjects.  Dynamic  Causal
Modelling (DCM) of event-related connectivity was done with data from an initial 301 participants (after
excluding participants  with  insufficient  signal  in  our  regions of  interest,  19  MDE remained,  who were
further  filtered to include subjects  for  whom the  explained variance of  the full  DCM for  each subject
exceeded variable minimum thresholds (see DCM section below).  This is summarised in Figure S11.
    QIDS scores covered a wide range (0 to 23), although the distribution was skewed (Figure S1). Additional
non-parametric Spearman’s rank correlation tests were used to test for the relationship between QIDS and
reward signals to minimize the risk of outliers affecting our mass-univariate GLM results (see below). Figure
S2 shows a histogram of the number of missed trials.
Figure S1. Histogram of participants’ QIDS scores.
Figure S2. Histogram of number of missed trials.
Participants with more than 21 missed trials were excluded (77 participants).
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Computational modelling
Table S1. Model specification. 
Name Description      Value update: Parameters
M1 only learn from choice condition , 
M2 learn equally from choice/no-choice 
conditions
, 
M3 learn differently from choice/no-choice 
conditions
, , 
M4 experience reward differently during 
choice/no-choice conditions
, , 
M5 learn and experience reward differently 
during choice/no-choice conditions
, , , 
The third column shows how internal values are updated after observing an outcome r in trial t. Choices
were modelled probabilistically by passing the value difference to a logistic sigmoid function: p(choose V1) =
1 / (1 + e^(-β (V1 – V2))). ε is the learning rate with c and n being indicators for separate choice/no-choice
learning rates; β is the inverse temperature parameter; ρ is the reward sensitivity parameter with c and n
being indicators for separate choice/no-choice parameters.
Model-fitting and model comparison
Parameter estimation (for each model) followed a hierarchical procedure. For each participant, we first
estimated  maximum  likelihood  (ML)  estimates  and  then  combined  these  into  a  group  prior  (normal
distribution). The prior was then used to estimate maximum a posteriori (MAP) parameter values for each
participant. These estimates were again combined into a single group prior and the procedure was iterated
until  convergence.  We  used  the  integrated  Bayesian  information  criteria  (iBIC)  to  perform  model
comparison. Sampling was used to estimate an integral over parameters, which was used to approximate
the  model  evidence.  iBIC  scores  were  computed  for  each  model  and  compared  to  choose  the  most
parsimonious model. More details are available (Supplements of Huys et al. 2013 and Rupprechter et al.
2018).
Computational modelling results
Model comparison identified Model 3 as the most parsimonious model (Figure S3) and subsequent analyses
only focussed on this model. For each participant we calculated the asymptotic internal value estimations
for the two stimuli as the average over the last 10 trials. The results are depicted in Figure S4, which shows
that  participants’  value  estimations  are  close  to  the  actual  probabilities  of  the  two  stimuli.  The  two
estimated  learning  rate  parameters  of  the  winning  model  were  highly  correlated  across  participants
(Pearson’s r=0.883, p<10-10)  but parameter recovery simulations showed they could both be recovered.
Spearman’s correlations were calculated between QIDS scores and each the three model parameters. No
correlation was significant (choice learning rate:  Spearman’s ρ=0.046, p=0.316; no-choice learning rate:
Spearman’s ρ=0.056, p=0.226; inverse temperature parameter: Spearman’s ρ=0.076, p=0.098).  We then
performed a  “default  Bayesian hypothesis  test”  (Wetzels  & Wagenmakers,  2012)  which allowed us  to
quantify evidence for the null hypothesis of no correlation. This relies on estimated Pearson correlations
which were all similar to the Spearman’s correlations and non-significant (choice learning rate: r=0.032,
p=0.487; no-choice learning rate: r=0.047, p=0.302; inverse temperature parameter: r=0.017, p=0.704). The
estimate  Bayes  factors  were:  choice  learning  rate:  BF10=0.047,  no-choice  learning  rate:  BF10=0.062,
inverse  temperature  parameter:  BF10=0.039.  These  values  can  be interpreted as  “strong” evidence  in
favour of the null (Wetzels & Wagenmakers, 2012).
    Whilst Huys et al. (2013) found meta-analytic evidence for an association of depressive symptom scores
(specifically anhedonia) and a “reward sensitivity” model parameter, which is closely related to our “inverse
temperature” model parameter, we did not find this effect. Differences between studies could account for
this.   It  is  important to note that we used an overall  depressive symptoms score instead of  a specific
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anhedonia score.  Additionally the signal detection task used by Huys et al. involves many more trials and
the influence of reward sensitivity on behaviour might only become apparent after many trials.
Figure S3. Model comparison results.
iBIC scores relative to the lowest (i.e. best) iBIC score are shown. M3 which includes different learning rates
depending on choice or no-choice condition was the most parsimonious model. M1 assumed participants
did not learn from no-choice trials. M2 assumed participants learned equally well from both conditions
(same learning rate parameter). M4 assumed that it was reward responsiveness that was dependent on
condition but  not  learning  rate  (one  learning  rate  parameter,  two reward  sensitivity  parameters).  M5
assumed both learning rate and reward sensitivity were dependent on condition.
Figure S4. Asymptotic internal value estimations. 
Yellow dots are asymptotic value estimations for the yellow stimulus (80% reward probability) and blue
dots are asymptotic value estimations for the blue stimulus (20% reward probability). The black dotted lines
show the average asymptotic value estimations across participants for the two stimuli, which are close to
the true reward probabilities.
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Neuroimaging analyses
Pre-processing details
SPM12 (version 7487) was used for analyses. Functional images were manually checked for artefacts before
pre-processing.  The first six blood oxygen level-dependent volumes were discarded as standard because of
transient  effects.  Functional  images  were  realigned  to  the  first  image  using  a  rigid  body  spatial
transformation (6 parameters)  and unwarped.  The estimated movement parameters were plotted and
manually  inspected  for  excessive  motion.  If  such  excessive  motion  was  identified,  the  corresponding
functional  images  were  inspected  and  participants  were  excluded  if  there  were  noticeable  excessive
movement.  Slice  timing  correction  was  performed  with  the  middle  slice  as  the  reference  slice.  (We
therefore  did  not  use  the  additional  slice  timing  correction  model  included  as  part  of  DCM.)  The  T1
weighted  structural  image  was  segmented  using  SPM12  tissue  probability  maps  and  the  ICBM  space
template for European brains and functional images were co-registered to the bias corrected T1 image. The
estimated deformation field was then used to spatially normalise the images and an 8 mm FWHM Gaussian
kernel was used to smooth the normalised images. The registration was inspected manually using SPM’s
checkreg tool and participants were excluded if the registration quality was judged insufficient.
Freesurfer ROIs
Raw T1 images were segmented and parcellated using FreeSurfer version 5.3 (Dale et al., 1999; Fischl et al.,
1999; Fischl et al., 2004) and the Desikan-Killany atlas (Desikan et al., 2006). FreeSurfer output was visually
quality checked, major errors were excluded and minor errors were corrected manually.  To create ROI
masks, FreeSurfer parcellations were reoriented to the original image and converted back to NIfTI format.
Using  FSL  5.0  (Smith  et  al.,  2004;  Woolrich  et  al.,  2009;  Jenkinson  et  al.,  2012),  these  images  were
thresholded to isolate each ROI and then binarised to create a mask. ROIs were normalised in the same way
as functional images using the estimated deformation field.
Multiple comparisons correction
To correct  for  multiple  comparisons  we  used  Monte  Carlo  simulations  (Slotnick  & Schacter,  2004)  to
establish a cluster extent threshold. This relies on the fact that the larger a cluster the less likely it is that
each individual voxel in the cluster shows spurious activity and survives an individual voxel threshold. The
script  we  used  can  be  downloaded  from  the  author’s  website
(https://www2.bc.edu/sd-slotnick/scripts.htm) who also defended this method in subsequent publications
(Slotnick, 2017). The parameters we used are as follows: x_matrix=64; y_matrix=64; slices=32; dim_xy=3.4;
dim_z=4.5;  mask_name='none';  mask_bytes=0;  mask_plot=0;  FWHM=8;  dim_resampled=2;
iterations=5000; p_corrected=0.001; p_voxel=0.05. Note that in Tables S2-S9 we usually list a small number
of local maxima at least 8mm apart but we focus on interpreting clusters of activity rather than individual
voxels.
Signal dropout
For group level analyses, SPM only includes voxels which are included in the mask of every individual. Signal
dropout of voxels within a single participant therefore excludes those voxels from further analyses for all
participants, which can become a problem when a large number of participants are involved. For first level
analyses the masking threshold was therefore lowered to 0.4 to increase the included area. An explicit
mask  was  used  to  constrain  analysis  to  voxels  within  the  brain  (SPM’s  intracranial  volume  mask;
mask_ICV.nii). Nevertheless, a few areas were excluded due to signal dropout (Figure S5), including parts of
the right VS and a region in the PFC including subgenual ACC and OFC.
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Figure S5. Group-level signal dropout. 
The second level mask (white) is shown as overlay on a Colin brain. Left: Dropout in the right VS (12,10,-12);
the inset of the bottom right shows a small part of the right VS which is included in the mask (10,8,-10). 
Right: Dropout in the subgenual ACC and OFC (0,32,-18).
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fMRI results tables
Table S2. Reward activation across participants.
Reward > No-reward (p<0.05 FWE correction)
k T x y z
19270 40.05 10 -86 -6 Occipital lobe
38.91 -20 -80 -14
38.43 -10 -88 -8
710 15.38 -52 0 48 Premotor cortex L
6.77 -40 -2 62
426 12.12 -16 44 50 dPFC
5.89 -32 34 48
5.47 -22 22 64
1311 10.97 -58 -8 -12 Temporal gyrus L
9.66 -58 -30 0
7.97 -50 -40 2
3036 10.61 -12 10 -14 Ventral striatum, vmPFC
9.95 -4 54 -10
9.87 -6 66 16
237 9.18 -22 -30 -2 Hippocampus L
117 7.91 54 38 6 PFC
6.76 52 42 -2
5.80 56 34 16
48 7.80 22 42 50 PFC
6.23 14 50 46
177 7.62 -26 -56 52 Parietal lobe L
97 7.04 24 -56 52 Parietal lobe R
73 6.56 24 -28 -2 Hippocampus R
122 5.91 -28 -8 2 Putamen L
82 5.68 -28 -8 -22 Hippocampus L
79 5.47 62 0 -14 Temporal lobe R
5.33 58 -6 -18
3 5.32 46 50 2 PFC
3 4.97 16 38 58 PFC
19 4.96 -22 -42 -48 Cerebellum
3 4.93 6 58 38
2 4.86 -4 54 42
3 4.75 20 16 22
3 4.75 28 48 36
4 4.72 62 18 26
1 4.66 58 8 -18
1 4.63 32 36 48
1 4.58 -24 14 -24
1 4.57 -26 18 -24
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Table S3. Reward deactivation across participants.
No-reward > Reward (p<0.05 FWE correction)
k T x y z
4938 13.22 42 -72 42 Angular gyrus R
13.00 58 -56 34
6.82 64 -52 -8
6654 12.54 0 22 50 SMA, dPFC / MCC
11.99 12 16 62
10.40 42 14 46
1156 11.39 46 16 0 Insula R
9.65 34 22 0
2925 10.17 -58 -62 28 Angular gyrus L
9.59 -58 -50 44
9.56 -62 -46 38
787 9.92 -40 18 2 Insula L
9.28 -30 22 -8
1347 8.62 4 -62 48 Precuneus
7.72 8 -66 64
192 7.36 -12 6 6 Caudate L
333 7.23 22 54 18 PFC
6.29 32 52 8
153 6.73 -32 -58 -32 Cerebellum
5.75 -24 -72 -32
4.85 -14 -78 -30
87 6.28 14 6 6 Caudate R
159 6.18 -30 52 16 PFC
16 5.41 -44 -60 -46 cerebellum
15 5.15 48 -4 -36 Temporal lobe R
Table S4. Effects of choice reward outcomes.
Reward (choice) > Reward (no-choice) (p<0.05 FWE correction)
k T x y z
1290 8.76 36 18 -12 Insula R
7.43 46 26 -2
5.41 34 20 -28
2394 8.50 0 52 16 mPFC /  rostral ACC
6.96 4 42 26
6.46 18 58 28
259 6.83 -28 18 -14 Insula L
165 6.20 -32 -92 6 Occipital lobe
65 5.33 -22 -6 -14 Amygdala L
142 5.32 -34 -82 -10 Occipital lobe
4.97 -30 -74 -14
74 5.26 22 -4 -12 Amygdala R
5.13 22 6 -8
5 4.75 -12 4 -10 VS L
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Table S5. Negative association between depressive severity and reward outcome signals in areas of 
reward activation across participants.
Conjunction analysis (each p<0.001 whole brain cluster corrected):
    (1) negative association of reward outcome signal with QIDS
    (2) activation across participants during reward outcome
k T x y z
3580 3.50 26 4 0 Putamen R + L, OFC
3.20 32 -2 6
2.99 -26 18 -20
168 2.51 -6 -60 -32 Cerebellum
2.37 -6 -52 -34
2.13 -16 -44 -40
Table S6. Negative association between depressive severity and reward outcome signals in areas of 
reward deactivation across participants.
Conjunction analysis (each p<0.001 whole brain cluster corrected):
    (1) negative association of reward outcome signal with QIDS
    (2) deactivation across participants during reward outcome
k T x y z
1629 4.01 -16 10 6 Caudate L, insula L
4.00 -34 18 -10
3.65 -14 8 16
478 3.84 18 8 6 Caudate R
1727 3.38 -4 30 50 dmPFC, ACC
3.23 10 32 48
2.57 24 56 20
162 3.22 -36 22 46 PFC L
2.00 -34 16 36
260 3.17 -42 -62 -48 Cerebellum
2.79 -38 -62 -36
860 2.74 -58 -46 34 Angular gyrus L
2.40 -60 -58 18
2.28 -52 -56 30
459 2.47 28 24 -6 Insula R
2.30 28 20 10
2.27 54 6 14
198 2.38 42 24 44 PFC R
2.12 36 20 40
2.05 32 14 30
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Table S7. Positive association between depressive severity and reward outcome signals in areas of 
reward activation across participants.
Conjunction analysis (each p<0.001 whole brain cluster corrected):
    (1) positive association of reward outcome signal with QIDS
    (2) activation across participants during reward outcome
k T x y z
1403 3.13 10 -86 20 Occipital lobe
2.92 4 -82 2
2.84 -8 -90 10
Table S8. Negative association between depressive severity and reward prediction error signals in areas 
of positive RPE signals across participants.
Conjunction analysis (each p<0.001 whole brain cluster corrected):
    (1) negative association of RPE signal with QIDS
    (2) positive RPE signal encoding across participants
k T x y z
3304 3.98 32 -2 6 Putamen R + L, pallidum R + L, OFC R, 
midbrain / VTA3.87 22 -2 2
3.30 32 -14 4
2.26 8 -16 -10
327 3.10 -42 12 -30 Temporal lobe L
2.40 -34 4 -30
2.23 -36 6 -22
198 2.89 -28 -62 -46 Cerebellum L
2.16 -38 -64 -46
1.71 -38 -62 -38
872 2.58 16 36 10 ACC
2.55 -10 38 22
2.40 14 42 24
161 2.53 -34 22 -16 OFC L
2.47 -26 20 -20
1.88 -50 28 -16
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Table S9. Negative association between depressive severity and reward prediction error signals in areas 
of negative RPE signals across participants.
Conjunction analysis (each p<0.001 whole brain cluster corrected):
    (1) negative association of RPE signal with QIDS
    (2) negative RPE signal encoding across participants
k T x y z
632 3.14 46 14 -2 Insula R
2.94 46 12 6
2.83 56 6 6
384 2.86 -34 12 12 Insula L
2.69 -42 10 2
2.39 -38 16 -4
160 2.72 -12 10 2 Caudate L
2.02 -16 20 2
143 2.58 -40 -62 14
324 2.54 -4 28 52 dmPFC
2.39 10 32 48
2.28 -4 38 48
165 2.28 -52 -56 32 Parietal lobe
2.10 -54 -58 42
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Control analyses
We repeated our correlation analyses  using  a  GLM with  additional  covariates  “site”,  “sex”,  and “age”
(mean-centred).  We  also  performed  additional  control  analysis  excluding  103  participants  who  were
related to another participant (372 remaining). The results of these analyses were very similar to the results
in Tables S2-S9 and here we only show that the negative association between depressive severity and
reward signals in the striatum (Figure S6).
Figure S6. Correlations with depressive symptom scores.
This shows the results of conjunction analyses of activation or deactivation across participants and negative
association with depressive symptoms (see also Figure 2 in the main text). (A and D) Results following the
inclusion of additional covariates site, sex and age. (B and E) Results following the exclusion of related
participants.  (C  and  F)  Results  following  exclusion  of  related  participants  and  inclusion  of  additional
covariates.
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Non-parametric correlations
Additional non-parametric Spearman correlation tests were performed between QIDS scores and median
contrast (reward > baseline) beta values extracted of 4mm spheres centred around local maxima of the
GLM analyses (Table S10). The results agree with the previous analysis, with the exception that the positive
association between depressive symptoms scores and reward signal encoding in the occipital lobe was not
significant.
Table S10. Spearman rank correlation analysis between reward signals and QIDS scores. 
x y z Spearman’s ρ p
18 8 6 -0.150 0.001 basal ganglia
26 4 0 -0.159 0.0005 putamen
32 -2 6 -0.127 0.005 putamen
-24 6 6 -0.152 0.0009 putamen
20 6 -6 -0.127 0.006 ventral striatum
-12 10 2 -0.121 0.008 ventral striatum
-16 10 6 -0.198 1.34e-05 caudate
-4 30 50 -0.156 0.0006 medial PFC
16 36 10 -0.127 0.006 rostral ACC
-34 18 -10 -0.183 6.15e-05 insula
4 -82 2 0.089 0.054 occipital lobe
10 -86 20 0.071 0.124 occipital lobe
-8 -90 10 0.044 0.337 occipital lobe
The median estimated beta values from individuals’ contrast files were extracted from voxels within 4mm
spheres centred around coordinates of significant reward signals. Correlations were calculated between
these beta values and depressive severity scores and results are presented here.
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Figure S7. Scatter plot of QIDS scores and median reward-contrast beta estimates.
Participants with QIDS scores larger than 11 were excluded and correlations remained significant after 
these exclusions. (A) 4mm spheres centred at (26,4,0); Spearman’s ρ=-0.140, p=.003. (B) 4mm sphere 
centred at (-16,10,6); Spearman’s ρ=-0.180, p<.001.
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DCM Analysis
Dynamic  causal  modelling  (DCM12.5;  Friston  et  al.  2003)  was  used  to  test  for  effective  (directed)
interactions between brain regions. DCM treats the brain as a deterministic non-linear dynamic system
which  receives  inputs  and  then  produces  outputs.  The  unknown  (arbitrary)  function  describing  the
evolution  of  the  neuronal  states  is  parameterised  using  a  bilinear  approximation,  which  reduces  the
parameters to three important sets: (a) the interaction between neuronal systems in the absence of input
(“A” matrix), (b) the change of this interaction induced by (experimentally-controlled) inputs (“B” matrix),
(c) extrinsic experimentally-controlled inputs (“C” matrix). A haemodynamic model (containing additional
parameters which are usually not of interest) is used to map the underlying neuronal state changes to the
haemodynamic response (i.e. the observed BOLD signal).
Time-series extraction
For the time-series extraction a GLM was used containing columns for outcomes, reward outcomes, choice
outcomes, choice cues, no-choice cues, choice responses, no-choice responses and nuisance regressors,
and an “effects of interest” F contrast was computed (including all effects except nuisance regressors). ROIs
were defined as a combination (logical  AND) of  the following ROIs:  (a)  12mm spheres centred around
coordinates of (group-level) local maxima (see main-text), (b) subject-specific whole brain mask (mask.nii
from first level analysis), (c) thresholded SPM mask using a liberal threshold (p<0.15; note that this was
used to exclude noisy voxels and was not used to infer statistical significance) for the reward (visual area
and VS) or choice (mPC) contrast, (d) anatomical FreeSurfer masks for the visual area (pericalcarine) and VS
(striatum). Time-series were extracted from each of these (combined) ROIs,  adjusted for the effects of
interest. We were not able to extract time-series from all three regions for 174 participants (because in at
least one region there were no voxels in the combined mask).
Variance thresholds
We used a script included with SPM (spm_dcm_fmri_check.m) to calculate the proportion of explained
signal  by  the  model.  As  suggested  in  the  function’s  documentation  and  the  SPM  mailing-list
(https://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/cgi-bin/webadmin?A0=SPM), we set an a priori threshold at 10% and excluded
participants  below  this  threshold.  Examples  of  models  with  low  variance  explained  were  inspected
manually and many of these models seemed to have “flat-lined”, meaning estimates did not converge from
their prior mean.
Control analyses
We performed several control analyses to verify that our results did not depend on the exact specification
of the model. First, we increased the threshold of the minimum explained variance to 15% and repeated
the  PEB  analysis  with  the  remaining  99  participants  (mean  variance  explained  28.31%).  Similarly,  we
reduced the threshold to 7.5% and repeated the analysis with 208 participants (mean variance explained
19.20%) and also computed the top-down connection strength as a function of the threshold (see Variance
threshold section below). Second, we repeated the analysis without including covariates and with including
only anxiety (HADS-A) as covariate. Third, we estimated a single PEB model for both “A” and “B” DCM
matrices (54 parameters; only using QIDS and site as covariates to limit the dilution of evidence). Last, we
re-defined the experimentally-controlled inputs as outcome(choice, reward), outcome(choice, no reward),
outcome(no-choice,  reward),  outcome(no-choice,  no-reward)  in  addition  to  the  (unchanged)  inputs
cue(choice), cue(no choice), response(choice) and response(no choice).  It was again assumed that each of
the four outcome conditions could modulate each of the endogenous connections.
    Results of control analyses are displayed in Tables S12-S17. Although the exact values of estimated
parameters varied and automatic pruning did not always identify the exact same connections as important,
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there was generally a large overlap between the individual results. Importantly, the negative association
between QIDS depressive severity and intrinsic connectivity strength from mPC to VS remained for  every
single analysis strategy. Note that any parameter not pruned during the automatic search is important and
useful in that it contributes to the free energy, even if the posterior probability is less than 95%.
PEB-BMA results: intrinsic connections (A matrix)
Tables S11-S17 list posterior probabilities and effect sizes of intrinsic connections related to commonalities
and differences across participants. Results for different variance thresholds are shown and with various
covariates included. The connection from mPC to VS is highlighted in all tables. It is the only connection
that has non-zero probability of there being an effect of QIDS for every single analysis strategy.
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Table S11. BMA results of intrinsic connections.
P(common) P(QIDS) P(HADS-A) P(site) P(age) P(sex) P(MDD)
A(1,1) 1 1 0 1 0.72 0 0
A(2,1) 1 1 0 0.62 0 0 0
A(3,1) 0 0 0 0.51 0 0 1
A(1,2) 1 0 0 0.56 0 0 0
A(2,2) 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
A(3,2) 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
A(1,3) 1 1 0.73 0.8 0.63 0 0
A(2,3) 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
A(3,3) 1 0 1 0 0 0.66 0
E(common) E(QIDS) E(HADS-A) E(site) E(age) E(sex) E(MDD)
A(1,1) 0.480 -0.019 0.000 0.152 -0.006 0.000 0.000
A(2,1) 0.121 0.013 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000
A(3,1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.145
A(1,2) 0.450 0.000 0.000 -0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000
A(2,2) -0.369 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000
A(3,2) 0.065 -0.011 0.000 -0.048 0.000 0.086 0.000
A(1,3) -0.232 -0.030 -0.017 0.060 0.004 0.000 0.000
A(2,3) 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.095 0.000 0.135 0.000
A(3,3) -0.245 0.000 -0.013 0.000 0.000 -0.054 0.000
165 participants; 10% variance threshold; P(x) shows the posterior probability of the estimates (E(x)) being 
non-zero. The first column identifies the connection as A(TO, FROM), where 1=visual area, 2=mPC, 3=VS; 
e.g. A(1,2) is the connection from mPC to visual area
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Table S12. BMA results of intrinsic connections using an increased quality threshold.
P(common) P(QIDS) P(HADS-A) P(site) P(age) P(sex) P(MDD)
A(1,1) 1 1 0 1 0.54 0 1
A(2,1) 1 1 0 0.71 0 0 0
A(3,1) 0.73 0.71 1 1 0 1 0.7
A(1,2) 1 0 0 1 0.53 0 0
A(2,2) 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
A(3,2) 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
A(1,3) 1 0.77 1 1 0 0 0
A(2,3) 1 0 0 0.77 0 1 0
A(3,3) 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
E(common) E(QIDS) E(HADS-A) E(site) E(age) E(sex) E(MDD)
A(1,1) 0.424 -0.032 0.000 0.122 -0.003 0.000 0.596
A(2,1) 0.135 0.017 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000
A(3,1) -0.024 0.009 -0.016 0.059 0.000 -0.077 0.107
A(1,2) 0.429 0.000 0.000 -0.085 0.003 0.000 0.000
A(2,2) -0.316 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
A(3,2) 0.068 -0.010 0.000 -0.082 0.000 0.109 0.000
A(1,3) -0.179 -0.018 -0.033 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.000
A(2,3) 0.114 0.000 0.000 -0.052 0.000 0.178 0.000
A(3,3) -0.311 0.000 -0.020 0.000 0.006 -0.169 0.000
99 participants; 15% variance threshold; P(x) shows the posterior probability of the estimates (E(x)) being 
non-zero. The first column identifies the connection as A(TO, FROM), where 1=visual area, 2=mPC, 3=VS; 
e.g. A(1,2) is the connection from mPC to visual area.
Appendix C. Supplementary Materials for Chapter 5 175
Table S13. BMA results of intrinsic connections using a decreased quality threshold.
P(common) P(QIDS) P(HADS-A) P(site) P(age) P(sex) P(MDD)
A(1,1) 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
A(2,1) 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
A(3,1) 0.73 0 0 0.51 0 0 1
A(1,2) 1 0.63 0 0.56 0 0 0
A(2,2) 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
A(3,2) 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
A(1,3) 1 1 0.76 0.59 0.51 0 0
A(2,3) 0 0 0 1 0 0.65 0
A(3,3) 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
E(common) E(QIDS) E(HADS-A) E(site) E(age) E(sex) E(MDD)
A(1,1) 0.539 -0.021 0.000 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.000
A(2,1) 0.104 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
A(3,1) -0.021 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.153
A(1,2) 0.436 -0.009 0.000 -0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000
A(2,2) -0.361 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000
A(3,2) 0.058 -0.010 0.000 -0.039 0.000 0.000 0.000
A(1,3) -0.247 -0.027 -0.018 0.034 0.003 0.000 0.000
A(2,3) 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.082 0.000 0.066 0.000
A(3,3) -0.243 0.000 -0.012 0.000 0.000 -0.110 0.000
208 participants; 7.5% variance threshold; P(x) shows the posterior probability of the estimates (E(x)) being 
non-zero. The first column identifies the connection as A(TO, FROM), where 1=visual area, 2=mPC, 3=VS; 
e.g. A(1,2) is the connection from mPC to visual area.
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Table S14. BMA results of intrinsic connections using a PEB matrix without covariates.
P(common) P(QIDS) E(common) E(QIDS)
A(1,1) 1 0.96 0.471 -0.023
A(2,1) 1 0.98 0.121 0.012
A(3,1) 0 0 0.000 0.000
A(1,2) 1 0 0.447 0.000
A(2,2) 1 1 -0.366 0.023
A(3,2) 1 0.76 0.069 -0.007
A(1,3) 1 1 -0.237 -0.042
A(2,3) 0 0 0.000 0.000
A(3,3) 1 0 -0.244 0.000
165 participants; 10% variance threshold; P(common) and P(QIDS) show the posterior probability of the 
estimates (E) being non-zero. The first column identifies the connection as A(TO, FROM), where 1=visual 
area, 2=mPC, 3=VS; e.g. A(1,2) is the connection from mPC to visual area.
Table S15. BMA results of intrinsic connections using a PEB matrix with a single covariate (anxiety).
P(common) P(QIDS) P(HADS-A) E(common) E(QIDS) E(HADS-A)
A(1,1) 1 0.95 0 0.475 -0.023 0.000
A(2,1) 1 0.97 0 0.120 0.012 0.000
A(3,1) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
A(1,2) 1 0 0 0.449 0.000 0.000
A(2,2) 1 0 1 -0.366 0.000 0.031
A(3,2) 1 0.78 0 0.069 -0.008 0.000
A(1,3) 1 0.92 0.82 -0.236 -0.027 -0.022
A(2,3) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
A(3,3) 1 0 0.7 -0.245 0.000 -0.008
165 participants; 10% variance threshold; P(common), P(QIDS), and P(HADS-A) show the posterior 
probability of the estimates (E) being non-zero. The first column identifies the connection as A(TO, FROM), 
where 1=visual area, 2=mPC, 3=VS; e.g. A(1,2) is the connection from mPC to visual area.
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Table S16. BMA results of intrinsic connections using an alternative input specification.
P(common) P(QIDS) E(common) E(QIDS)
A(1,1) 1 0 0.674 0.000
A(2,1) 0.98 0 0.050 0.000
A(3,1) 0.62 0.93 -0.015 0.010
A(1,2) 1 0 0.453 0.000
A(2,2) 1 0 -0.402 0.000
A(3,2) 1 0.98 0.071 -0.014
A(1,3) 0 0 0.000 0.000
A(2,3) 0.7 0 0.042 0.000
A(3,3) 1 0 -0.396 0.000
141 participants; 10% variance threshold; common variance explained = 19.89%; P(common) and P(QIDS)
show  the  posterior  probability  of  the  estimates  (E)  being  non-zero.  The  first  column  identifies  the
connection as A(TO, FROM), where 1=visual area, 2=mPC, 3=VS; e.g. A(1,2) is the connection from mPC to
visual area.  See Control analyses section for input specification.
Table S17. BMA results of intrinsic connections using an alternative input specification and anxiety as 
covariate.
P(common) P(QIDS) P(HADS-A) E(common) E(QIDS) E(HADS-A)
A(1,1) 1 0 0.62 0.677 0.000 0.012
A(2,1) 0.98 0 0 0.051 0.000 0.000
A(3,1) 0.64 1 0.46 -0.016 0.012 -0.004
A(1,2) 1 0 0.93 0.457 0.000 0.023
A(2,2) 1 0.66 1 -0.401 -0.013 0.024
A(3,2) 1 1 0 0.072 -0.015 0.000
A(1,3) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
A(2,3) 0.71 0 0 0.046 0.000 0.000
A(3,3) 1 0 0.57 -0.397 0.000 -0.008
141 participants;  10% variance threshold; mean variance explained = 19.89%; P(common),  P(QIDS) and
P(HADS-A) show the posterior probability of the estimates (E) being non-zero. The first column identifies
the connection as A(TO, FROM), where 1=visual area, 2=mPC, 3=VS; e.g. A(1,2) is the connection from mPC
to visual area.
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PEB results: modulations (B matrix)
Tables  S18-S21  list  posterior  probabilities  and  effect  sizes  of  modulations  of  connections  related  to
commonalities and differences (QIDS) across participants. Table S21 lists posterior probabilities and effect
sizes of a control analysis for which a single PEB model was defined for both intrinsic connectivity and
modulations.
Table S18. BMA results of modulations by reward outcome conditions.
P(common) P(QIDS) E(common) E(QIDS)
B(1,1) 1 0 -1.346 0.000
B(2,1) 0 0 0.000 0.000
B(3,1) 0 0 0.000 0.000
B(1,2) 0 0.82 0.000 -0.069
B(2,2) 0.98 0.88 -0.579 -0.068
B(3,2) 0 0 0.000 0.000
B(1,3) 0 0 0.000 0.000
B(2,3) 0.62 0 0.185 0.000
B(3,3) 1 0 -0.775 0.000
P(common) and P(QIDS) show the posterior probability of the estimates (E) being non-zero. The first 
column identifies the modulation of connection as B(TO, FROM), where 1=visual area, 2=mPC, 3=VS; e.g. 
B(1,2) is the modulation of the connection from mPC to visual area.
Table S19. BMA results of modulations by reward omission conditions.
P(common) P(QIDS) E(common) E(QIDS)
B(1,1) 0 0 0.000 0.000
B(2,1) 0 0 0.000 0.000
B(3,1) 0 0 0.000 0.000
B(1,2) 0 0 0.000 0.000
B(2,2) 1 0 -0.957 0.000
B(3,2) 0 0 0.000 0.000
B(1,3) 0.88 0.99 0.492 0.187
B(2,3) 0 0 0.000 0.000
B(3,3) 1 0 -1.223 0.000
P(common)  and  P(QIDS)  show the  posterior  probability  of  the  estimates  (E)  being  non-zero.  The  first
column identifies the modulation of connection as B(TO, FROM), where 1=visual area, 2=mPC, 3=VS; e.g.
B(1,2) is the modulation of the connection from mPC to visual area.
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Table S20. BMA results of modulations by choice outcome conditions.
P(common) P(QIDS) E(common) E(QIDS)
B(1,1) 1 0 -0.626 0.000
B(2,1) 1 0 -0.238 0.000
B(3,1) 1 0 0.251 0.000
B(1,2) 0.99 0 -0.519 0.000
B(2,2) 0.98 0 -0.615 0.000
B(3,2) 0 0 0.000 0.000
B(1,3) 0 0 0.000 0.000
B(2,3) 0 0 0.000 0.000
B(3,3) 1 1 -0.959 0.114
Bayesian model average results. P(common) and P(QIDS) show the posterior probability of the estimates (E)
being non-zero. The first column identifies the modulation of connection as B(TO, FROM), where 1=visual 
area, 2=mPC, 3=VS; e.g. B(1,2) is the modulation of the connection from mPC to visual area.
Table S21. BMA results of modulations by no-choice outcome conditions.
P(common) P(QIDS) E(common) E(QIDS)
B(1,1) 1 0 -0.527 0.000
B(2,1) 1 0 -0.180 0.000
B(3,1) 1 0 0.147 0.000
B(1,2) 1 0 -0.660 0.000
B(2,2) 1 0 -0.916 0.000
B(3,2) 0 0 0.000 0.000
B(1,3) 0 0 0.000 0.000
B(2,3) 0 0 0.000 0.000
B(3,3) 1 0 -1.050 0.000
P(common) and P(QIDS) show the posterior probability of the estimates (E) being non-zero. The first 
column identifies the modulation of connection as B(TO, FROM), where 1=visual area, 2=mPC, 3=VS; e.g. 
B(1,2) is the modulation of the connection from mPC to visual area.
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Table S22. Control analysis BMA results of intrinsic connections and modulations  
P(mean) P(QIDS) P(site) E(mean) E(QIDS) E(site)
A(1,1) 1 0.71 1 0.441 -0.011 0.147
A(2,1) 1 1 0 0.123 0.012 0.000
A(3,1) 1 0 0.58 -0.033 0.000 0.014
A(1,2) 1 0 0.55 0.443 0.000 -0.030
A(2,2) 1 1 0 -0.457 0.027 0.000
A(3,2) 1 0.72 1 0.069 -0.006 -0.045
A(1,3) 1 1 1 -0.230 -0.039 0.092
A(2,3) 0 0 1 0.000 0.000 -0.091
A(3,3) 1 0 0 -0.376 0.000 0.000
reward
B(1,1) 1 0 1 -1.115 0.000 -0.361
B(2,1) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
B(3,1) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
B(1,2) 0 1 1 0.000 -0.098 -0.381
B(2,2) 1 0 1 -1.166 0.000 0.417
B(3,2) 0 0 1 0.000 0.000 0.177
B(1,3) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
B(2,3) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
B(3,3) 1 0 1 -1.179 0.000 0.383
reward
omission
B(1,1) 0.52 1 0 -0.169 0.074 0.000
B(2,1) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
B(3,1) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
B(1,2) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
B(2,2) 1 0 1 -1.155 0.000 0.463
B(3,2) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
B(1,3) 0 1 1 0.000 0.216 0.487
B(2,3) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
B(3,3) 1 0 0 -1.340 0.000 0.000
choice
B(1,1) 1 0 0 -0.906 0.000 0.000
B(2,1) 1 0 0 -0.122 0.000 0.000
B(3,1) 1 0 0 0.106 0.000 0.000
B(1,2) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
B(2,2) 1 0 0 -1.175 0.000 0.000
B(3,2) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
B(1,3) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
B(2,3) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
B(3,3) 1 1 0 -1.210 0.087 0.000
no-choice
B(1,1) 1 0 0.62 -0.845 0.000 -0.122
B(2,1) 1 0 0 -0.105 0.000 0.000
B(3,1) 0.52 0 0 0.038 0.000 0.000
B(1,2) 1 0 0 -0.309 0.000 0.000
B(2,2) 1 0 0 -1.174 0.000 0.000
B(3,2) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
B(1,3) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
B(2,3) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
B(3,3) 1 0.59 0 -1.297 -0.038 0.000
(See Tables S12 and S21 for legends.)
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Summary of main DCM results
Modulation of connectivity
On average across subjects, reward outcomes modulated visual area, mPC and VS self-connectivity. Self-
inhibition was decreased during reward outcomes leading to increased overall activation in these regions
(as  observed  during  model-free GLM  analysis).  No  difference  in  modulation was associated  with  QIDS
scores.  Similarly,  no-reward  outcomes  modulated  self-connectivity  of  mPC  and  VS.  Self-inhibition  was
decreased leading to overall increased activation. Both mPC and VS showed stronger negative modulation
during no-reward than during reward outcomes (leading to decreased inhibition and therefore stronger
activation during no-choice outcomes). In addition, differences in the no-reward modulation of the VS to
the visual  area (inhibitory)  connection were positively  associated with  QIDS scores.  This  means higher
depressive symptoms were associated with increased excitation / decreased inhibition from VS to the visual
area.
    Outcomes during both choice and no-choice conditions modulated the following connections: visual
area→visual area, visual area→mPC, visual area→VS, mPC→visual area, mPC→mPC, VS→VS. Self-inhibition
was decreased for all regions, leading to increased activation. Self-inhibition of the visual area was stronger
and self-inhibition of VS and mPC was weaker during choice outcomes compared to no-choice outcomes.
Visual area to VS connectivity was increased during both choice and no-choice outcomes, and higher during
choice  compared  to  no-choice  outcomes.  Choice  and  no-choice  outcome  conditions  decreased  the
connectivity from the visual area and mPC and from mPC to the visual area. Compared to choice outcomes,
no-choice outcomes had a weaker negative modulation effect on the visual area→mPC connection, but a
stronger  negative  modulation effect  on  the  mPC→visual  area  connection.  Higher  depressive  symptom
scores were associated with increased modulation of VS self-inhibition during choice outcomes only. This
means that while outcomes from participants’ own choice overall led to an increase in VS activity (through
decreased inhibition), in participants with higher depressive symptoms this increase was reduced. 
Summary of DCM results organised by region
Visual  area: There was evidence for effective (excitatory)  endogenous connectivity to mPC, which was
increased with higher depressive symptoms. The region’s self-inhibition was weaker in participants with
higher depressive symptoms. The medial PFC region had an excitatory influence on the visual area, while VS
had  an  inhibitory  influence  and  the  connection  strength  was  negatively  associated  with  depressive
symptoms. Choice and no-choice outcomes were associated with increased influence on VS. Self-inhibition
was weaker (resulting in increased activity) during all outcomes except no-reward outcomes. Both choice
and no-choice conditions decreased the connectivity to and from mPC. Higher depressive symptoms were
associated with decreased inhibition from VS during no-reward outcomes.
mPC: There was evidence for excitatory endogenous connections to and from the visual area and to VS. The
excitation from the visual area and the mPC self-inhibition increased with higher depressive symptoms. The
influence of mPC on VS decreased with higher depressive symptoms.  Self-inhibition was weaker during all
outcomes compared to baseline. Both choice and no-choice outcomes decreased the connectivity to and
from the visual area.
VS: Received excitatory input from mPC and its activity exerted inhibitory influence on the visual area. The
influence from mPC was decreased with higher depressive symptoms. The connection strength to the visual
area was negatively associated with depressive symptoms. Self-inhibition was weaker during all outcomes
compared to baseline. Choice and no-choice outcomes were associated with increased influence of the
visual area, with stronger modulation during choice than no-choice outcomes. Higher depressive symptoms
were associated with increased influence on the visual area during no-reward outcomes and stronger self-
inhibition during choice outcomes.
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Variance threshold
In Figure  S8 we plot  the association of  QIDS with  VS  to VS connectivity as  a function of  the variance
threshold. It shows the expected values (c.f. E(QIDS) of A(3,2) in previous tables) of the second level PEB
model (without BMR). Covariates included (zero-mean centred) QIDS, HADS anxiety, site age and sex. As
expected, it roughly follows an inverted U shape. At low thresholds noise suppresses the association and at
high thresholds too few participants remain.
Figure S8. Association of fop-down connection strength with QIDS as a function of variance threshold.
The association of the covariate of interest (QIDS) with the connection from VS to accumbens as a function
of the variance threshold in the estimated PEB model. As described earlier, our a priori chosen threshold
was 10%.
To make an unbiased estimate of connectivity it  was necessary to include data from subjects who had
sufficient signals.  To convince ourselves of the validity of our findings we performed a large number of
control analyses. Importantly, there was no significant difference in depression symptom severity between
included and excluded participants, making it extremely unlikely that exclusions biased our main results.
We varied the DCM threshold criterion, including up to 301 participants (see Table S23),  and observed
exactly what we predicted (Figure S8): at very low thresholds the reward activation signals are so low that
noise  dominates  which  suppresses  the  negative  association,  although  a  non-significant  negative  trend
remains when all subjects were included.  (At very high thresholds so few subjects were included that the
statistical  power was affected and the association was not significant).   In  Tables S12-13 we show the
results of another two full BMA analyses using higher and lower thresholds with very similar results to the
main text analysis. Finally, we show that the negative association also holds within random splits of the
data (Figure 5).
Appendix C. Supplementary Materials for Chapter 5 183
Consequently we believe it is extremely unlikely that the exact number of inclusions biased our main result,
which is the association between depression symptom severity and effective cortico-limbic connectivity.
Rather  than lowering  the variance threshold  post-hoc,  which would have allowed us  to  include more
participants,  we chose to be consistent with DCM recommendations on signal threshold to allow valid
inferences, so used additional control analyses to provide an unbiased estimate of abnormal connectivity.
In summary, when we used data with sufficient signals to make valid inferences we found a significant
negative  association  between  cortico-limbic  connectivity  and  depressive  symptoms,  when  there  was
insufficiently strong signals we couldn’t draw conclusions, and none of the analyses suggested a significant
positive relationship between cortico-limbic connectivity and depressive symptoms.
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Analyses of individual depression symptoms
There are some potential issues of the correlation analysis we performed so far. QIDS scores are skewed
and correlation results might be affected by the heteroscedasticity. Closely related to this, we performed
the analysis across groups and since the MDD group naturally displayed higher depressive symptom scores,
it is possible our results related more closely to a group effect rather than an effect of increasing symptom
severity  (although we did try to account for that by including an additional group-indicator covariate).
Finally, the sum of the 16 individual symptom scores of our depression questionnaire might hide additional
variation related to individual symptoms (Fried & Nesse, 2015).
    To begin to address these potential concerns, we performed additional analyses for which we included
each individual QIDS symptom (i.e. question) in the PEB design matrix. In the questionnaire each question
was  coded  as  a  number  from  0  to  3  with  increasing  severity.  For  the  design  matrix  columns  were
transformed to code absence (score=0) or presence (score>0) of the symptom and not mean centered so
that the mean column corresponded to a participant without any symptoms and each symptom column
coded the additive effect of having the symptom. Other covariates (anxiety, age, sex, site) were again zero-
mean centered. This means we essentially performed a list of ‘group comparisons’ of ‘participants reporting
a specific symptom’ (e.g. concentration/decision-making difficulties) versus ‘participants who did not report
this symptom’.
    We also repeated this analysis after excluding current MDD participants and then again after excluding
both current MDD and remitted MDD participants. Results are shown in the additional Supplement Tables
document).  The top-down connection from the prefrontal  cortex to the accumbens was related to the
presence of a number of symptoms, most notably “concentration or decision making difficulties” which was
found in  a variety of  different analyses strategies including the analysis  which did not  include past  or
present MDD participants. This means participants reporting changes in their usual capacity to concentrate
or make decisions had a decreased top-down connectivity.  We also found evidence for decreased top-
down  control  in  participants  displaying  changes  in  their  general  interest,  a  substantial  sub-part  of
“anhedonia”,  but this  was only  true when all  participants were included.  Importantly  however,  only  4
never-depressed participants reported “general  interest” symptoms, but 18 reported “concentration or
decision making difficulties”. We note that these are exploratory analyses and we did not have strong
hypotheses about which symptoms would be most associated with the connection from VS to VS.
    As a final remark, it is worth mentioning that the symptom of decreased energy (one of the three core
symptoms  of  a  major  depressive  episode  as  defined  in  ICD-10  and  also  related  to  “motivation”)  was
associated with increased VS (self-)inhibition which would also lead to decreased activation as observed in
many previous fMRI studies.  In  this  study blunted reward response associated with  overall depressive
symptoms severity was mainly found in caudate and putamen. This might mean that blunting in different
parts of the striatum could be related to (severity of) different depression symptoms.
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Figure S11. Project overview and analysis workflow.
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Table S23. Demographic and clinical details after exclusions (c.f. Figure S11)
Controls Past MDD Current MDD
652 participants































































0 – 12, 
3.36 ± 2.07
1 – 22, 
5.43 ± 3.85




0 – 12, 
3.09 ± 2.51
0 – 17, 
5.37 ± 3.46








0 – 10, 
3.21 ± 1.86
1 – 22, 
5.73 ± 4.35




0 – 12, 
3.08 ± 2.55
0 – 17, 
5.32 ± 3.73
6 – 20, 
11.50 ± 3.90
QIDS = Quick Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology (Self Report;) HADS = Hospital Anxiety 
and Depression Scale
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Additional computational modelling
It was possible to fit our computational models to the behaviour of 562 participants as some participants
were excluded for fMRI pre-processing reasons (see Figure S11). In our hierarchical fitting approach every
included participant  can potentially  influence every  other  participant (by  changing the empirical  group
prior) and model comparison might also be affected. We therefore repeated our model fitting and model
comparison including all 562 participants. The winning model remained the same. For each approach we
extracted  the  estimated  parameters  from  the  winning  model  for  the  included  participants.  All  three
parameters were nearly identical for all participants (Pearson’s r>.99 for each parameter). We note that for
model-based fMRI we used the estimated parameters (and simulated hidden variables) from the model
which was fitted to all participants.
Model recovery simulations
To assess the strength of our model comparison results,  we performed model recovery simulations by
simulating  data  from  one  of  the  models  and  then  fitting  each  model  to  the  simulated  data.  Model
comparison was then used to see if it correctly identified the model which simulated the data as “best-
fitting”  model.  Each  model  was simulated 20  times using  562  participants  and  66 trials  to  match  our
experimental data. Table S24 shows the results of these model recovery simulations. It can be seen that
while simple models (including our winning model)  were recovered well,  there was too little data (per
individual) to reliably support the recovery of the more complicated models against their simpler versions.
Given the similarity of models 3 (our winning model) and 5 (which also includes separate reward sensitivity
parameters), we ran additional analysis to compare these two models and see if our result of increased
learning with increased control was also reproducible using a more complicated version of our winning
model.  There  was  a  large  significant  correlation  between the  instrumental  learning  rates  (Spearman’s
ρ=0.553,  p<10-10)  and  between the  Pavlovian  learning  rates  (Spearman’s  ρ=0.601,  p<10 -10)  of  the  two
models. As in our winning model, analysis of the alternative model 5 showed that the large majority of
participants had a higher learning rate for choice trials than for no-choice trials (553 of 562, 98%; model 3:
499 of 562 or 89%). We repeated these model recovery simulations with only the included 475 participants
which again gave us very similar results (Table S25) and we also repeated the correlation analysis between
QIDS and model parameters which led us to the same conclusions.
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M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
M1 20 0 0 0 0
M2 0 20 0 0 0
M3 0 2 18 0 0
M4 0 7 1 8 4
M5 0 0 9 7 4




M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
M1 20 0 0 0 0
M2 0 20 0 0 0
M3 0 0 20 0 0
M4 0 13 0 7 0
M5 0 0 16 1 3
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Tables B1-B6 include (zero-mean centered) HADS anxiety, site, age and sex covariates of no interest
Table B1: All 165 participants: BMA Expectations
Nr Pname mean HADS site age sex QIDS1 QIDS2 QIDS3 QIDS4 QIDS5 QIDS6 QIDS7 QIDS8 QIDS9 QIDS10 QIDS11 QIDS12 QIDS13 QIDS14 QIDS15 QIDS16
1 A(1,1) 0.35 0.00 0.16 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 A(2,1) 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00
3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 A(1,2) 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 -0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 A(2,2) -0.38 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.15 0.07 0.12 -0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 -0.15
6 A(3,2) 0.09 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 A(1,3) 0.00 -0.12 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.17 -0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.19 0.00 0.00
8 A(2,3) 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 -0.13 0.00 0.00
9 A(3,3) -0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.20 0.13 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.31 -0.23 0.21 0.00 0.00
Table B2: All 165 participants: BMA Probabilities
Nr Pname mean HADS site age sex QIDS1 QIDS2 QIDS3 QIDS4 QIDS5 QIDS6 QIDS7 QIDS8 QIDS9 QIDS10 QIDS11 QIDS12 QIDS13 QIDS14 QIDS15 QIDS16
1 A(1,1) 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 A(2,1) 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 A(1,2) 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 A(2,2) 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.59 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
6 A(3,2) 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.66 0.68 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 A(1,3) 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
8 A(2,3) 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
9 A(3,3) 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Table B3: HC+rMDD (MDD excluded) participants: BMA Expectations
Nr Pname mean HADS site age sex QIDS1 QIDS2 QIDS3 QIDS4 QIDS5 QIDS6 QIDS7 QIDS8 QIDS9 QIDS10 QIDS11 QIDS12 QIDS13 QIDS14 QIDS15 QIDS16
1 A(1,1) 0.38 0.00 0.17 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 A(2,1) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00
3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 A(1,2) 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.26 -0.20 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 -0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 A(2,2) -0.34 0.14 0.00 0.03 -0.02 -0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.13 -0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 -0.26
6 A(3,2) 0.08 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 A(1,3) 0.00 -0.12 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.13 -0.19 -0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.23 0.00 0.00
8 A(2,3) 0.11 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.08 0.07 -0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 A(3,3) -0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.13 0.00 0.00 -0.22 0.12 0.23 0.20 0.00 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.00 -0.33 0.18 0.00 0.00
Table B4: HC+rMDD (MDD excluded) participants: BMA Probabilities
Nr Pname mean HADS site age sex QIDS1 QIDS2 QIDS3 QIDS4 QIDS5 QIDS6 QIDS7 QIDS8 QIDS9 QIDS10 QIDS11 QIDS12 QIDS13 QIDS14 QIDS15 QIDS16
1 A(1,1) 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 A(2,1) 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 A(1,2) 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 A(2,2) 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.66 0.52 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
6 A(3,2) 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 A(1,3) 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
8 A(2,3) 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.66 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 A(3,3) 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Table B5: HC (rMDD + MDD excluded) participants: BMA Expectations
Nr Pname mean HADS site age sex QIDS1 QIDS2 QIDS3 QIDS4 QIDS5 QIDS6 QIDS7 QIDS8 QIDS9 QIDS10 QIDS11 QIDS12 QIDS13 QIDS14 QIDS15 QIDS16
1 A(1,1) 0.48 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 A(2,1) 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.09 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 -0.14 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 A(1,2) 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.65 -0.23 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.00 -0.18 -0.11 0.00 0.00
5 A(2,2) -0.48 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.24
6 A(3,2) 0.09 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 A(1,3) 0.00 -0.16 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.21 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.00 -0.35 0.35
8 A(2,3) 0.00 -0.06 -0.12 0.00 0.06 0.17 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.44 -0.25 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.25 0.00 0.00
9 A(3,3) -0.21 0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.22 -0.29 0.00 -0.35 0.24 0.00 -0.17
Table B6: HC (rMDD + MDD excluded) participants: BMA Probabilities
Nr Pname mean HADS site age sex QIDS1 QIDS2 QIDS3 QIDS4 QIDS5 QIDS6 QIDS7 QIDS8 QIDS9 QIDS10 QIDS11 QIDS12 QIDS13 QIDS14 QIDS15 QIDS16
1 A(1,1) 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 A(2,1) 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 A(1,2) 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.58 0.65 0.00 0.00
5 A(2,2) 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
6 A(3,2) 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 A(1,3) 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
8 A(2,3) 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
9 A(3,3) 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Tables B7-B12 do not include additional covariates of no interest
Table B7: All 165 participants: BMA Expectations
Nr Pname mean QIDS1 QIDS2 QIDS3 QIDS4 QIDS5 QIDS6 QIDS7 QIDS8 QIDS9 QIDS10 QIDS11 QIDS12 QIDS13 QIDS14 QIDS15 QIDS16
1 A(1,1) 0.42 0.00 0.15 0.00 -0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 A(2,1) 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00
3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00
4 A(1,2) 0.31 0.00 0.17 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 -0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 A(2,2) -0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.17 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.00
6 A(3,2) 0.09 -0.08 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 A(1,3) 0.00 0.00 -0.12 -0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.32 0.00 0.00 -0.17 0.00 0.00
8 A(2,3) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00
9 A(3,3) -0.23 -0.11 0.00 0.00 -0.18 0.18 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.36 -0.20 0.23 0.00 0.00
Table B8: All 165 participants: BMA Probabilities
Nr Pname mean QIDS1 QIDS2 QIDS3 QIDS4 QIDS5 QIDS6 QIDS7 QIDS8 QIDS9 QIDS10 QIDS11 QIDS12 QIDS13 QIDS14 QIDS15 QIDS16
1 A(1,1) 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 A(2,1) 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.00
3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.00
4 A(1,2) 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 A(2,2) 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
6 A(3,2) 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.59 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 A(1,3) 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
8 A(2,3) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.00
9 A(3,3) 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Table B9: HC+rMDD (MDD excluded) participants: BMA Expectations
Nr Pname mean QIDS1 QIDS2 QIDS3 QIDS4 QIDS5 QIDS6 QIDS7 QIDS8 QIDS9 QIDS10 QIDS11 QIDS12 QIDS13 QIDS14 QIDS15 QIDS16
1 A(1,1) 0.49 0.00 0.07 0.00 -0.18 0.00 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 A(2,1) 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00
3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 A(1,2) 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.29 -0.20 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 -0.37 0.00 -0.08 0.00
5 A(2,2) -0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 -0.17 0.00 0.17 -0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 -0.08
6 A(3,2) 0.10 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 A(1,3) 0.00 0.08 -0.14 -0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.42 0.00 0.00 -0.17 0.00 0.00
8 A(2,3) 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 A(3,3) -0.21 -0.11 0.00 0.00 -0.21 0.11 0.16 0.19 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.30 0.19 0.00 0.00
Table B10: HC+rMDD (MDD excluded) participants: BMA Probabilities
Nr Pname mean QIDS1 QIDS2 QIDS3 QIDS4 QIDS5 QIDS6 QIDS7 QIDS8 QIDS9 QIDS10 QIDS11 QIDS12 QIDS13 QIDS14 QIDS15 QIDS16
1 A(1,1) 1.00 0.00 0.62 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 A(2,1) 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 A(1,2) 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.51 0.00
5 A(2,2) 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.65
6 A(3,2) 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 A(1,3) 0.00 0.65 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
8 A(2,3) 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 A(3,3) 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Table B11: HC (rMDD + MDD excluded) participants: BMA Expectations
Nr Pname mean QIDS1 QIDS2 QIDS3 QIDS4 QIDS5 QIDS6 QIDS7 QIDS8 QIDS9 QIDS10 QIDS11 QIDS12 QIDS13 QIDS14 QIDS15 QIDS16
1 A(1,1) 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 A(2,1) 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00
3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 A(1,2) 0.33 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.68 -0.23 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.00 -0.22 -0.11 0.00 0.00
5 A(2,2) -0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.00 -0.09 0.20 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.00
6 A(3,2) 0.10 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 A(1,3) 0.00 0.00 -0.15 -0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.17 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 A(2,3) 0.03 0.14 0.00 -0.13 0.00 0.00 0.46 -0.25 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.28 0.00 0.00
9 A(3,3) -0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.21 0.00 0.00 -0.36 0.22 0.00 0.00
Table B12: HC (rMDD + MDD excluded) participants: BMA Probabilities
Nr Pname mean QIDS1 QIDS2 QIDS3 QIDS4 QIDS5 QIDS6 QIDS7 QIDS8 QIDS9 QIDS10 QIDS11 QIDS12 QIDS13 QIDS14 QIDS15 QIDS16
1 A(1,1) 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 A(2,1) 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.68 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 A(1,2) 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.64 0.66 0.00 0.00
5 A(2,2) 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.69 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00
6 A(3,2) 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 A(1,3) 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 A(2,3) 0.52 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
9 A(3,3) 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Tables B13-B18 only include a single symptom Tables B19-B24 include a single symptom (concentration / decision making difficulties)
    (concentration / decision making difficulties)  and additional covariates of no interest (HADS anxiety, site, age, sex)
Table B13: All 165 participants: BMA Expectations Table B19: All 165 participants: BMA Expectations
Nr Pname mean QIDS10 Nr Pname mean HADS site age sex QIDS10
1 A(1,1) 0.48 0.00 1 A(1,1) 0.48 0.00 0.16 -0.04 0.00 0.00
2 A(2,1) 0.12 0.00 2 A(2,1) 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 A(1,2) 0.45 0.00 4 A(1,2) 0.45 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 A(2,2) -0.42 0.20 5 A(2,2) -0.41 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.15
6 A(3,2) 0.09 -0.09 6 A(3,2) 0.09 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.04 -0.11
7 A(1,3) -0.17 -0.26 7 A(1,3) -0.23 -0.15 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.00
8 A(2,3) 0.00 0.00 8 A(2,3) 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.06 0.00
9 A(3,3) -0.25 0.00 9 A(3,3) -0.25 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00
Table B14: All 165 participants: BMA Probabilities Table B20: All 165 participants: BMA Probabilities
Nr Pname mean QIDS10 Nr Pname mean HADS site age sex QIDS10
1 A(1,1) 1.00 0.00 1 A(1,1) 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.00
2 A(2,1) 1.00 0.00 2 A(2,1) 1.00 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 A(1,2) 1.00 0.00 4 A(1,2) 1.00 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 A(2,2) 1.00 0.99 5 A(2,2) 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
6 A(3,2) 1.00 0.93 6 A(3,2) 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.86 1.00
7 A(1,3) 1.00 1.00 7 A(1,3) 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.64 0.00 0.00
8 A(2,3) 0.00 0.00 8 A(2,3) 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.89 0.00
9 A(3,3) 1.00 0.00 9 A(3,3) 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.00
Table B15: HC+rMDD (MDD excluded) participants: BMA Expectations Table B21: HC+rMDD (MDD excluded) participants: BMA Expectations
Nr Pname mean QIDS10 Nr Pname mean HADS site age sex QIDS10
1 A(1,1) 0.48 0.00 1 A(1,1) 0.49 0.00 0.17 -0.08 0.00 0.00
2 A(2,1) 0.11 0.00 2 A(2,1) 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 A(3,1) -0.03 0.00 3 A(3,1) -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 A(1,2) 0.46 0.00 4 A(1,2) 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 A(2,2) -0.43 0.18 5 A(2,2) -0.42 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.14
6 A(3,2) 0.09 -0.07 6 A(3,2) 0.10 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.08
7 A(1,3) -0.16 -0.23 7 A(1,3) -0.20 -0.15 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 A(2,3) 0.00 0.00 8 A(2,3) 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.08 0.00
9 A(3,3) -0.26 0.00 9 A(3,3) -0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table B16: HC+rMDD (MDD excluded) participants: BMA Probabilities Table B22: HC+rMDD (MDD excluded) participants: BMA Probabilities
Nr Pname mean QIDS10 Nr Pname mean HADS site age sex QIDS10
1 A(1,1) 1.00 0.00 1 A(1,1) 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.92 0.00 0.00
2 A(2,1) 1.00 0.00 2 A(2,1) 1.00 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 A(3,1) 0.87 0.00 3 A(3,1) 0.87 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 A(1,2) 1.00 0.00 4 A(1,2) 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 A(2,2) 1.00 0.97 5 A(2,2) 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.97
6 A(3,2) 1.00 0.75 6 A(3,2) 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.94 0.85
7 A(1,3) 1.00 0.97 7 A(1,3) 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 A(2,3) 0.00 0.00 8 A(2,3) 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
9 A(3,3) 1.00 0.00 9 A(3,3) 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table B17: HC (rMDD + MDD excluded) participants: BMA Expectations Table B23: HC (rMDD + MDD excluded) participants: BMA Expectations
Nr Pname mean QIDS10 Nr Pname mean HADS site age sex QIDS10
1 A(1,1) 0.46 0.00 1 A(1,1) 0.47 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 A(2,1) 0.10 0.00 2 A(2,1) 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.05
3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.00
4 A(1,2) 0.46 0.00 4 A(1,2) 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 A(2,2) -0.45 0.00 5 A(2,2) -0.45 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 QIDS-SR individual symptoms information:
6 A(3,2) 0.09 -0.07 6 A(3,2) 0.09 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.05 -0.09 QIDS-16: 1. Falling asleep
7 A(1,3) -0.16 0.00 7 A(1,3) -0.16 -0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 QIDS-16: 2. Sleeping during the night
8 A(2,3) 0.00 0.00 8 A(2,3) 0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.00 0.05 0.00 QIDS-16: 3. Waking up too early
9 A(3,3) -0.24 -0.23 9 A(3,3) -0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.22 QIDS-16: 4. Sleeping too much
QIDS-16: 5. Feeling sad
Table B18: HC (rMDD + MDD excluded) participants: BMA Probabilities Table B24: HC (rMDD + MDD excluded) participants: BMA Probabilities QIDS-16: 6. Decreased appetite
Nr Pname mean QIDS10 Nr Pname mean HADS site age sex QIDS10 QIDS-16: 7. Increased appetite
1 A(1,1) 1.00 0.00 1 A(1,1) 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 QIDS-16: 8. Decreased weight
2 A(2,1) 1.00 0.00 2 A(2,1) 1.00 0.95 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.52 QIDS-16: 9. Increased weight
3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 3 A(3,1) 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.70 0.00 QIDS-16: 10. Concentration/decision making
4 A(1,2) 1.00 0.00 4 A(1,2) 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 QIDS-16: 11. View of myself
5 A(2,2) 1.00 0.00 5 A(2,2) 1.00 0.98 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.00 QIDS-16: 12. Thoughts of suicide or death
6 A(3,2) 1.00 0.71 6 A(3,2) 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.86 QIDS-16: 13. General interest
7 A(1,3) 1.00 0.00 7 A(1,3) 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 QIDS-16: 14. Energy level
8 A(2,3) 0.00 0.00 8 A(2,3) 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 QIDS-16: 15. Feeling slowed down






Tables D.1-D.18 shows details about the trained classifiers. Each classifier was
trained using the nested cross-validation scheme depicted in Figure 6.1. See Ta-
ble D.1 for the caption relevant for all other tables.
Classifier Linear SVM Accuracy 70% (72%)
Inner-loop CV Undersampled k-fold Healthy controls 76/36
Lifetime MDD 40/13
Features A, A+B, A+C, A+B+C
TABLE D.1: Classifier #1 details. Classifier states the inner-loop clas-
sifier type. Inner-cross validations were always repeated 10 times.
Accuracy shows overall leave-one-out accuracy (and balanced ac-
curacy in parentheses). Healthy controls shows the number of cor-
rectly/incorrectly classified controls. Lifetime MDD shows the num-
ber of correctly/incorrectly classified lifetime MDD cases. Features
lists the possible feature sets (which could be selected in the inner-
loop).
Classifier Linear SVM Accuracy 70% (72%)
Inner-loop CV Stratified k-fold Healthy controls 76/36
Lifetime MDD 40/13
Features A, A+B, A+C, A+B+C
TABLE D.2: Classifier #2 details.
Classifier Linear SVM Accuracy 70% (72%)
Inner-loop CV Undersampled k-fold Healthy controls 87/25
Lifetime MDD 23/30
Features A, A+site, A+B, A+B+site, A+B+C, A+B+C+site
TABLE D.3: Classifier #3 details.
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Classifier Linear SVM Accuracy 65% (65%)
Inner-loop CV Stratified k-fold Healthy controls 72/40
Lifetime MDD 35/18
Features A, A+site, A+B, A+B+site, A+B+C, A+B+C+site
TABLE D.4: Classifier #4 details.
Classifier Linear SVM Accuracy 71% (73%)
Inner-loop CV Undersampled k-fold Healthy controls 76/36
Lifetime MDD 41/12
Features A, A+B, A+var(A), A+B+var(A)+var(B)
TABLE D.5: Classifier #5 details.
Classifier Linear SVM Accuracy 71% (73%)
Inner-loop CV Stratified k-fold Healthy controls 76/36
Lifetime MDD 40/13
Features A, A+B, A+var(A), A+B+var(A)+var(B)
TABLE D.6: Classifier #6 details.
Classifier RBF SVM Accuracy 70% (70%)
Inner-loop CV Undersampled k-fold Healthy controls 79/33
Lifetime MDD 37/16
Features A, A+B, A+C, A+B+C
TABLE D.7: Classifier #7 details.
Classifier RBF SVM Accuracy 71% (71%)
Inner-loop CV Stratified k-fold Healthy controls 79/33
Lifetime MDD 38/15
Features A, A+B, A+C, A+B+C
TABLE D.8: Classifier #8 details.
Classifier RBF SVM Accuracy 66% (63%)
Inner-loop CV Undersampled k-fold Healthy controls 81/31
Lifetime MDD 28/25
Features A, A+site, A+B, A+B+site, A+B+C, A+B+C+site
TABLE D.9: Classifier #9 details.
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Classifier RBF SVM Accuracy 64% (61%)
Inner-loop CV Stratified k-fold Healthy controls 76/36
Lifetime MDD 29/24
Features A, A+site, A+B, A+B+site, A+B+C, A+B+C+site
TABLE D.10: Classifier #10 details.
Classifier RBF SVM Accuracy 71% (71%)
Inner-loop CV Repeated k-fold Healthy controls 79/33
Lifetime MDD 38/15
Features A, A+B, A+var(A), A+B+var(A)+var(B)
TABLE D.11: Classifier #11 details.
Classifier RBF SVM Accuracy 71% (71%)
Inner-loop CV Stratified k-fold Healthy controls 79/33
Lifetime MDD 38/15
Features A, A+B, A+var(A), A+B+var(A)+var(B)
TABLE D.12: Classifier #12 details.
Classifier Logistic Regression Accuracy 62% (62%)
Inner-loop CV Undersampled k-fold Healthy controls 69/43
Lifetime MDD 33/20
Features A, A+B, A+C, A+B+C
TABLE D.13: Classifier #13 details.
Classifier Logistic Regression Accuracy 63% (63%)
Inner-loop CV Stratified k-fold Healthy controls 70/42
Lifetime MDD 34/19
Features A, A+B, A+C, A+B+C
TABLE D.14: Classifier #14 details.
Classifier Logistic Regression Accuracy 63% (60%)
Inner-loop CV Undersampled k-fold Healthy controls 77/35
Lifetime MDD 27/26
Features A, A+site, A+B, A+B+site, A+B+C, A+B+C+site
TABLE D.15: Classifier #15 details.
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Classifier Logistic Regression Accuracy 65% (63%)
Inner-loop CV Stratified k-fold Healthy controls 78/34
Lifetime MDD 30/23
Features A, A+site, A+B, A+B+site, A+B+C, A+B+C+site
TABLE D.16: Classifier #16 details.
Classifier Logistic Regression Accuracy 62% (62%)
Inner-loop CV Undersampled k-fold Healthy controls 70/42
Lifetime MDD 33/20
Features A, A+B, A+var(A), A+B+var(A)+var(B)
TABLE D.17: Classifier #17 details.
Classifier Logistic Regression Accuracy 63% (63%)
Inner-loop CV Stratified k-fold Healthy controls 70/42
Lifetime MDD 34/19
Features A, A+B, A+var(A), A+B+var(A)+var(B)
TABLE D.18: Classifier #18 details.
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